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Labour commission to
Ireland

Report of the
Labour commission to
Ireland

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REPORT

— of —

THE LABOUR COMMISSION TO IRELAND

PRICE 2/-
(POST FREE 2/3)

LONDON :
Printed by the CALEDONIAN PRESS LTD. (T.U.), 74 Swinton Street,
Gray's Inn Road, W.C. 1

1921

REPORT

THE ENGINEERING

CONVENTION

REPORT

of

THE LABOUR COMMISSION TO IRELAND

THE LABOUR PARTY

33 Eccleston Square, London, S.W. 1

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ARTHUR GREENWOOD,

Secretary of the Commission.

ATTACHED TO THE COMMISSION

TOM JOHNSON, Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress.

E. ROONEY, Stenographer.

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REPORT OF THE LABOUR COMMISSION TO IRELAND

PART I INTRODUCTION

THE situation in Ireland to-day is nothing short of a tragedy, whether from the point of view of the Irish people or from the standpoint of British honour and prestige. British labour is vitally interested in the Irish situation from two points of view. It is concerned with the problem of Irish Government and the bestowal upon the people of Ireland of the freedom which they passionately desire. It is concerned also with the degradation which the British people are now suffering in consequence of the policy of repression and coercion which has been carried out in its name. On the general problem of the settlement of the political problem in Ireland, the Labour Party has declared its policy. The manifesto embodying this policy is reprinted as an appendix to this Report. Labour representatives in the House of Commons have protested against the policy of physical force applied to Ireland, as the Labour Party regards recourse to methods of violence as a confession of bankruptcy of statesmanship and the desperate expedient of men lost to all sense of humanity.

On October 25 Mr. Arthur Henderson moved in the House of Commons :

That this house regrets the present state of lawlessness in Ireland and the lack of discipline in the armed forces of the Crown, resulting in the death or injury of innocent citizens and the destruction of property ; and is of opinion that an independent investigation should at once be instituted into the causes, nature, and extent of reprisals on the part of those whose duty is the maintenance of law and order.

This proposed vote of censure condemned the action of the British Government and its agents in Ireland, and asked for an independent inquiry. The request for an inquiry was refused. The situation in Ireland did not improve. Indeed, it grew worse, and the Labour Party, therefore, decided to set up a Commission under its own auspices to inquire into the whole question of "reprisals" and violence in Ireland.

The Personnel of the Commission

The Parliamentary Labour Party appointed three of its members, the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P., Mr. J. Lawson, M.P., and Mr. W. Lunn, M.P., to serve on the Commission, whilst the Executive Committee of the Labour Party appointed its chairman (Mr. A. G. Cameron), its vice-chairman (Mr. F. W. Jowett), and Mr. J. Bromley to represent the Executive of the party. At the first meeting of the Commission Mr. Henderson was unanimously elected as chairman. In view of the importance of the delegation's work, and the opportunities which it was thought might arise to assist the establishment of peace in Ireland, the Right Hon. W. Adamson, M.P., joined the Commission. Brigadier-General C. B. Thomson became military adviser, and Captain C. W. Kendall, legal

adviser. Mr. W. W. Henderson accompanied the Commission as press secretary, and Mr. Arthur Greenwood was appointed secretary of the Commission. Mr. Tom Johnson, secretary of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, was attached to the Commission, and the services of Mr. E. Rooney as stenographer were placed at the disposal of the Commission by the Irish Transport Workers' Union.

Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, gave every possible assistance to the Commission. As a result of his instructions we were supplied with permits to enable us to travel by motor anywhere we wished to go and at any hour. We were everywhere received with the utmost courtesy by responsible officials, both civil and military. We wish, therefore, to place on record our sense of obligation to the Chief Secretary, to the officials of Dublin Castle, and to the responsible military and police officers with whom we came into contact. We do so the more earnestly because the main burden of our report is a denunciation of the Government's policy.

The Diary of the Commission

The Commission left for Dublin on Tuesday, November 30. That evening it met the Secretary of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress. On the following day a long discussion took place between representatives of the Irish Labour Party and the Commission on Labour policy regarding Ireland, the possibilities of securing a suspension of acts of violence, and the detailed work of the Commission. Both the Commission and the Irish Labour representatives were in perfect accord, and the latter proffered every possible help to the delegates. They placed at our disposal the services of Mr. Tom Johnson, whose assistance was invaluable. During the time we were in Ireland, Mr. Johnson acted as a liaison officer between the Commission and Irish Labour, both in Dublin and elsewhere. The attitude of the Irish Labour movement towards the promotion of peace in Ireland is dealt with later in this report, and need not therefore be referred to here.

The Commission made Dublin its headquarters for several days. During this time, evidence was taken at the Shelbourne Hotel, and visits were paid to Balbriggan, Skerries, Croke Park, and other places in Dublin itself. At Balbriggan—the scene of a “reprisal” on a large scale—the delegates visited the hosiery factory which was destroyed by fire, and the many houses and other premises which were burnt in the attack upon the town on September 20. The evidence of eye-witnesses was taken in the Town Hall.

At Skerries, witnesses were examined with regard to the shooting of individuals there. At Croke Park, the Commission reconstructed the scene of Sunday, November 21, and took evidence on the spot. In Dublin visits were paid to the Painters' Trade Union Club and the Women's Trade Union Club, both of which premises had been raided, and some of our members investigated incidents which had occurred in private houses.

In the meantime, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Adamson interviewed Mr. Arthur Griffith in Mountjoy Prison, and visited the Archbishop of Dublin. Mr. Henderson also travelled to Armagh and interviewed Cardinal Logue.

On Saturday, December 4, the Commission visited Dublin Castle and had an interview with the Chief Secretary for Ireland. The chief military, police, and civil officers of Dublin Castle were present at the interview.

On Sunday, December 5, Mr. Adamson returned to Scotland to fulfil an important engagement in Fifeshire, and on the following morning Mr. Henderson left for London. Mr. A. G. Cameron acted as chairman of the Commission during the remainder of his stay in Ireland.

The evening prior to the departure of Mr. Henderson, the Commission met members of the Executive of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress for the purpose of reviewing the Irish situation from the point of view of the establishment of peace.

On Monday morning, December 6, the Commission travelled by train to Cork. We met the Lord Mayor, the senior Sinn Fein member for the city, and several members of the City Council. The Lord Mayor kindly placed a room in the City Hall (since totally destroyed by fire) at our disposal, and offered to supply the Commission with all the information collected by the City Council concerning incidents in Cork.

We investigated several unfortunate occurrences which took place during our stay in the city, and a large number of witnesses were examined with regard to "reprisals" carried out during the past few months. We paid visits to buildings which had been burnt, and to houses and shops where furniture, fittings, and other property had been destroyed. Members of the Commission travelled by motor car from Cork to Bandon to see the hosiery works and other property which had suffered destruction, and to take the evidence of witnesses.

On Wednesday, December 8, we left Cork for Killarney. Owing to the suspension of the passenger service on the railways, we travelled by motor car through the south-west of Ireland. On Thursday we reached Tralee, which place provided us with abundant evidence of "reprisals" and terrorism. On the way to Tralee we investigated the circumstances of the burning of the co-operative creamery at Ballymacelligott and the so-called "Battle of Tralee" which is said to have taken place there. From Tralee members of the Commission motored out to see the Abbeydorney Co-operative Creamery and take evidence concerning its partial destruction by fire, whilst other members journeyed to Ardfer to investigate the shooting of a girl there. In this case, however, the Commission was not able to obtain sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the girl was shot by a member of the Crown forces.

The following morning, Friday, December 10, we set out for Limerick, passing through Listowel, where we observed the shop signs from which Irish names had been obliterated by order of members of the Crown forces. On the way we called at Foynes, where a co-operative society's store and a working men's club had been burnt down, and at Shanagolden, where the co-operative creamery had also been destroyed by fire and damage done to other buildings, and where an old man had been shot.

Arriving at Limerick we proceeded to take evidence, and on the following morning (Saturday) certain members of the Commission met the Mayor and members of the town council at the Town Hall, where further evidence was taken. Other members of the Commission travelled to Hospital and Tipperary, at both of which places evidence was taken.

The two sections of the Commission reassembled later in the day at Limerick Junction and entrained for Dublin. On our return there we completed our investigation into the Croke Park case, and took evidence in other cases. Members of the Commission visited Dublin Castle and interviewed officials there.

On Sunday, December 12, we received news of the burning of many buildings in Cork, and at the request of the Commission, two members visited the city on the following day.

On Tuesday, December 14, Messrs. Cameron, Jowett, and Bromley left for London to attend the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, the remainder of the Commission leaving Dublin the following day.

It will be seen that our inquiries were confined to Dublin and neighbourhood and to the south-west of Ireland, which is the most disturbed area of the country. We were unable, without prolonging the inquiry, to visit districts in which incidents have taken place that merit close

investigation. We believe, however, that the evidence we have been able to obtain is more than sufficient to justify the strongest condemnation of the policy of the British Government.

The work of the Commission falls into two parts—the inquiry into “reprisals” and the efforts which were made towards a cessation of acts of violence as a necessary preliminary to negotiations for a permanent settlement of the problem of Irish government. The first part of the report is concerned with “reprisals,” and the second section to the larger problem of peace. Before embarking upon a discussion of “reprisals,” however, we feel it to be necessary to explain the method of inquiry which we pursued.

Method of Inquiry

Before our departure to Ireland we had received numerous letters calling attention to “reprisals” which were alleged to have taken place. We had, of course, in our minds the various occurrences in Ireland which had been the subject of questions or debates in Parliament. During the whole of our stay in Ireland cases for inquiry were constantly being brought to our notice. By every post there came suggestions or appeals for investigation into “reprisals” of which the writers had knowledge. Telephone messages and telegrams called attention to acts of violence committed in various places in Ireland by the armed forces of the Crown. Personal callers came to bring “reprisals” to our notice.

It was obvious from the commencement of our investigation that to attempt to inquire into all the allegations of “reprisals” which in one way or another were forced upon our attention was to attempt the impossible. Some method of selection of cases for investigation was essential. We therefore decided to examine various types of cases. We could, of course, have done this within easy reach of Dublin; but we were unanimous in the view that our inquiry would not be complete unless we visited the more disturbed areas in Ireland. Our representative cases are drawn, therefore, from Dublin and from the south-west of Ireland, though we have received sworn statements relating to “reprisals” in other parts of the country.

The cases dealt with in this report fall into two groups—“outrages” committed upon the police and other armed servants of the Crown and upon those associated with the Crown forces, and “reprisals” committed by the Crown forces. The latter fall under six main heads:—

- (1) General terrorism and provocative behaviour.
- (2) Arson.
- (3) The wilful destruction of property, otherwise than by fire.
- (4) Looting.
- (5) Cruelty to persons.
- (6) Shooting.

Often enough the various types of violence are to be found combined in the same occurrences.

It was made clear to us at the outset that we could not accumulate evidence merely by relying upon witnesses coming forward voluntarily. We may say, however, that at every place at which we stayed people did present themselves to give evidence. It was, of course, necessary to visit many places to make observations on the spot and to take evidence from witnesses on the scene of the occurrences. But, in addition, we had on many occasions to go to the homes of people who could of their own knowledge assist us in our investigations.

In some cases we found it difficult or impossible to obtain sufficient reliable evidence, either through the absence of important witnesses, who were perhaps “on the run,” or through the fear of possible consequences if

facts were disclosed. The atmosphere of terrorism which prevails in many parts of Ireland renders it extremely difficult to gather information. Those who were eyewitnesses of incidents deserving of inquiry have been threatened with violence, and even death, if they disclose what they saw. We have information of one case where a firm of solicitors declined to swear an affidavit through fear of the consequences which might ensue.

The number of places to be visited and witnesses to be examined led us at times to divide the Commission into groups. This had distinct advantage when it was necessary to visit private houses and small shops, and it also enabled more cases to be examined than would otherwise have been possible.

We should have been glad to receive the fullest possible evidence from official sources. Whilst responsible officers, civil and military, have been willing to discuss with members of the Commission cases investigated by us, we were not supplied with copies of the official reports bearing on such cases. These documents are confidential, and we were informed that in consequence we could not be provided with copies of them. The Chief Secretary offered to arrange for the police or military concerned in cases we wished to examine to appear before us, but as in very many cases the men concerned have been removed to other parts of the country since the occurrences on which we desired their statements took place, we were not able to take evidence from them.

PART II

THE REIGN OF VIOLENCE

The Armed Forces in Ireland

There is a state of war in Ireland, and what are called "outrages" and "reprisals" are but incidents in a bitter campaign. On the one hand, there are the armed forces of the Crown; on the other, the Irish Republican Army. It will be well before describing the "reprisals" we have investigated to provide a background by explaining the composition, character, and temper of the opposing forces in Ireland. Only in this way is it possible to bring individual incidents into relation with the general situation.

The Government forces in Ireland consist of :—

- (a) The Military Garrison.
- (b) The Royal Irish Constabulary.
- (c) The Auxiliary Division.

In regard to (a), some fifty thousand soldiers are at present quartered in Ireland; they are in the main young and inexperienced, few of them have had the training given to a recruit in pre-war days before joining a service unit. The majority of the junior officers are equally ignorant of their professional duties; many in Infantry Battalions have not passed through the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. Under the conditions existing in Ireland up to and during the visit of the Commission, these lads were continually being called upon to support the police against the civil population, a task which has always been distasteful to regular soldiers and should be confided only to highly disciplined troops. As a result, training has been neglected, discipline has become lax, many youths at the most receptive period of their lives have been brutalised and demoralised, and all this has been done at enormous cost to the tax-payer.

On the whole, few charges have been laid against the military forces in Ireland. We have in many places observed with pleasure soldiers walking about, unarmed, and apparently on good terms with the people. The military, so far as we can gather, resent being incriminated with the "Black and Tans" and Auxiliary cadets in reprisals. Indeed, we have sufficient information to warrant us in saying that the relations between the military and the police are not of the best and that in certain places the feud might result in open hostility.

Until the proclamation of martial law, the military forces of the Crown had a purely passive rôle in Ireland. They were widely scattered and undertook no independent action; they formed a sort of second line to the R.I.C. and the Auxiliary Division. Under martial law, the military authorities should, in theory, assume supreme command, and the rôles of the soldiers and police would be reversed. Although this would be a marked improvement on the existing state of affairs, since some order and coherence would be imparted to the activities of the forces of the Crown, unless martial law is applied to the whole of Ireland (and this it is estimated would require two hundred thousand troops) it will cause deep resentment in the areas singled out for special treatment and do more harm than good. Undoubtedly, martial law, applied without distinction or discrimination, offers the most humane method of coercion. The cost of this policy, however, must be reckoned not only in terms of money but by the effect produced on the

British Army as a whole. If a force, exceeding in size the expeditionary force sent to France in 1914, is to be employed for purposes of repression, it can only be raised by taking all the men from the garrison towns in England and Scotland and exposing them to the demoralising influences inseparable from civil war.

Under heading (b) are included the so-called "Black and Tans." Originally, the R.I.C. was recruited from men of Irish birth, but during the recent troubles resignations from the Irish Constabulary were so numerous that it became necessary to enrol Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Welshmen to keep the force up to strength. Most of these new recruits were ex-soldiers and, at first, retained their khaki while wearing constabulary caps and belts, which are of so dark a green as to appear almost black. Hence the expression "Black and Tans," a name whose point and humour have made it a catchword, although the khaki uniforms have now nearly disappeared.

Whilst we wish to avoid making any general accusation against a body of men with so distinguished a record as the R.I.C., we feel compelled to express the opinion, based on our personal observations, that a by no means negligible proportion of the force, as at present constituted, consists of men of intemperate habits who are utterly unsuited to their duties. It may be that not more than one per cent. of the R.I.C. are men of really bad character. Nevertheless, this small fraction has discredited the whole force as an instrument of policy by making it an object of general dread and detestation. Evidence in support of this statement was found in every district visited, though in some a distinction was made between members of the old Constabulary and the "Black and Tans."

The Auxiliary Division of the R.I.C. is recruited almost exclusively from ex-officers. Perhaps for this reason a licence is permitted among the "cadets" (the rank and file of the division) which makes their conduct depend more on the personality of local commanders than on instructions from headquarters. In Tralee, the Auxiliaries enjoyed a reputation for good behaviour and moderation among the inhabitants, but in other districts which we visited they inspired terror as the authors of reprisals whose brutality and destructive effects were only equalled by the skill and forethought with which they had been planned.

In the Auxiliary Division the men who matter are those possessed of ability and education, who are inflamed by political passion and who, so far as could be seen during the visit of the Commission, were being given a free hand in the south and west of Ireland. Wherever reprisals have been scientifically carried out so as to cause the maximum economic and industrial loss to an Irish countryside or city, they have almost invariably been the work of detachments of cadets. Several cases investigated by the Commission revealed the fact that these detachments had worked independently of, and brooked no interference from, the other forces of the Crown. In view of their recent conduct, after the issue of orders forbidding all reprisals, they do not seem to recognise even the authority of Dublin Castle, and the question suggests itself—under whom then do they serve? Some obvious deductions can be made from much that is uncertain and confused. This division is essentially undemocratic in its composition. It is a class weapon which is being forged in Ireland and could be used in England. Further, the method of its employment at the present juncture gives colour to the suspicion that it is the instrument of those reactionary forces which dictate the Irish policy of the British Government. Hitherto, reprisals by Auxiliaries have been hushed up as far as possible, and efforts have been made to impute the blame for their misdeeds to innocent civilians. Evidently this force enjoys special and powerful protection. Now that martial law has been proclaimed in certain parts of Ireland, it will be interesting to see how far the detachments of cadets in those regions will come under military control.

The Irish Republican Army

The forces of the Crown in Ireland are opposed by the Republican Volunteers. To speak of the forces of Sinn Fein as an army is misleading. The Irish Republican Army may consist of 216 battalions, whose strengths vary from 100 to 1,000 men, but it is an army only in name. This remark implies no disrespect for the I.R.A., which, in point of fact, is a far more formidable organisation than any army raised from a population of at most three million could ever be. The I.R.A. is formidable because it is intangible; if it functioned as an army it would have to concentrate to fight, and then it could be defeated without difficulty. But, in its present form, it lives and fights dispersed; it is everywhere all the time and nowhere at any given moment. Without the sympathy and support of the vast majority of the population it could not exist. This support is probably more general and effective to-day than it has been at any previous period. Irish Volunteers are fed and harboured by people who, three years ago, were certainly not Sinn Feiners, and some of whom were Unionists. So great has been the provocation by the forces of the Crown that eighty per cent. of Irish men and women now regard the shooting of policemen and throwing bombs at lorries with the same philosophic resignation that Mr. Lloyd George displays towards arson, pillage, and the shooting of civilians at sight in the presence of their wives and children. Under such conditions it is practically impossible to bring the Irish Republican Army to bay. It might be driven under ground by the use of overwhelming military force, but it will spring up again when that force has been withdrawn. Executions and torture are not deterrents; they have, indeed, the opposite effect. It is reported on good authority that the day Kevin Barry was hanged several hundred young men in Dublin enrolled themselves as Volunteers. The destruction of creameries and manufactories only serves to stimulate recruiting by increasing the number of desperate men. The policy of reprisals by destruction, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, will ruin Ireland outside Ulster, but will not defeat the Volunteers.

Attacks upon Members of the Crown Forces

Members of the Royal Irish Constabulary have been shot, both on and off duty. These cases are regarded by Sinn Feiners (whether they approve of them or not) as "reprisals" rather than "outrages." They were, it is said, the outcome of the British Government's policy of coercion and repression manifested in the imprisonment of people without trial, the prohibition of public meetings, and similar acts. The shooting of members of the Constabulary and the subsequent resignations which took place were largely responsible for the "dilution" of the old R.I.C. by new comers of a less desirable type, and for the enrolment of the Auxiliary Division of the R.I.C.; though, on the other hand, it is clear that the resort by a section of the Sinn Fein movement to a policy of physical force was itself but the outcome of a coercive policy on the part of the British Government.

Since the introduction into Ireland of reinforcements of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the embodiment of the Auxiliary Division, attacks by members of the Irish Republican Army upon the forces of the Crown have increased in number, whilst the scale of operations has been enlarged. There have been several ambushes in which many members of the Crown forces have been killed or wounded. These incidents have been fully reported in the British press. But regrettable as these operations are, they appear to us less reprehensible than the murder of British officers and civilians in their beds on "bloody Sunday," November 21. Sinn Feiners have, as we shall show presently, been shot in cold blood; but "two wrongs do not make a

right" and, by whomsoever it is carried out and whoever is the victim, the murder of individuals, unable to defend themselves, is murder, whether committed by members of the British Crown forces or by Irish Volunteers.

Victimisation of People Associated with the R.I.C.

The Commission has obtained statements relating to acts of victimisation committed upon persons related to, or associated with, members of the Royal Irish Constabulary. We have not had an opportunity of personally investigating any of these cases. Those to which our attention has been drawn are for the most part cases of what may be called petty victimisation, though they are undoubtedly calculated to embitter the R.I.C. There are a number of cases where women employed as R.I.C. barrack servants or women on friendly terms with the Constabulary have received threatening letters. In some cases women have had their hair cut off. There are instances also of the wives of families of members of the R.I.C. being turned out of their homes, which have been burnt. Some official police reports concerning cases of victimisation are printed in the Appendix.

So far as we have been able to ascertain, the terrorisation of persons in some way connected with the R.I.C. has not been carried out on a scale comparable with the terrorisation of the mass of the Irish people. Nevertheless the policy of victimisation is most regrettable and has tended to embitter the relations between the Constabulary and the Irish people.


"Reprisals"

We shall, in this Report, deal in some detail with a number of the recent tragic occurrences in Ireland. The Government has repeatedly condoned "reprisals," and the Chief Secretary has defended the action of the armed forces of the Crown. On numerous occasions in the House of Commons he has given a point blank denial to statements made by members of the House on the basis of information received from non-official Irish sources. He has made assertions, a few of which he has ultimately been driven, most grudgingly, to withdraw. The attitude of the Government, judged by its spokesmen, is that many of the unhappy events in Ireland of which the British public has heard during the past few months were either figments of the imagination or incidents in which the acts of the Crown forces were justifiable. The results of our investigations will show how much truth there is in this point of view.

(1) General Terrorism and Provocative Behaviour

In every part of Ireland that we visited we were impressed by the atmosphere of terrorism which prevailed. This is due to some extent to uncertainty; people are afraid that their houses might be burned; they fear that they might be arrested or even dragged from their beds and shot.

But terrorism is accentuated by other less direct methods. Lorries of armed men with their rifles "at the ready" are frequent sights in the towns and even in the country districts. We are aware that the Irish Secretary would have us believe that these "brave men" might be shot by "cowardly assassins" in the streets, but we cannot believe that for men to carry rifles "at the ready" is a means of protection against the possibility of being shot from a window or at a distance. This display of arms assists to spread the feeling of terror. The sight of "tin hats," drawn bayonets, and revolvers, and here and there of sandbags, or machine guns, or powerful searchlights, is calculated to terrorise the civilian population.



A STREET SCENE IN HOSPITAL

But the insolent and provocative conduct of certain sections of the Crown forces is even more likely to inspire fear or to incite "reprisals." In at least one town to our own knowledge, the R.I.C. often carry "Black and Tan" flags on their motor lorries, glorying in the title which has spread fear throughout the land. Sometimes, below it will be found a small Sinn Fein flag, or the flag of the Irish Republic will be trailed at the tail of the lorry in the dust or mire of the road. We would submit that no disciplined force would so deliberately encourage bitterness of spirit or inflame feelings of retaliation in this way.

We have witnessed with feelings of shame the insolent swagger of individual "Black and Tans" in the streets of Irish towns. We have heard raucous voices, to the accompaniment of the rumble of a police lorry, bawling the R.I.C. song :—

"We are the boys of the R.I.C.,
We are as happy as happy can be."

Incidents such as these may not seem to be important, but who can doubt that in Ireland to-day they intensify the hatred of the British Government and its ways?

It is unfortunate also that the civilian population should witness—as many have done—members of the Crown forces under the influence of drink. A member of the Commission stated to his colleagues that he had seen in the street an Auxiliary cadet, revolver in hand, distinctly the worse for liquor.

At a railway station, the members of the Commission saw a number of "Black and Tans" (they wore the R.I.C. uniform and were certainly not, to judge by their general appearance and accent, members of the R.I.C.) invade the refreshment room. We use the word "invade" advisedly. Their behaviour was unmannerly, to say the very least. They shouted out the R.I.C. song and, in general, made the room intolerable for travellers who were inside when the "Black and Tans" appeared. Some of the uniformed men were the worse for drink, and one "Black and Tan" hurried along the platform of the station using his rifle, presumably loaded, as a walking stick. Again it may be said that these incidents are but small affairs. But such conduct must arouse feelings of resentment or fear, or both, amongst the civilian population.

In some places, members of the Crown forces have compelled shopkeepers to obliterate the Irish signs over their doors and windows. This we know has happened at Killarney, Tralee, and Listowel. Such petty tyranny creates ill-feeling.

One species of terrorism to which reference must be made is the publication in the newspapers, or by means of typewritten circulars, of notices threatening punishment to the general public if certain things are done or not done. These notices are not signed by any responsible officer, but bear a signature such as "Black and Tan," "Death or Liberty League." Notices of this kind have been sent to the owners at the point of the revolver. Some of these notices are given in the Appendix.

Perhaps the most potent method of terrorism is that which is frequently adopted during raids and disturbances, namely, that there must be conducted quickly as the representatives of the Crown or military taking part in them are exposed to consideration. This explanation does not seem to us to excuse the firing of shot, the breaking of windows, the flinging of papers about the rooms and the furniture, and the reckless destruction of household or office effects. It does it excuse the attitude only too often adopted towards the people, a summary "put 'em up" is, until it becomes a habit, a piece of sense, an unpleasant ordeal, but on night raid, the word "put 'em up" is more trying.



ACHONRY CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY BURNED ON OCTOBER 1

As an illustration we may quote the case of a local trade union official. We do not for one moment believe that the Government can prove anything against him—unless to be a trade union official is a crime—and we are convinced of his veracity. Some months ago he was arrested and imprisoned for five days without any reason being assigned. More recently, he was visited by armed men after he had retired to bed. His wife and children were told to leave the bedroom. The man, whose only garment was his shirt, was told to put up his hands and, with the muzzle of a rifle barrel placed to his bare chest, he was interrogated for a space of twenty-five minutes on matters of which he had no knowledge. These are the methods of the Inquisition. Intimidation of this kind but terrifies or embitters innocent citizens and particularly women and children who have in some cases witnessed it.

After Curfew in Dublin we heard on several nights the firing of shots. As civilians out after ten p.m. run the risk of being shot at sight, and as the police and military utilise the Curfew hours for raiding purposes, it is a fair assumption that shots during the night are generally fired by them. We have been told that often this firing is not intended for purposes of destruction, in which case we can only conclude that its purpose is terrorism.

We have no desire to overstate the facts; but the atmosphere of terrorism which has been created and the provocative behaviour of armed servants of the Crown, quite apart from specific “reprisals,” are sufficient in themselves to arouse in our hearts feelings of the deepest horror and shame.

(2) The Burning of Property

A large number of buildings in Ireland have been destroyed by fire, but the Government has admitted only a very few cases of arson committed by members of the Crown forces. Generally, as, for example, in the recent great fire at Cork, the Chief Secretary denies the existence of evidence showing that the fires were caused by forces which theoretically are under his control. There is, however, ample evidence in our judgment to show that buildings have been deliberately burnt and in many cases utterly destroyed by servants of the Crown. The premises which have been destroyed include creameries, factories, and other large business premises, as well as shops, private houses, and farms.

We give in the Appendix to the Report a statement showing particulars of forty-two attacks made upon co-operative concerns, mainly creameries. In the large majority of cases the buildings were wholly or partially destroyed by fire. With the economic aspect of this destruction we shall deal later in this Report. For the moment we are concerned more especially with the question of the responsibility for these “reprisals.”

(a) Tubbercurry and Achonry Creameries

The Chief Secretary for Ireland declared in the House of Commons on October 20 that he had “never seen a tittle of evidence to prove that the servants of the Crown have destroyed these creameries.” Over a month later, however (on November 25), he admitted that in the case of the Tubbercurry and Achonry creameries “the burning was committed by members of the police force on October 1, in an outburst of passion evoked by the brutal murder of District Inspector Brady and the wounding of another of their comrades on the evening of the previous day.”

In the cases of Tubbercurry and Achonry, we do not know of the existence of any proof that members of the two societies were concerned in the death of District Inspector Brady. It is, however, clear from the Chief Secretary’s

SEE NOTICE AT BACK.		POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS.		No. of Telegram <u>84</u>	
Office of Origin and Service Instructions.		Inland Telegrams		For Postage Stamps.	
CK Code 04288 3/16		Words.	Sent	To be affixed by the Sender. Any Stamp for which there is not room here should be affixed at the back of this form. 12 words, including the words in the address, 9d. Every additional word 1d. A Reply for the Charges on this Telegram can be obtained for One Penny.	
TO { Head Constable Constabulary Ballymote Inform all available Authority Force to proceed at once to Ballymote where a Sergeant has been shot.		At	By	SLIGO 4-288 24 Charge	
FROM { D.D. Sigs.		The Name and Address of the Sender, if NOT TO BE TELEGRAPHED, must be written in the Space provided at the Back of the Form. (G.S.) 11/29/19. Wt. 36c/Dist. 20 mil. 5/19. P.H. (483).			

This telegram is referred to on page 15 in connection with the burning of the Ballymote Creamery on the evening of the date of this telegram.

statement that the destruction of the two creameries was a "reprisal"; and that, either with or without authority, members of the R.I.C. took vengeance upon the farmers of the district.

(b) Ballymote Creamery

We reproduce in this volume a copy of a telegram, dated November 3, from the District Inspector of the R.I.C. at Sligo, instructing the Head Constable of Ballaghadreen to "inform all available Auxiliary force to proceed at once to Ballymote, where a sergeant has been shot." There appears to us to be no reason why Auxiliaries should be sent to a place where a police sergeant had been shot, unless for purposes of revenge. On November 3, the Ballymote co-operative creamery, belonging to a society with 980 members, was destroyed by fire. We have not personally investigated this case, but we cannot refrain from remarking upon the coincidence of the date of the telegram with the date of the burning of Ballymote creamery.

(c) Abbeydorney Creamery

The circumstances of the partial destruction by fire of the Abbeydorney creamery were the subject of investigation by the Commission. There can, in our opinion, be no doubt that the buildings were fired by uniformed men, who used petrol for the purpose of setting the creamery buildings alight more speedily and effectively. The store, which contained a good deal of inflammable material, was completely gutted. The manager was ill-used. After the departure of the incendiaries, 300 lbs. of butter and two 80 lb. cheeses had disappeared.

About a fortnight after the attack on the creamery at Abbeydorney, two policemen were fatally shot. Later in the day a body of R.I.C. men inflicted damage to property in the town. Since then the houses of the manager and the foreman employed at the creamery have been burnt.

(d) Shanagolden Creamery

The Commission visited the village of Shanagolden. On August 24 an attempt was made to fire the co-operative creamery there. We were not able to ascertain the reason for this first attack on the building. We were told that the attempt to burn the creamery was made by "Black and Tans" from the neighbouring village of Foynes. The cheese shed was actually set alight, but the flames were extinguished. Next day the local Volunteers arrested a "Black and Tan" and a policeman in connection with the occurrence of the previous evening and marched them up and down the village street without their boots.

As a "reprisal," it is assumed, two lorries of "Black and Tans" arrived at the village in the evening. They shot dead an old man of seventy-five years. At the inquest a verdict of wilful murder against the police was returned. They burned a house, and attempted to burn a house and shop, but the occupier's wife succeeded in saving it.

"The "Black and Tans" were seen to sprinkle petrol inside the creamery. A five-gallon tin of petrol was left behind by the party. Immediately after they left the building there was a loud explosion and the creamery burst into flames. A cardboard box, bearing the name and official address of a sergeant of the R.I.C., was subsequently found in the shrubbery. It is assumed locally (though there is no proof) that the box had contained explosives.

The county court judge awarded £12,000 damages. Cheese to the value of £4,000, which had been made for export to Great Britain, was destroyed. Prior to its destruction the creamery had been receiving from two hundred farmers in the district about 6,500 gallons of milk per day.



A VIEW OF THE HOSIERY WORKS AT BALBRIGGAN BURNED BY CROWN FORCES ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1920

On the night following the burning of the creamery, four young men of the village were arrested by "Black and Tans" and roughly handled. One of them was stripped naked, and, it is said (though we have no direct evidence), left five miles away from the village. On the same evening an attempt was made to burn the local library.

The destruction of buildings in a district other than creameries at the time the latter are destroyed, and other acts of violence are not confined to Shanagolden. At Ballymacelligott men were shot, and houses and other buildings and hay ricks set on fire, as well as the creamery. A more detailed account of the incidents at Ballymacelligott is given in a later section of this Report.

(e) Balbriggan Hosiery Works

Creameries are by no means the only business premises which have been fired by members of the Crown forces. The Government has admitted that the fires at Balbriggan were caused by servants of the Crown. There are two hosiery works at Balbriggan. On the night of September 20 one of them (belonging to an entirely English company) was destroyed by fire. The company employed 109 people in the factory and at least 120 out-workers. The other hosiery works would probably have met a similar fate had not the R.I.C. been dissuaded by a local resident.

(f) Bandon Hosiery Works

Whilst we were in Cork some members of the Commission visited Bandon and there saw, amongst other things, the remains of the factory of the Bandon Hosiery Company, whose premises were burnt down on October 24. Two nights previous an attempt was made to fire the factory, but only slight damage was done. The company employs about seventy persons. The factory and stock were completely destroyed at the second attempt, and the damage caused was estimated at £50,000. At the military inquiry fourteen witnesses deposed that the fire was the work of the military and it is understood that the authorities admit this to be the case. The Balbriggan factory was destroyed, with other property in the town, as a "reprisal" for the death of a police officer; but we have not been able to discover any similar motive for the attack on the Bandon works, though it is suggested as a possible explanation that some of the employees were Sinn Feiners.

(g) Printing Works at Tralee

Members of the Commission saw the ruins of a printing works in Tralee. The damage done by the Crown forces is estimated at over £50,000. At the works two newspapers were printed and thirty persons were employed. The destruction of the premises is ascribed, though there is of course no positive proof of this, to the fact that the editor of one of the papers had criticised the action of the authorities.

(h) Destruction of Shops

The examples given above—all of them the subject of inquiry by the Commission—will give some indication of the damage done to industrial concerns. Large business premises of other kinds and shops have been burnt down in many places. We need do no more than refer at this stage to the wholesale destruction by fire of the premises of many important business firms in the centre of Cork on the night of December 12. Before this disaster occurred we had visited other shops in Cork which had suffered a similar fate. We refer to incendiarism in the city of Cork later in the Report.



PHOTOGRAPH OF A SHOP IN CORK DESTROYED BY FIRE

At Bandon inquiry was made into the burning of a large haberdashery, stationery, and boot stores. Men in uniform were seen to throw petrol on the shop windows and doors, and bombs through the windows. These exploded and flames broke out. The upper part of the building was used as a dwelling and several people were in bed when the fire occurred. They succeeded in escaping, the girls clad only in their nightdresses. The house and shop were entirely destroyed.

(i) Destruction of Farms and Private Houses

Other cases of arson in which shops and stores suffered serious damage or entire destruction could be given. But our purpose is to give examples which we investigated. The Commission made inquiries into the burning of a farm, the tenant of which was an aged and bed-ridden woman of seventy-five years. Members of the Commission found the house and farm buildings in ruins, with the exception of a small fowl-house. This shelter, without windows and lighted only when the door is open, was occupied by the two daughters of the old lady, and a boy of about eight years, their nephew. They are living now under deplorable conditions. The tenant of the farm has been removed to the workhouse. Two policemen and a number of men in civilian dress came to the farm and asked for a son of the tenant. He was not at home. The occupants of the house were told to "clear out." The old lady, who was ill, was taken outside, and the two sisters, partly dressed and without boots, together with the small boy in his nightshirt, left the house. The men poured petrol on the beds and furniture, on the outhouses and pigsty, and even on the pigs and poultry. The buildings were burnt to the ground, and about forty fowls were burnt to death, but the pigs were rescued. The family spent the night in the fields. On the morning after the fire, two full tins of petrol and some empty tins were found in the farmyard.

In Balbriggan many small cottages have been destroyed by the Crown forces. Many citizens of Cork have suffered the loss of their homes. The countryside has not escaped, for in our inquiries we came across hamlets where cottages here and there had been burnt, usually by the "Black and Tans" or other Crown forces as part of a night's programme. In how many small country towns there are to be seen the charred remains of homes we cannot say, but it is beyond doubt that arson has been committed on a large scale. We publish a photograph of a one-story corrugated iron building used as a store and a dwelling for the sister of the proprietor. An unsuccessful attempt was made to burn it, but later the same day a party of police and military returned and destroyed the building by fire and looted the premises.

Burning is not confined to business premises, shops, farms, and private houses. Public and quasi-public buildings have also suffered. It would appear that places where people gather together are special objects of destruction, as we have already seen in the case of creameries. The effect of destroying public buildings is clearly to render almost impracticable the administration of public affairs, and to impose serious obstacles to the fulfilment by local bodies of their public responsibilities.

Before the final destruction of the Cork City Hall, several attempts had been made to fire the municipal buildings which had suffered partial damage before it was razed to the ground.

(i) Tralee County Hall

The Tralee County Hall, together with a theatre attached to it, was burnt out during the early hours of the morning of November 1. The hall contained the County Council Offices, the Urban District Council Offices, and the offices of the Harbour Board. Uniformed men were responsible for the fire. An officer said to a person who had been roused out of bed by the fire, "Bad work in Kerry to-night. Three of the Crown forces have been killed,



A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING A DESTROYED FARM AND THE FOWL-SHED IN WHICH THE FAMILY IS NOW LIVING
(See page 19)

but Tralee will pay for it." During the fire there was shooting from the police barracks near by and the soldiers on the scene of the conflagration had to take cover. It is reported, though we have no direct evidence of the truth of the statement, that a military officer was wounded by shooting from the barracks. After the fire, the military assisted people to take back the furniture which had been removed from their houses in case the fire spread.

(k) Incendiarism as a Policy

In the foregoing statements regarding the destruction of property by fire, we have confined our attention to cases we investigated. In every instance, except those of the Achonry and Tubbercurry creameries, evidence was taken on the spot. We have received information of many cases into which we were not able to inquire. But we consider the material which we have collected to be sufficient for our purpose.

The forces of the Crown in Ireland have been guilty of arson. As we have pointed out, in a few instances the Government has admitted as much, and we have no doubt that, if the Chief Secretary were pressed to declare the facts in other cases, he would be driven, however reluctantly, to make similar admissions. Incendiarism is part of the policy of the "Black and Tans" and Auxiliaries. It is, we believe, one of their methods of terrorism and revenge.

In face of the admissions of the Government as to the origin of the fires at Balbriggan, Achonry, and Tubbercurry, the general public may well suspect the truth of the denials of the British Government as to the complicity of their servants in other cases, even if direct evidence were not available. Such evidence, however, there is, and the legitimate surmises of those who mistrust the Government's statements are proved to be well founded.

It has been represented to us, however, that the presence of uniformed men at a fire is no proof that Crown forces are responsible for the outbreak. It has been suggested that Sinn Feiners have obtained police and military uniforms, and that the fires might be the work of Republicans bent upon creating hatred of the British Government. We cannot believe that there is much substance in the argument. It is to be remembered that in many places the Curfew is in operation. During the hours when most of the burnings have taken place the police and military were in possession of the streets, and any fires which broke out must soon have become known to them, and they would have been able, had they chosen, to drive off the incendiaries. We have not received evidence of any street battles which might reasonably be expected to occur in these circumstances. Moreover, if it were true that arson were generally the work of Sinn Feiners, it is reasonable to suppose that the patrols of Crown forces in the streets at night would not have allowed the incendiaries to complete the work of destruction. They would, we believe, have taken all possible steps to subdue outbreaks of fire caused by men to whom they are opposed. In point of fact, however, there is overwhelming evidence to show that in the case of many fires, not only have the Crown forces taken no steps to suppress the outbreaks, but that, on the contrary, they have actually hampered those who desired to extinguish the fires. In an Appendix to this Report, dealing with occurrences in the city of Cork, we deal with the cutting of fire hose by persons who clearly did not desire that the fires should be subdued. We also received evidence from the responsible fire brigade officials in another town of the cutting of hose by men who, it would seem, were members of the Crown forces.

Many of the fires which have occurred both in town and country districts have been those of houses occupied by known Sinn Feiners. Sinn Fein halls have been destroyed by fire. Public buildings in places where there



A CORRUGATED IRON SHOP AND DWELLING LOOTED AND BURNT BY CROWN FORCES

is a Sinn Fein majority, or at least an anti-British majority, on the local authority have met the same fate. To suggest that such burnings are the result of deliberate Sinn Fein activity seems to us unreasonable and, indeed, stupid, more especially as in many of these cases people have been shot or ill-treated. We cannot conceive even the most extreme and violent Sinn Feiners operating a policy which would result in destroying property of value to their own supporters, and subjecting their friends to physical hurt.

As regards Cork, where there has been arson on a large scale, we understand that the Government take the view that the work might be that of a loosely organised body of people acting without authority. There is in Cork a body calling itself the Anti-Sinn Fein Society. We have no authentic information as to the composition of this intangible and nebulous organisation, but it is suggested that it is composed of discontents in the town, many of them ex-soldiers, and also of individual members of the R.I.C. and the Auxiliary Division. We do not know how far this is the case. But if the facts are as stated, the burning of the buildings by men, some of whom are servants of the Crown, argues the existence of an indiscipline for which the Government must be held responsible. This argument, we may observe, is inconsistent with the view that in Cork the fires are the work of Sinn Feiners.

Even if only a tithe of the fires which have admittedly occurred in many parts of Ireland during the past few months were caused by Government agents, the case against the forces of the Crown and the Government would, in our judgment, be amply proved.

(3) Destruction other than by Burning

Fires are not the only method of destruction employed by the British forces in Ireland. We have investigated cases in which valuables of all kinds, including furniture and other household effects and documents, have been wantonly destroyed. During our stay in Cork certain houses and shops were entered by Auxiliaries, and shop fittings, mirrors, furniture, pictures, ornaments, and crockery were smashed wantonly and thoroughly. Members of the Commission visited some of these places, and with their own eyes saw the havoc which had been wrought. We leave aside for the moment the looting which took place. Even if nothing had been taken away, the destruction in the shops and in the houses of people who had evidently taken great pride in their homes is in itself sufficient to merit the strongest possible condemnation. It is said that the excuse which is offered for this wicked destruction is that people in these premises jeered at the Auxiliaries who were engaged in holding up and searching people in the street. According to the Government, the reason was that the police had been fired on in the vicinity.

To our astonishment, we find that Mr. Denis Henry's reply to a question by Mr. T. P. O'Connor in the House of Commons on December 8 stated that "the allegations of looting and of wanton destruction of property in this case, and in the other cases referred to, are absolutely unfounded." We cannot doubt what we have seen with our own eyes, and we cannot do otherwise than assert emphatically that the reports on which Mr. Denis Henry based his answer are untrue.

During our stay in Dublin, members of the Commission visited the head office of the Irish National Painters' and Decorators' Union which was raided on November 24. The secretary was arrested and the office searched for correspondence. In making the search the military succeeded in wrecking many of the office fittings. The three rooms of the office had been left undisturbed since the date of the raid, and we were, therefore, able to see the disorder which prevailed. Books, papers, and correspondence were thrown in heaps about the floors of the three rooms; tables were overturned, pictures smashed, and cabinets pulled to pieces.



THE TRANSPORT WORKERS' HALL, CORK, AFTER DESTRUCTION BY FIRE

A register of members was torn up, as well as other papers and correspondence. Even if the necessity for searching for documents be admitted, it appears to us unreasonable and vindictive to act in the manner in which the military clearly did act at the Painters' and Decorators' office.

(4) Looting

It is within the knowledge of the British Government that there have been cases of looting. We understand that certain members of the Crown forces have been punished for this offence, but looting is carried on more extensively than the Government would be prepared to admit. Members of the Commission heard from an Auxiliary of cases where allegations of theft had been made against the Crown forces, and where subsequently the articles assumed to have been stolen had been found. No doubt there are cases of this kind. On the other hand, the evidence we have received goes to show that a considerable amount of looting has actually taken place. There are obviously opportunities for theft where raids are being made on premises. We took evidence from a witness who stated that over £800 worth of goods had been taken from his shop. Shortly before the raid on his premises, which, it may be pointed out, was undertaken with a view to arresting a person in his employ, the dealer in question and his assistants had taken stock. The morning following the raid, the assistants again took careful stock, allowing for the sales since the previous stocktaking, and goods to the value named above were found to have disappeared. Sir Hamar Greenwood has stated that there is no truth whatever in the assertion that goods were taken from the shop; presumably, the Chief Secretary's information is obtained from members of the Crown forces who took part in the raid, or their superior officers. The choice is between accepting the word of the accuser or the word of the accused. We have formed the opinion with regard to this case that the allegations made against the servants of the Crown are true, as we cannot believe that the witness and his assistants have deliberately invented a story of looting.

Witnesses who saw the burning of creameries assert that butter and cheese were in some cases taken away by attacking parties. In some instances we know that the produce of the creameries was destroyed or damaged by fire. It is also beyond doubt that in others the Crown forces looted the stores of the creameries before they were fired.

We have referred above to the destruction of property in houses and shops in Cork. On this occasion articles were taken from the shops, though Mr. Denis Henry, in the House of Commons on December 8, denied this. In many cases which came under our personal notice witnesses affirmed that during raids articles were taken from their houses. We cannot believe that all the many statements we have heard to this effect, coming as they do from different parts of Ireland, are devoid of truth. On the contrary, we are convinced that there has been a very large number of thefts from houses and shops. We have also heard of cases where "Black and Tans" have entered shops, obtained goods, and departed without paying for them.

During our stay in Cork, we received reports that whilst we were in the city people searched in the streets had been robbed of money and other articles. We were not able to investigate all the cases of which we had information. The cases in which we did inquire, however, were, in our opinion, conclusive. We may quote the evidence taken in one case, where we had corroborative information :—

"At between 9.0 and 9.15 p.m., on December 6, 1920, I had just left my friend — at his door in — Street, Cork. I was walking towards my home when I was stopped by some Auxiliary Police. They ordered me to take my hands out of my pockets and hold them up. I did so and one of the Auxiliaries searched me and took everything from my pockets except my

watch. The searcher handed the contents of my pockets to the men behind him. They were then handed back to me in one packet and I was told to retrace my steps and go home by another route or I would be shot. When I arrived home I examined my papers and wallet, and found that £48 in £1 notes belonging to my firm was missing; also £35 in four £5 notes, one £10 note, and five £1 notes, private money, together with £16 10s. 4d. in an envelope, being my salary for one month, had disappeared. I have not reported the matter to the police as I fear the consequences."

Mr. Denis Henry, on the occasion above referred to, stated that he had communicated with the police authorities who had informed him that "the Auxiliaries conducted a general search of people in the streets of Cork on Monday and Tuesday (December 6 and 7), but that the allegation of theft of money, or any other property, is entirely untrue." Unfortunately for the Government and its agents, there were too many well substantiated cases of theft in the streets of Cork for this blank denial to be accepted. Frankly, we do not believe that a number of people would at the same moment suddenly fabricate stories about thefts. We are not surprised that the Auxiliaries would not admit to the police that they were guilty of robbing persons whom they searched.

There are so many undoubted cases of looting and theft that the Commission must add these crimes to those of burning and destruction with which we have already dealt. We were filled with shame that, in the name of law and order, servants of the British Government should be guilty of besmirching in the eyes of Ireland the honesty of the British people.

(5) Physical Violence and Brutality

Many cases of beating and other forms of brutality came to our notice, some of which we were able to investigate. Whilst we were in Cork we heard on the second day of our visit that during the afternoon Auxiliaries with whips of the kind used by drivers of jaunting cars had struck pedestrians with them. We did not actually see the occurrence, but we took evidence from a town councillor who had witnessed the incident. The Auxiliaries appear to have driven people before them, lashing the while with the whips. Most of the people who were struck did not protest, probably through fear of worse consequences, but one man who did was called "an Irish swine" —an epithet commonly applied by many members of the Crown forces to the people of Ireland. The event naturally created deep resentment in the city.

In some places there has been a good deal of flogging of people. We had before us in one town a witness with a record of fourteen years' service in an Irish regiment. He served through the late war, and was a company sergeant major. Whilst in the street he was seized by five police and searched. The statement he made may be given in his own words :—

"They then accused me of teaching Sinn Feiners the use of machine guns. This I at once denied and said, 'You should arrest me and put me on trial if you make such a serious charge against me.' One of the police then called me a — bastard, and used other very vile language to me. I was compelled at rifle-point to kneel in the mud, and on threat of death made to take an oath that I was not a Sinn Feiner. A framed photo of De Valera was then shown me by one of the policemen, and I was ordered to spit on it three times or be shot. I was struck and kicked. I was then ordered to get up and clear off. I did so but was followed by about twelve policemen who again set on me and very severely beat me with rifles, fists, and feet. I was knocked to the ground and kicked whilst there. These men were not English; they all spoke with an Irish accent, and one who spoke with a strong brogue served me worst. He said after a time, 'Let him go; he has had enough,' but when the others desisted and I rose, he felled me again.

I was eventually allowed to go, but two of them continued to follow me, kicking and beating me. I believed they desired to get me away from the other people and shoot me. Four or five soldiers, members of the regiment, came up and prevented the police doing me any further injury. When handing back my papers, they said, 'Here, take your rubbish, and we have taken no quids from you, so don't write and tell Lloyd George that we have done so.' They said they were going to shoot every ex-soldier in —."

At the time we saw this man he bore the bruises caused by the brutal treatment of the police.

The "Black and Tans," at any rate in some places, appear to have taken to themselves the power to administer oaths. The following statement was given to the Commission in evidence by a lad of eighteen who had been searched and a postcard photograph of the late Lord Mayor of Cork found in his possession :—

"The 'Black and Tan' who had searched me said I had a photo of MacSwiney. The man in charge told me to go down on my knees. I did not go down. He struck me across the face with his clenched fist. Then he told me again to go down on my knees. I did not go down, and three or four of the 'Black and Tans' who were around pushed me down on my knees. The leader then took a bound book about the size of a novel from under his arm. He gave it to me and told me to hold it above my head and repeat the following words :—"I swear that I will have nothing to do with Sinn Fein in future." I took no notice. Then the leader of the 'Black and Tans' put the barrel of his rifle to my forehead and told me to repeat the oath. All this time I had said nothing. I repeated the oath. The leader then said, 'Say "God bless the R.I.C."'" I said nothing, and the leader struck me with his fist on the face, and said, 'Repeat "God bless the R.I.C." three times.' I said, 'God bless the I.C.' Then he took a large framed photo of De Valera from under his arm and told me to spit in De Valera's face three times. I took no notice. The leader again struck me on the face with his fist. I made an attempt to do what I was told, but didn't actually do it, and one of the 'Black and Tans' said, 'They are very dry.' The leader again struck me on the face. Then they all went away."

For refinement of cruelty, it would be difficult to find a worse case than that of a witness we examined on the treatment he had received at the hands of men who clearly were members of the Crown forces. This man was taken from his home by masked men with revolvers. He was asked questions which, he says, he was unable to answer. He was kicked and thumped, and later received blows on the head from revolvers, and kicked again whilst on the ground. He was asked whether he preferred to be shot or drowned. He could not swim. He replied that he would rather be shot. The masked men decided that he should be drowned, and he was thrown into the river. Fortunately, the tide was low and he was able to keep his head above water. Two shots were fired after him. Then one of the men said, "He's gone where MacSwiney's gone," and they left the witness in the belief that he was drowned.¹

¹ Since the foregoing was written we have learnt that extracts from the proof copy of this Report giving particulars of this case appeared in the Irish Press. At about 2 a.m. on the morning following the publication of the evidence in the newspapers, we are informed from a trustworthy source that a number of masked and armed men burst into the house where the witness in question lived. Fortunately for him he was not there. But the men damaged the furniture and other effects in the house, and, on leaving, one of them said, "Tell him we'll get him, and when we do we will guarantee that he will give no more evidence. We will make a clean job the next time."

This scandalous incident illustrates the peril of giving evidence on the doings of the armed forces of the Crown. We deeply regret that an attempt should have been made to victimise a witness, whose only offence was that he told the Commission of his experience of the agents of the British Government.

We give these cases as illustrations of occurrences which are not infrequent, and for which we can find no justification whatever. Even if the individuals ill-used were notorious and prominent Sinn Feiners and "gun men," we should regard such inhuman treatment as a disgrace to those directly and indirectly responsible for it.

Unfortunately, in their work of hunting down people, the agents of the British Government often act in a way which is terrifying to women. We took evidence in a case where a party of five or six men dressed in the uniform of the R.I.C. (one of them drunk) called at a house after one o'clock in the morning in search of a man of over seventy years of age. His wife and a girl were the only persons in the house. There was a violent knocking at the door and someone called out, "Hurry up or the door will be broken in." The woman opened the door as quickly as possible, and she was asked whether her husband was at home. Her reply was to the effect that he was not. The evidence of the witness continued :—

One of the men then asked if there was any correspondence between myself and my husband. I answered "No," whereupon I was jeered at and asked, "Is it likely that a husband and wife do not correspond?" A man of about thirty years of age, dressed in civilian clothes with his hair brushed back and his face smeared with some greyish-looking stuff, was with the party. He was more offensive and violent than any of the uniformed policemen. He brandished a revolver in our faces and abused and scolded the girl, asking her why she stayed in my house, and finally shouted at me that "If it is two years we will do for him." I noticed that this particular man had an English accent of the North of Ireland (*sic*). After this, all the men went out, then one returned and came upstairs. A window was suddenly broken. I feared shooting, and told the girl to lie down. We both lay down until we heard the motor lorries going off amidst much laughter. After a bit, when all was quiet I looked out and found that two thatched buildings belonging to our farm were on fire, also some hay. There was a cow and a calf in one of the buildings, but I managed to let them out. I found two paraffin lamps overturned in the house, also a candle near the burnt buildings. The next day I found that a large coal shovel, two pairs of gloves, a flash lamp, and a fat hen—but a very old and, I hope, tough one—had disappeared.

It is a very trying experience for a woman of my age. For two hours, from 1.15 to 3.15 a.m., I was in fear for my life, to say nothing of my home. I live in constant dread of another attack.

Some members of the Commission visited the home of a widow whose house has been twice raided. On the first occasion, about a dozen Auxiliaries rushed into the house and asked for her son. Some of them terrified a delicate daughter whom they covered with revolvers and asked where two of her brothers were. As the Auxiliaries were unable to obtain any information they went away. On the following night at 11.30 p.m., Auxiliaries again came to the house. They broke in the panel of the door and shouted for the son for whom they had inquired on the previous day. The widow replied that the boys had been home to tea but she had not seen them since. One of the party went upstairs and sat on the bed. He pointed a revolver at the daughter who was ill in bed and demanded to know the whereabouts of her brothers, but she could not tell him. Downstairs the men roughly handled the old widow, saying that if she did not tell them where her boys were they would burn down the house. They placed a tin of petrol on the floor. The woman then told the Auxiliaries that her son — was in prison, but she did

not know where — and — were. The widow told those of our members who visited her that she prayed for mercy. The men left the house swearing that there was “no bloody God.”

This rough and brutal treatment of women is by no means the worst that is to be said against men in the service of the British Crown. It is, however, extremely difficult to obtain direct evidence of incidents affecting females, for the women of Ireland are reticent on such subjects. The following case is one which came under our notice. A young woman who was sleeping alone in premises which were raided by the Crown forces was compelled to get out of bed and her nightdress was ripped open from top to bottom.¹

The cases of physical violence and brutal treatment which we have cited are, like the examples of other crimes which we have given, but examples. We could refer to more cases, but we believe that the reader of this Report will agree with us that they suffice to show the infamous deeds which have been done in the name of the British people.

(6) Shooting

The people of Ireland have become accustomed to the display of arms. Men who are being searched or interrogated are frequently covered by rifles or revolvers. The Crown forces are “gun men” ever ready to brandish their weapons in order to inspire fear or elicit information. Unfortunately, their arms have been used for a much deadlier purpose.

One of the most important cases of shooting on a large scale was the indiscriminate firing which took place at the Croke Park Football Ground, Dublin. This incident is dealt with more fully elsewhere in the Report. We may point out here, however, that there were far more casualties at Croke Park than at Peterloo. The killed and injured—numbering seventy-three persons in all—included both women and boys, who it is safe to say were perfectly innocent victims. If the police succeeded in shooting a single “gun man,” they did so by a pure accident. The brutal murder of British officers on the same day appears to have overshadowed in the minds of the British public the equally callous murder of innocent people at Croke Park. We believe the second crime to be every whit as bad as the first, and, indeed, in some ways worse.

We received evidence of a considerable number of cases of shooting—far more than we can refer to here. We give, however, one or two examples. The following evidence was given by a father relating to the shooting of his son :—

I was awakened by a loud knocking at our house door. I opened it and saw a group of men standing outside. One of them asked me where my son was, and I answered, “In the British Army.” The man then asked me where my other son was, but before I could answer the boy himself shouted from his bedroom, “All right, father, I am here.” Three men in the uniform of the R.I.C. then rushed in past me to my son’s room; they told him to get dressed and hurry up. He put on a pair of trousers and his coat. The policemen then informed us that they only wished to ask our son a few questions and would not keep him long, after which they took him away. There was a man in a trench coat and soft hat with the party and, from the way in which he spoke to the others, I concluded he was an officer.

After some three hours, as my son did not return, I went to look for him, and eventually on looking over a wall saw his body lying in a field

¹ See also Appendix, page 70.

a few yards away. I carried him back to the cottage. He was quite dead and had several wounds in his body, one in the left wrist, and one at the back of his head. So far as I am aware he was not a member of the I.R.A.

Another case which we investigated was that of a man who was taken from his home by men in khaki. Later during the night his dead body was brought back to the house and the doctor who came with it said, "They have shot the wrong man." At the inquest, which was held subsequently, a verdict of wilful murder against the military was returned.

An eye-witness told us that he saw two policemen walk up to a man at the corner of a street. One policeman struck him with his rifle and the other deliberately shot him. The man died shortly afterwards in hospital. It is worth noting that the medical men at the hospital who attended the wounded man did not give evidence at the military inquiry.

Another case of shooting in cold blood relates to the attempted murder of a Labour man. His wife told us that "at about 2.30 a.m. a party of military called at our house. My husband let them in. They asked him his name. The party searched the house and then left. The officers were polite, but the men were rough." Less than a month later "at about 12.30 a.m. I heard a lorry stopping outside the cottage and then somebody banging at the outer door until it was smashed in. I opened the inner door and saw two men in the uniform of the R.I.C. My husband was standing just behind me and the men in the doorway asked him his name. He told them; they then asked him if he was a Sinn Feiner. He answered that he was a Labour man and Councillor, whereupon both men shot at him with revolvers. He fell and I helped him to a chair and one of the policemen fired in another shot after me. My husband, beyond answering the questions put to him, never said a word to the policemen; he did not interfere with them in any way whatever. My husband sympathised with Sinn Fein but was not a member of the I.R.A."

In these and other similar cases into which we have inquired, members of the Crown forces have deliberately shot men in cold blood. These crimes occurring singly and often not reported in the British press are as revolting as the murder of British officers in their beds and deserve equally thorough denunciation. Even if the Irish victims were "gun men," we do not think that this in any way lessens the guilt of those who committed the murders.

The Chief Secretary for Ireland has referred on several occasions to men having been shot whilst trying to escape. We have information which goes to show that prisoners, alleged to have been fired upon and killed in an attempt to escape, have been shot in cold blood. Where the men are killed the production of evidence from eye-witnesses is often impossible, though it is sufficient to know that in at least one case an examination of the dead body showed that bullets had entered in front and not in the back. In another case where two men were shot in circumstances which made an attempt to escape the maddest folly, one survived. An affidavit sworn by the survivor will be found in the Appendix (page 83).

We have heard of cases, though we have not taken direct evidence on the matter, where men have been shot in mistake for some other person. Such tragedies are the inevitable result of the policy of shooting men without making adequate inquiries as to their identity, and throw light upon the methods of terrorism which are now in operation.

There is a large number of men in Ireland who are "on the run." We met many such men. Some of them are avowed Republicans and active

supporters of the Sinn Fein movement. A proportion of them are members of the Irish Volunteers. Others "on the run" are men who have little connection with the organised Sinn Fein movement. Amongst these are active trade unionists. Those who are not extreme Sinn Feiners and are yet "on the run" are victims of police or military stupidity.

Men who are "on the run" do not necessarily disappear entirely. For example, in one important town, all but five of the town councillors are men to whom the term could be applied. Yet they do not, unless special danger threatens, absent themselves from the meetings of the Council. Naturally, however, it is difficult for men in this predicament to play their part fully in public affairs. Many men "on the run" walk abroad openly in the day time, fairly secure in the knowledge that they will not be recognised by the "Black and Tans" or Auxiliaries, as the case may be. The Crown forces, however, possess their addresses, and the innumerable raids which have taken place during Curfew hours have been made, very often, in order to find men who are "on the run." The only hope of securing them is to find them in their homes. The result is that men in whom the agents of the British Government are keenly interested, in order to avoid being "looked up," as the phrase is, keep away from home. In some cases men have had to leave altogether the districts in which they lived. There are, of course, varying degrees of being "on the run," but almost all of those who are so described fear that if they fall into the hands of the "Black and Tans" or Auxiliaries they will be shot where they stand. Many men are "on the run," not because of anything which might be proved against them, but because experience of men, whom perhaps they knew, being shot at sight, has led them to the view that once arrested they would have no opportunity of disproving any charges. The attitude of such men may be unwarranted, but it is a sad commentary on the way law and order is maintained in Ireland that men should be driven to a belief that, if arrested, they would be murdered without trial.

(7) Some Examples of Terrorism and Violence

In the foregoing section of this Report we have given examples of cases of "reprisals" and evidence of different kinds of violence coming under the notice of the Commission. We have not endeavoured to search out merely the very worst cases. The majority of incidents selected for mention are typical of many similar occurrences. A number of the cases with which we have dealt do not fall under a single heading, and, therefore, in order to give an idea of the various elements of terrorism entering into particular incidents or practised in particular localities, we propose to refer to four incidents—those of Balbriggan, Croke Park, Ballymacelligott, and the surrender of arms in Cork—and to the conditions prevailing in the town of Tralee and the city of Cork.

(a) Tralee

Tralee, more than any other place visited by the Commission, exemplifies the demoralising effects of coercion, repression, and reprisals. The whole population seemed to be sunk in the depths of morbid fear and contagious depression. There is no Curfew in Tralee, but the streets become bare soon after the hour of darkness sets in. The roads are narrow and in bad condition. There is little evidence of active public services. It is not to be wondered at. We were told that the local Council, instead of meeting at the Town Hall, was compelled to meet in secret in some hidden ravine. Tralee had been the victim of reprisals early in November, the principal public buildings being destroyed by fire. When the Commission visited the town, the situation was comparatively calm. But the effects of the operation of



A VIEW SHOWING THE RUINS OF PATRICK STREET, CORK, AFTER THE FIRES OF DECEMBER 11-12
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“official determination” were very obvious. Petty tyranny, beatings, intimidation, raids, threats of violence against husbands uttered to wives, brutal assaults to make boys forswear Sinn Fein, to denounce the Pope, to spit on photographs of Mr. De Valera, to chant the “battle-cry” of the R.I.C., and innumerable other methods of terrorisation, which were reported to the Commission, had left their marks upon the inhabitants. We do not believe that any official document would be worth the paper it was printed upon if Mr. Hugh Martin were to meet some of the policemen who displayed a keen anxiety as to his whereabouts. Names printed above shops in Irish characters have had to be obliterated under penalty of vengeance. The “Black and Tans” used to drive about in lorries trailing a Sinn Fein flag through the mud. Even in Cork, where the Commission found a noticeable nervous tension and a dread of what “seemed about to happen,” the people were not nearly so reduced in spirit as those in Tralee. The very atmosphere in Tralee was deadening. The conditions there spoke eloquently of what the people had suffered under the “Black and Tans.” These have now been partly replaced by Auxiliaries, and it is only fair to state that the Commission were informed that the latter were conducting their duties with greater consideration for the inhabitants than they had been accustomed to experience from the “Black and Tans.”

(b) Cork


The atmosphere of Cork prior to the latest acts of incendiarism was beyond description. During the time we were in the city terrorism was at its height. Cork has perhaps suffered longer from the brutal domination of ill-disciplined armed forces than any other town in Ireland, probably because it has been regarded as one of the most important Sinn Fein centres. Within the past twelve months there have been three Lord Mayors of Cork. Lord Mayor McCurtain was murdered in the presence of his wife. Mr. Terence MacSwiney died in prison. His present successor is “on the run” and carrying out his duties as best he can.

The proper administration of the city of Cork by the local authority has been rendered well nigh impossible. Many members of the Council have been marked down for attention by the Crown forces and are able to attend the various meetings of committees only at considerable risk. Attempts have been made to set on fire the City Hall and several raids have been made on the municipal offices.

The whole of the civilian population has been in varying degrees under the terror. During the month of November alone we were informed by the Cork City Council that over 200 Curfew arrests had been made, four Sinn Fein clubs burnt to the ground, twelve large business premises destroyed by fire¹ (in addition to attempts made to fire others including the City Hall); seven men shot dead, a dozen men dangerously wounded, fifteen trains held up, four publicly placarded threats to the citizens of Cork issued, and over 500 houses of private citizens forcibly entered and searched. This by no means completes the list of incidents which occurred in Cork in the space of a single month. There were, in addition, attempted arrests which were unsuccessful, much indiscriminate shooting, and many minor outrages upon the people of Cork.

During the time that we were in the city there was provocative behaviour on the part of Auxiliaries, a large number of searches of individuals, a number of cases of theft from persons searched, the wanton destruction of property, and the incident of whipping pedestrians in the street. It is not surprising in these circumstances that the economic life of Cork has suffered considerably. As an illustration of the effect upon trade of the prevailing un-

¹ See Appendix, pages 89 and 90.



ANOTHER SCENE IN PATRICK STREET, CORK, AFTER THE FIRES OF DECEMBER 11-12

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settlement and terrorism, we may refer to the information which we received that the receipts of certain traders in the city had, during the past three months, fallen by fifty to seventy-five per cent. The economic stagnation arises directly out of the state of terror which exists in Cork. There is, of course, unemployment in the city. People are indisposed to make purchases other than those which are absolutely essential, and few people from the surrounding districts care to come into the city of Cork to shop.

The Commission was impressed by the sense of impending disaster which overhung the city of Cork during the time it was staying there. This uncertainty was ended by the tragic occurrences of Saturday, December 11, when the Regent Street of Cork was destroyed by incendiaries. By this date the Commission had returned to Dublin, but it decided to send two members of the Commission to Cork to make immediate investigations. The newspaper reports of the Cork fires conveyed but a faint impression of the terrible havoc wrought in the city. The most valuable premises in the town were utterly destroyed, large business houses and massively fronted shops were reduced to piles of smouldering débris, charred woodwork, and twisted iron girders.

Shortly after 9 p.m. on Saturday, December 11, Auxiliary Police and "Black and Tans" appeared in large numbers in the streets of the city, and at the revolver point (before actual firing took place) drove people to their homes earlier than the Curfew regulations required.

This was regarded by the citizens as ominous and increased the nervousness which had been caused by the ambush at Dillon's Cross during the same day and the apprehensions of reprisals that were naturally entertained by the people. The streets were soon entirely deserted and the work of destruction begun.

The first of the burnings took place at Grant's extensive premises in Patrick Street, and during the night new fires broke out. At 4 a.m. the City Hall was fired and the efforts of the firemen failed to save it. It was completely gutted. But a few days previously the Commission had taken evidence in the City Hall of the unfortunate occurrences in Cork during the past few months. The City Library adjacent to the Hall was also destroyed.

The members of the Commission made special inquiries regarding the origin and cause of the fires and numerous witnesses were interviewed. Eye-witnesses observing the fires from adjacent premises state positively that the incendiaries were agents of the British Government. Some persons had witnessed the entry of members of the forces into buildings which shortly afterwards were on fire. In some cases explosions occurred. Others, again, saw them engaged in looting. The smashing of glass and doors was heard as men forced their way into business premises intent upon theft.

Firemen of the local brigade received assistance from the military engaged on patrol duty during Curfew hours. The old R.I.C. men (as distinct from "Black and Tans") were engaged mainly in conveying information to the brigade of further outbreaks of fire occurring from time to time during the night. Two members of the brigade were slightly wounded by bullets whilst carrying out their duties.

We would point out that the fires occurred after the Crown forces had driven the people indoors, and that during the greater part of the time that outbreaks of fire took place the Curfew regulations were in operation. We are of opinion that the incendiarism in Cork during the night of December 11-12 was not a "reprisal" for the ambush which took place on the same date at Dillon's Cross. The fires appear to have been an organised attempt



THE CARNEGIE LIBRARY, CORK, DESTROYED BY FIRE DECEMBER 11-12, 1920



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE BURNINGS IN CORK ON DECEMBER 11-12, 1920

to destroy the most valuable premises in the city, and we do not think that the arrangements could have been carried out if they had been hastily made after the unfortunate occurrence at Dillon's Cross.

On receiving the Report of the delegates who had visited Cork, the Commission despatched the following telegram on December 15 to Mr. Henderson :—

Statements made by Chief Secretary in House of Commons yesterday concerning the burning of Cork are grossly inaccurate. Parliamentary Members of Labour Commission who visited Cork yesterday convinced that fires were work of Crown forces. Suggestion that fire spread from Patrick Street across the river to City Hall, a distance of several hundred yards, cannot be entertained by anyone knowing topography of Cork. We stand by our statements regarding the fires in Cork, and can, if safety of witnesses guaranteed, produce reliable evidence on subject. We therefore demand independent inquiry into recent incident in Cork. If Government refuse inquiry British public will form its own conclusions.

The Government is undertaking a military inquiry, presumably on lines similar to those usually held, except that a report is to be published. We shall await the Report with interest, but we doubt whether the Court of Inquiry will have at its disposal the non-official information which is essential to a true finding of the cause of the fires.

We may here refer to the misfortune which befell the chauffeurs who had driven the Commission through the south-west of Ireland after they were despatched home to Cork from Limerick Junction Station. The four chauffeurs with their empty cars happened to arrive at Dillon's Cross about the time of the ambush. They were arrested by Auxiliaries and placed against a wall. The Auxiliary Police refused to listen to their explanation, or to allow them to show their special permits. They were told that they were about to be shot. An officer, however, then came up and said that they were not to be shot until they had been searched in the barracks. They were ordered into their cars and told to drive to the barracks, three members of the force, with revolvers, accompanying each driver. They were then taken to the guard room and searched, after which they were put into a small cell with seven other persons and detained until 2 p.m. on the following day. On returning to their cars they found that a number of motor accessories and personal belongings, amounting in value to nearly £40, were missing. So far as we know, the missing property has not yet been returned.

(c) Balbriggan

The incidents which occurred at Balbriggan on the night of September 20-21 last have been admitted by the British Government to be in the nature of a "reprisal" for the shooting of two members of the R.I.C. There is no doubt in our minds after visiting Balbriggan and taking evidence in the Town Hall there that the Crown forces were utterly out of hand and took the law into their own hands to inflict punishment on the population of the town for the death of Inspector Burke and the wounding of another policeman.

Shops, houses, and inns were set on fire, and in one long street almost all the houses had been burnt or their windows broken. The illustration given in the Report shows a portion of the right side of this street. On the left are a number of houses of a newer type, erected by the local authority, now in ruins. The hosiery factory of Messrs. Deedes, Templer, and Co., Ltd., to which we have already referred, is now a mere shell. Messrs. Smith and Co.'s factory was saved from destruction only through the intervention of a man who appealed to the policemen who said they were going to burn it down.



COTTAGES AT BALBRIGGAN BURNED BY CROWN FORCES ON SEPTEMBER 20

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The incendiaries appear to have gloated over their evil work for they waved their caps and cheered. There is evidence to show that they looted drink. A local policeman admitted that the outrages were "going too far," but he was sworn at by the invaders for asking them to desist from further damage.

Two civilians were killed and others injured. We discovered cases of brutal treatment by the police. The people fled in terror to the fields, in very many cases clad only in their night attire. Men, women, and children spent the night out of doors and for days afterwards the little town became practically deserted with the approach of nightfall, the population leaving their homes for the night through fear of another attack. In addition to two civilians who were killed, two women died from the effects of exposure, two women had miscarriages as a result of the night's events, and four babies suffering from measles were taken out to the fields and died as a consequence.


Balbriggan offers a clear example of a "reprisal" where men wearing the uniform of the British Crown broke out of control and took a savage revenge upon the whole population of the town for an "outrage" upon members of the Royal Irish Constabulary.

(d) The Massacre at Croke Park

The Commission took considerable pains to elucidate the case of the Croke Park shootings. Certain points of fact had been admitted by the Government in official statements, and it was, therefore, unnecessary to obtain substantiation of points which were not in dispute. The Commission were more concerned to secure reliable evidence on those points on which the official statements conflicted with unofficial versions or which the Government had categorically denied or glossed over or ignored. The evidence accumulated by the Commission from actual eye-witnesses who were interviewed reveals certain important discrepancies between the official and unofficial accounts. In his official statement in the House of Commons on November 23, Sir Hamar Greenwood said that :—

The round-up and search of spectators was carried out by the authorities according to a pre-concerted plan with the object of securing Sinn Fein gun men who had taken part in the assassinations of that morning of fourteen British officers in Dublin. . . . It had been arranged that after the military had surrounded the field an officer should announce to the crowd through a megaphone that a search was to be made by the police, and that no anxiety need be felt by innocent persons. The police force approached the neighbourhood of the field *while the military were encircling it, but before the military cordon was complete* the police were observed by civilians, who had evidently been specially posted to watch the approaches to the field. *The police were fired upon from two corners of the field.* Simultaneously men rose from their places on the grand stand and fired three quick shots from revolvers into the air. Of this there is indisputable evidence. It seems quite clear that these shots were a pre-arranged signal of warning to certain sections of the crowd. A stampede was caused not by the firing alone, which caused considerable alarm, but also by a rush of men seeking to make their escape from the field. They hurried mostly to one side of the field, where a corrugated iron railing was the only barrier to be surmounted. Through the fall a number of people were crushed. Meanwhile the armed pickets outside, joined, no doubt, by gun men escaping from inside the ground, were maintaining a fire in the direction of the police, who returned the fire. The firing lasted not more than three minutes. About thirty revolvers, thrown away by men who had formed part of the spectators, were picked up on the ground.

The Commission have no hesitation in recording their opinion that the Croke Park tragedy was not in the nature of a premeditated "reprisal." It



is quite possible that the authorities had for some time been contemplating a round-up at Croke Park when the match between the Dublin and Tipperary teams took place. But it would appear from Sir Hamar Greenwood's statement that the decision had been finally determined by the assassinations of officers earlier in the day. It is inconceivable that the forces employed in the round-up would not be affected by those assassinations, and accordingly it is only reasonable to expect that special precautions would be taken against any hitch in the carrying out of the plan for the encircling of the field by the military. Sir Hamar Greenwood states that the police arrived before the military cordon was complete, and it would appear from this admission that the round-up, instead of working to plan, was partially disorganised in its preliminary stages. Even if this initial blunder had not taken place, the Commission find it difficult to concur in the view of the authorities that the scheme was a sound one. Mass psychology is often a sensitive and uncertain factor, and mob fears are quickly aroused. This is particularly true in Ireland where the sudden arrival of Crown forces, particularly the R.I.C., has so often been followed by tragedy.

With regard to Sir Hamar Greenwood's assertion that the police were fired on from two corners of the field, particular attention was given to the point by the Commission and every effort was made to bring to light evidence in support of it. The Commission are, however, compelled to declare that in the light of the mass of evidence available this charge would appear to be quite untrue. Not one of the many witnesses examined corroborated it. On the contrary, evidence was submitted to the effect that the police commenced to fire almost immediately the lorries came to a halt. Rifle fire was directed down Russell Street whence the lorries had come, and also over the turnstile entrance to the football field at the spectators inside. The consequence of this was that a man was mortally wounded about half way down Russell Street, a young woman was shot dead at her fiancé's side near the centre line of the field, and a small boy perched in a tree just inside the turnstile entrance was brought down wounded.

The Commission was unable to obtain evidence to support or to disprove the contention that signal shots were fired from the stand into the air, and it is quite possible that if this incident did occur the reports of shots from the stand might have so synchronised with those on the bridge as to be practically indistinguishable to anyone at a little distance. That large numbers of spectators stampeded is but natural, and the indiscriminate shooting of panic-stricken men cannot be even partly justified or defended on the ground that there might have been "gun men" among them trying to escape. It was manifestly folly to expect the crowd to disperse in an orderly fashion after firing had taken place from the bridge. It would not have been an easy matter to have secured an orderly clearing of the field even if no firing had taken place and the officer had, according to plan, issued police instructions through a megaphone. Finally, it is difficult to understand why, if pickets and "gun men" "maintained a fire in the direction of the police," there were no casualties among the police or among the militant civilians and no prisoners with arms captured.

Our conclusion is that the scheme in itself was dangerous, that its execution was a lamentable failure, and that there was no justification for what occurred. Not even panic, itself a sufficiently serious reflection in the case of a disciplined force, can excuse the action of the police amongst whom there appears to have been a spirit of calculated brutality and lack of self-control which, as has been officially admitted, resulted in twelve innocent persons losing their lives, eleven being injured seriously enough to be detained in hospital, and fifty others being more or less slightly hurt—a grand total of seventy-three victims. According to the evidence furnished to the Commission, the operations were conducted by the R.I.C. and Auxiliaries. The

soldiers took no part. Finally, the central point of the Government's defence, namely, that the police were fired on from two corners of the field, does not, in face of the evidence submitted to the Commission, appear to be tenable. Croke Park was a ghastly tragedy resulting from official errors of judgment and incompetence.

(e) Ballymacelligott and the "Battle of Tralee"

The Commission made a very close investigation into the circumstances surrounding the burning of Ballymacelligott creamery and the shooting which took place. In the first instance it will be well to give the statement made by the Government on the Ballymacelligott case.

On November 17, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, the Chief Secretary stated :—


I have received a report regarding this occurrence, from which it appears that a police escort, with a party of journalists, while travelling from Castleisland to Tralee in County Kerry on the 12th instant, were attacked at Ballymacelligott by about seventy armed men concealed near the creamery, and were actually fired upon from the creamery. The police defended themselves, and in so doing killed four of their assailants and wounded others, but the exact number of wounded is not known. Seven arrests were effected, including a doctor and his servant, who were attending a wounded man inside the creamery. The doctor and his servant were subsequently released, but the other prisoners have been retained for trial. The creamery and two or three adjoining home-steads, from which heavy fire was directed upon the police, and a quantity of hay ricks were burned. The creamery was found to contain petrol and a number of spent cartridges. It was probably the headquarters of the local Irish Republican Army in Ireland. The hay ricks burned with explosions due, undoubtedly, to concealed ammunition.

In answer to a further question, Sir Hamar Greenwood replied :—

I have spoken to a gentleman who was in the ambush, and I am quite sure of my facts. During this particular day, there were three fights in the vicinity of this creamery, and I am convinced of the facts that I have stated in the House. I am glad that I have been able to interview one of my own staff who was in the ambush, and happily escaped with his life, who was able to give me an exact description of one of these ambushes, and an exact account of how one creamery, at any rate, was destroyed.

The Chief Secretary in the House of Commons, on November 24, said :—

Let me come to the case of the creamery destroyed at Ballymacelligott, Co. Kerry. Here, happily, we can check the evidence printed in a paper that gives a certain qualified support to the Right Honourable gentleman. That evidence can be checked by officers of the Auxiliary Division who were in the attack, and it happened, also, that a very gallant officer from my own office was present, in addition to two journalists and two photographers. Let us give the story. It gives an idea of the facts of these creamery cases. . . . At Ballymacelligott in Kerry, a number of policemen were fired at on the morning of November 12 from the creamery. They attacked the creamery, wounded one or two men, and killed one or two men. On the afternoon of the same day, along comes this party of journalists and photographers, escorted by Auxiliary Division men, to the total number of sixteen. As they came near the creamery, which was within twenty yards of the road, I am told dozens of rifle shots rang out. There was an ambush. The trench part of the ambuscade is still there.




BALLYMACELLIGOTT CREAMERY AFTER THE FIRE OF NOVEMBER 13, 1920

These men got out of their cars, attacked the attackers, killed several, wounded several, and captured several others. They were fired at from the creamery; they were fired at from the manager's house of the creamery. That is not the end of the story. Those who formed the ambush got reinforcements and came back, and towards five o'clock in the evening the police retired to Castleisland for reinforcements. They came back next morning, and went into the creamery. They found a number of spent cartridges in it, they knew they had been fired at from it, and I say, as an act of war, they were justified in burning a portion of it down. It was within twenty yards of a road along which policemen had to patrol frequently every day. It was the centre of an ambush. More than that, I had looked at the record of the manager of this creamery. He was a rebel in 1916 and . . . was sent to gaol for nearly a year. He is the organiser of all the raids in that neighbourhood. . . . Of course, we have arrested him, and scores of others in the same neighbourhood. These Auxiliary Division men went to the manager's house, knowing his record, and knowing that they had been fired at from the house, but they found a wounded Sinn Féiner inside, and naturally, being chivalrous British soldiers, they did not touch the house, but left it over the head of the wounded Sinn Féiner.

We are not, for the moment, concerned with the Chief Secretary's code of ethics. Our main concern is with his statements. The information supplied to Sir Hamar Greenwood on the case at Ballymacelligott is, as we shall show, untrue in certain important particulars. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that the account of the occurrences given by the Chief Secretary is a caricature of what actually happened, supplied to him, apparently, by a member of his own staff. The actual story of the occurrences, so far as we have been able to reconstruct it from evidence which is well corroborated, is as follows :—

On Friday morning, November 12, a number of lorries containing police and military stopped on the road outside the creamery. So far as can be ascertained, no shots were fired from the creamery or the neighbourhood by other than Crown forces. It may be pointed out that none of the men who were killed or wounded were carrying arms, and that no arms or ammunition of any kind were found in the creamery. We are convinced that, had any arms or ammunition been discovered, the fact would have been stated by the Chief Secretary for Ireland in the House of Commons.

The members of the Crown forces jumped out of the lorries and the workmen in the creamery took to their heels and ran up the fields away from the road. It is not surprising that these men should have fled at the approach of armed men in uniform, especially in view of the events which had occurred prior to this date in the district. A railway worker had been shot through the neck two days previously, and a young farmer named Hoffman, of Farmer's Bridge, had also been shot, and died from his injuries. The "Black and Tans" fired upon the retreating men. Two men, John MacMahon and Patrick Herlihy, were shot dead. The former was a farmer and a member of the committee of management of the co-operative society. He had brought a quantity of corn to the creamery that morning, and was waiting to have it ground at the mill attached to the society's building. The latter was employed as a dairyman at the creamery. Two men were wounded. The first, Tim Walsh, the engine driver at the creamery, was very seriously wounded in the abdomen, and will probably not recover; the second, John McEllistrim, brother-in-law of the creamery manager, sustained a compound fracture of the arm. The police appeared to have acted in an aggressive manner, except when in the presence of the officer in charge of the military escort. This officer telegraphed for the doctor and assisted with the wounded. A soldier standing near the dead body of MacMahon was heard



A VIEW OF THE INTERIOR OF BALLYMACCELLIGOTT CREAMERY

to say, "Disgraceful; it's a shame." Shortly after the shooting the parish priest and a nurse appeared on the scene, and gave assistance. The doctor, who had been sent for, arrived at the creamery early in the afternoon, and after attending to the two wounded men who had been moved to the manager's house, departed to make a further call, and promised to return for McEllistrim and take him to the hospital at Tralee. The Crown forces left and travelled towards Castleisland. On this occasion no prisoners were taken.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day (Friday, November 12), there came along the road from Castleisland two Crossley motor cars and two lorries. In the cars were Captain Pollard and Captain Jones, the former an ex-journalist who is on the staff at Dublin Castle, and the latter the personal secretary of Sir Hamar Greenwood. There were from fifteen to twenty men in the party, of whom about half, or perhaps more, were in civilian clothes. They included journalists and photographers. There were a few men about the creamery at the time, but certainly not anywhere approaching the seventy men who are alleged to have been present.

On this occasion also, shots were fired by the party who had arrived by motors. We have discovered that three men with rifles and bandoliers were seen walking up the road away from the main road between Castleisland and Tralee. Some little time after the Dublin Castle party had opened fire, shots were fired in reply from the higher ground on the left of the main road from Tralee. The return fire, however, did not consist of more than half a dozen shots. A search was made for the wounded, but not a single wounded man was found.

The doctor, who had returned and was waiting for McEllistrim to be dressed and prepared for his journey to Tralee, was arrested, as also was his chauffeur. Five men who were found about the creamery were also arrested. The party with its prisoners proceeded to Castleisland. On this occasion the creamery was searched and books and papers in the office were scattered about.

On Saturday afternoon, November 13, motor cars and lorries were seen approaching the creamery from the direction of Castleisland. At Ballymacelligott the party stopped, it is said, to look for the dead; apparently, however, no dead bodies were found. A few shots appear to have been fired, but none by local people. Captain Pollard and others who had taken part in the previous afternoon's proceedings were again in the party.

The creamery was set on fire by some member or members of the party from Castleisland. We have reason for believing that it was not the military who were acting as escorts, nor can it have been the prisoners captured the previous day who were being taken to Tralee. The "Black and Tans" tried to put out the fire. Those who would have attempted to save the butter in the creamery were prevented from doing so by the person who appears to have been in charge of the party.

As to the question of the trenches referred to by the Chief Secretary, it is undoubtedly true that there had been between Ballymacelligott and Castleisland, about three statute miles from the creamery, a trench across the road three or four feet wide and three feet deep. On the other side of the creamery, between Ballymacelligott and Tralee, there had been a shallow trench about one and half feet wide across the road. But we have positive knowledge that both these trenches were filled in at least four days before the occurrences at Ballymacelligott. At Farmer's Cross, some distance away, there was also a trench which had been filled in before the attack on the creamery.

The burning of the creamery and the killing and wounding of four persons are not the only incidents in connection with the Ballymacelligott

affair. Sir Hamar Greenwood has admitted that two or three homesteads were burned. These acts of incendiarism were committed on Saturday, November 13. We took evidence on these events and incidentally discovered that from one of the houses a small purse was taken containing four sixpences, a half-crown, and 1s. 7½d. in coppers. The purse was afterwards found in the farmyard. The Chief Secretary suggested that there were explosions from the hayricks due to concealed ammunition. One of the soldiers told a witness who was alarmed at the repeated explosions from the direction of three burning hayricks that they were only explosives that the "Black and Tans" had put there.

During our investigation into the Ballymacelligott case, we endeavoured to ascertain whether any military inquiry had been held into the circumstances of the deaths of the two men who were shot dead. We could obtain no evidence that there had been any such inquiry. After our return from Ireland, the Chief Secretary stated in the House of Commons (December 23) in reply to a question that "no court of inquiry in lieu of inquest has yet been held in these cases. I am inquiring as to the reason for this, and have asked the military authorities to arrange for a court to be held as soon as possible." Six weeks had then elapsed since the two men had been shot.

There are obvious discrepancies between the two accounts of "the battle of Tralee" presented to the House of Commons by Sir Hamar Greenwood. The first account gives the impression of a single incident. The fuller statement shows that there were three incidents. We have already pointed out certain assertions made by the Chief Secretary which are in direct conflict with the evidence obtained by the Commission, but we may perhaps risk repetition in order to emphasise the inaccuracies in the official story of the Ballymacelligott incidents.

(1) According to the official account, on the morning of November 12 a party of police were fired on from the creamery. We have not been able to obtain any corroboration of this allegation.

(2) On the afternoon of November 12 it is said that the "party of journalists and photographers" was fired upon from the creamery and the manager's house. "Dozens of shots rang out." We frankly do not believe a word of this statement. We have ascertained that after "the Dublin Castle circus"¹ opened fire, probably half a dozen shots were fired in return, but not from either the creamery or the manager's house.

(3) We do not agree that there were "about seventy armed men concealed near the creamery." Seven men were captured (including a doctor and his servant). Yet it has never been suggested that these seven of the mythical seventy were found with arms in their possession. Moreover, no official statement has been made that arms and ammunition had been discovered in the creamery or the manager's house or in the vicinity.

(4) It is said that "there was an ambush. The trench part of the ambuscade is still there." We could not find it. We do not believe that there was an ambush. The story of the ambush is due, apparently, to the hectic imagination of those from whom the Chief Secretary obtained his information.

(5) We are told that on the occasion of the second attack on the creamery, on the afternoon of November 12, "the attackers killed several, wounded several, and captured several others." The only truth in this statement is that a number of people were taken prisoners. Captain Pollard looked for the dead and wounded, and again on the following day the party stopped, it is alleged "to look for dead bodies." No one ever saw any dead or wounded

¹ The phrase is not ours. It is current in "official circles" in Ireland, and is used because it appears to us to be an apt description of the party.

men. Certainly, it is clear, that on the afternoon of November 12 no wounded men were taken prisoners. It has not been suggested that the men who were captured were wounded. We should have thought that there would have been wounded men amongst the prisoners if any of the mythical seventy had been injured. Again, we fear that these statements must be attributed to the overheated imagination of the member of the Chief Secretary's staff who gave him what purports to be "an exact description" of the ambush.

(6) It is said that "those who formed the ambush got reinforcements and came back, and towards five o'clock in the evening the police retired to Castleisland for reinforcements. They came back next morning." The story of the Chief Secretary begins at this stage to read like a pitched battle. We think, however, that the events of the afternoon of November 12 appeared as a battle only to the excited minds of some of the members of one of the "opposing forces." We could not obtain any information whatever to substantiate the statement regarding reinforcements. On the contrary, our evidence shows that there were no "reinforcements" and the "retirement" was not a "retirement" in the face of superior forces, but merely the undisturbed departure of the "Dublin Castle circus" with the prisoners who had been taken. We might point out that as Castleisland is but a few miles away from Ballymacelligott, we think that the "reinforcements" might have arrived the same day, instead of next morning, especially after an action on so large a scale as the official account implies.

(7) Next day (November 13) the "circus" with its prisoners returned to Ballymacelligott on their way to Tralee. Spent cartridges, it is said, were found in the creamery. The evidence received was to the effect that the police on the morning of November 12 fired from the creamery after the retreating men. The fact that there was petrol in the creamery, as the Chief Secretary points out, may be explained by the fact that the co-operative society possessed a motor van.


(8) We are told that from homesteads in the vicinity of the creamery "heavy fire was directed upon the police." After the most searching inquiries we did not obtain a shred of evidence to support this statement.

(9) Sir Hamar Greenwood stated that the manager of the creamery had been arrested. This is untrue, though it is not surprising that he is "on the run."

(10) As to the statement that the explosives were due to ammunition concealed in the hayricks, we draw attention to the evidence of a witness, which, if true, means that the "Black and Tans" themselves placed the ammunition in the hayricks.

There is obviously a serious conflict between the evidence gathered by the Commission and the fanciful and highly coloured story of the "battle of Tralee" presented by the Chief Secretary to the House of Commons. We believe that the account which we have given will bear examination.

Sir Hamar Greenwood justifies the burning of the creamery. It is alleged that the forces of the Crown and the "Dublin Castle circus" were fired upon on two occasions. On neither occasion was there a single casualty amongst the police, military, or civilians who attacked the creamery. The only casualties were those resulting from the fire of the Crown forces on Friday morning, November 12, when two men were killed and two wounded. It is to say the least a most extraordinary thing that not one of the "dozens of shots" which "rang out" found its billet. It is equally extraordinary that no arms or ammunition were found about the creamery or on the persons of the killed, wounded, and prisoners. "The battle of Tralee" is a figment of the imagination, though no doubt the participants on the Government side will still believe that "'twas a famous victory."



PHOTOGRAPH OF VICO ROAD, DALKEY, CO. DUBLIN, THE SCENE, ACCORDING TO PUBLISHED PHOTOGRAPHS, OF THE "BATTLE OF TRALEE" IN CO. KERRY!

There appeared in many papers shortly after the incidents at Ballymacelligott a photograph variously described as a picture from "the Kerry Front" and an illustration of the "Battle of Tralee."¹ One paper informs its readers that the photograph "is typical of the state of things in the country. It was taken during the 'Battle of Tralee,' where a convoy of R.I.C. Cadets was ambushed by Republicans. Three Sinn Feiners were killed and one cadet was wounded. The cadet and two of the dead Sinn Feiners are seen lying in the road. The cadet is in the foreground. In the background, cadets are taking Sinn Feiners prisoners." We may leave aside the inaccuracy of these statements. What we wish to emphasise is that this photograph (which has been suppressed) purports to have been taken in the south-west of Ireland. We reproduce a photograph showing the junction of Vico Road and Victoria Road, Dalkey, Co. Dublin, near the entrance to Victoria Park. It is this exact scene, with the addition of the people referred to above, which has appeared as a picture of the "Battle of Tralee." The reader will draw the obvious conclusion that the picture is a faked photograph, taken in County Dublin and deliberately misrepresented to the British public as depicting a "battle" which took place in a distant corner of Ireland. The conclusion is correct, for there is no such scene in the vicinity of the "battle ground." We do not know who made the arrangements for taking the photograph at Dalkey, but we can readily understand that its publication would give an air of verisimilitude to the story of the famous encounter as described by the Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Commission is strongly of the opinion that there are certain sinister features in connection with the incidents at Ballymacelligott, on November 12 and 13, which should be the subject of an independent inquiry. We do not think that the Government should rely for its information in this case upon the *ex parte* statement of servants of the Crown, who appear to have acted recklessly and without a sense of responsibility. On the basis of the unchecked statements of one of his officials, the Chief Secretary has stated quite definitely that the burning of the Ballymacelligott creamery was justified. In our view, the Ballymacelligott incidents are as discreditable to the Government as any of the occurrences for which the Government or its agents have been responsible.²

(f) The Surrender of Arms in Cork

In view of the suggestion which has been made by the Chief Secretary that arms in the possession of Irish people should be surrendered to parish priests, we think it important to relate what happened in Cork when a somewhat similar procedure was followed. The facts which we state below are given on the highest authority.

In May, 1916, after the Dublin insurrection, the Bishop of Cork at a large meeting held in the Volunteer Hall, Cork, appealed to the Irish Volunteers in his diocese to surrender their arms. The surrender was agreed to on the following conditions:—

- (1) The arms were to be handed over to the Bishop or the Lord Mayor of the city, and to remain in their possession until the end of the war, when they were to be restored to their owners.
- (2) The Volunteers were to be guaranteed against arrest, imprisonment, or deportation.

These conditions were accepted by the military authorities, and a considerable number of Volunteers delivered up their arms, which were stored at the private residence of Mr. Butterfield, the Lord Mayor of Cork at the

¹ A reproduction of this photograph will be found in the *Illustrated London News* for November 27, 1920.

² Since the return of the Commission to England, Ballymacelligott has been the scene of two further deaths. According to reports in the newspapers, uniformed men entered the house of the creamery manager on Christmas night. Two men who were found there were both shot dead and the house was set on fire.

time. Before the surrender was completed, however, the military raided the house of the Lord Mayor, seized the arms, and arrested Volunteers who had deposited their arms according to the agreement. Naturally enough, the surrender of arms on the part of other Volunteers ceased, and the Bishop and the Lord Mayor were both reproached with betraying the Volunteers by taking away their arms and leaving them defenceless against military forces whose word could not be trusted. As a result of representations made by the Bishop and Mr. Butterfield, the imprisoned Volunteers were released, but the arms remained, and still remain, in military custody. There is, we feel, no need for even a single word of comment upon the treachery of the military authorities concerned.

The Government and the Truth about "Reprisals"

The answers given by the Chief Secretary for Ireland in reply to questions concerning events in Ireland, and the statements made by Ministers of the Crown, have been characterised by a disregard for truth. The official view of some of the occurrences with which we have dealt in this Report is diametrically opposed to the view taken by the Commission after investigation. The Government, on its side, bases its statements solely upon information received from its own agents. We fear that often the sources from which this information comes are tainted by prejudice. Moreover, the Crown forces involved in incidents which would reflect little credit upon them are unlikely voluntarily to report with accuracy the occurrences in which they have played a part. We cannot imagine a body of "Black and Tans" guilty of the conduct described in this Report, in connection with cases which the Commission made the subject of inquiry, presenting a report to their superior officers in accordance with the facts. These considerations render the statements made by the Chief Secretary untrustworthy.

The sources on which we mainly relied, on the other hand, were unofficial. As was to be expected we have had pressed upon us the point of view of the victims of "reprisals." Though we endeavoured, wherever possible, to obtain the testimony of independent people and the official view on cases coming under our notice, we drew much of our evidence from people who had actually suffered from the actions of the Crown forces. No doubt some of our evidence was prejudiced by political bias against the British Government, as the evidence of the Crown forces is prejudiced by bias against the Sinn Fein movement. But we have, wherever we detected it, allowed for the bias of witnesses whom we examined.

We have every desire to state the facts as we have found them, fairly and without exaggeration. But even if the weight of evidence which we have collected is somewhat coloured by feelings of hostility against the British Government and its armed servants, we think that it bears the stamp of truth in all essentials. Most of the evidence which we submit in this Report rings true. The statements made on behalf of the Government, on the other hand, do not carry conviction.

But what, in the opinion of the Commission, is even worse than the misrepresentation of facts is the attitude of the Government towards "reprisals." Terrorism and outrage on the part of members of the forces of the Crown in Ireland are condoned, defended, and justified. Deeds of a similar character perpetrated by other people in Ireland are denounced by the men who give their support to "reprisals," by "Black and Tans" and Auxiliary Police, as brutality, murder, and assassination.

The fact that men are alleged to be acting in support of law and order under the authority of a Government does not place them above the law. It does not elevate murder to the level of a virtue. Murder in cold blood,

the callous and brutal treatment of innocent children, incendiarism, and theft are crimes and offences against the moral law, even when they are committed under the auspices of the British Empire and in the name of law and order. Sir Hamar Greenwood has applied the term "murder gang" to the "gunmen" of Ireland. The epithet can be applied to those individuals who, in the pay of the British Government, kill people in cold blood. The Chief Secretary has identified himself with a policy which is a disgrace to the British people, and which we believe to be unparalleled in this country. The criminal nature of this policy of violence is clearly seen by considering the essential features of "reprisals" and violence.

What are "Reprisals" ?

The burning of Balbriggan is regarded by the Chief Secretary for Ireland as a "reprisal" for the shooting of a police officer. Men were shot, houses and other buildings were burnt, women and children terrified and driven to the fields. The police may or may not, in this terrible havoc, have punished those guilty of the death of the police officer. But even if they did it is a frightful procedure to inflict so much injury upon the many who are innocent in order that the very few who are guilty may suffer. The destruction of the creameries at Achonry and Tubbercurry, in revenge for the death of a district inspector of police, struck at the whole countryside around the two creameries, yet the burnings may not have struck at the individuals implicated in the shooting of District Inspector Brady. "Reprisals" of this kind are a cruel and inhuman policy, the resort of those whose bankruptcy of statesmanship is equalled only by their incompetence to deal with the situation which they have largely created.

Besides "reprisals" for specific occurrences there are the more general sort of "reprisals"—"reprisals" against all and sundry, not because of this or that particular crime, but because of the general attitude of the bulk of the Irish people towards the British Government and its paid servants in Ireland. The policy of sheer terrorism, and of brutal treatment to individuals, is directed against the people as a whole. Again, the innocent certainly suffer, and the guilty may or may not suffer with them.

"Reprisals" and the whole policy of violence are condemned because they are inhuman, and also because by driving the people to revolt or sullen despair they but intensify the problem they are designed to solve by crushing it out of existence.

The Government's Responsibility for "Reprisals"

Unable or unwilling to cope with the growing bitterness and violence which its policy of repression had enormously strengthened, the Government resorted to the reinforcement of the R.I.C. by ex-service men and the establishment of a new type of armed force consisting almost entirely of ex-officers. We do not wish to make any sweeping accusation against the R.I.C. and the Auxiliary Division. But there are individuals in both forces—and the number we fear is not small—whose actions merit the strongest condemnation.

The worst elements in the two forces—notwithstanding the praise bestowed upon the R.I.C. and the Auxiliary Division by the Chief Secretary—are undesirable characters. Disciplined control might have restrained them. But the outstanding fact regarding numbers of the "Black and Tans" and Auxiliaries is that they are not under control. The Government has created a weapon which it cannot wield. It has liberated forces which it is not at

present able to dominate. The men have got out of hand, and the Government cannot truthfully deny it.

The result has been seen in the tragic occurrences which we have described in this Report. The Government had no choice but to support its servants. It was represented to them that any other course would dishearten the Crown forces in the pursuit of their dangerous duties and play into the hands of the physical force section of the Sinn Féin movement. We do not believe that the Government directly and definitely inspired "reprisals" and violence. But it brought into existence a new constabulary, with its Auxiliary Division, which was undisciplined and virtually uncontrolled. The Government must take full responsibility for its own offspring. Moreover, whilst it has perfunctorily denied certain occurrences which are beyond doubt, it has associated itself with and defended the crimes committed by the Crown forces in Ireland. The blame for the present situation does not rest primarily with the members of the Crown forces, but with the Government.

The Results of the Government's Policy

(1) The Health of the People

Months of oppression, coercion, and physical violence cannot but have far-reaching effects upon the people who suffer under them. The future alone will bring to light the complete results of the awful events which have followed in rapid succession in Ireland, particularly during the past twelve months. We may, however, point to some of the consequences which are now obvious to all who have come into close touch with the Irish people.

It is clear that the terrorism which prevails has had serious effects upon the health of people. We may leave out of account the obvious consequences likely to follow to the members of a household who have been the horrified witnesses of bloodshed and violence in their own homes, and consider the effects of the terror upon those who have never experienced such an ordeal. There is medical testimony to show that the fear inspired by "Black and Tans" and Auxiliary Police has had the most adverse effects upon pregnant women. Children naturally suffer from the effects of a terror-laden atmosphere, and we are informed that the number of cases of such diseases as St. Vitus' dance has considerably increased. A large section of the population is "all nerves." The strain has begun to tell, especially in those areas where the excesses of the Crown forces have been most frequent.

(2) Economic Life

Equally disastrous has been the effect of the existing conditions in Ireland upon the economic life of the country. The creeping paralysis which has attacked Irish trade and industry is not without its influence upon Great Britain. Last year Ireland imported goods to the value of £158,000,000, whilst her exports amounted to £178,000,000. The great bulk of this trade was with Great Britain. Instead of expanding (as with settled peace it undoubtedly would) it may diminish to the detriment of both the Irish and British peoples. At a time when unemployment is increasing, Ireland's economic activities are being slowly strangled. If Ireland were able to satisfy her needs, the effect upon British trade and upon employment in this country would be appreciable, whilst the payment she would make in the form of bacon, butter, eggs, cattle, and other produce would not be without their effect on the cost of living.

The stagnation of trade in Ireland is due partly to the destruction of industrial capital (in the shape of buildings, machinery, and other equip-

ment), partly to the general atmosphere of terrorism, and partly also to the actual suspension of the railway service over a large part of the country. Fortunately, however, the railway service is to be resumed.

We have referred in earlier sections of the Report to the burning of creameries, over forty of which have been totally or partially destroyed. The total business done by these creameries amounts, at the very least, to £1,000,000 a year. To the creameries comes the produce of the farmers in the neighbourhood. The number of suppliers of milk to a creamery may be a few score or several hundreds. The destruction of a creamery, through which a farmer reaches the market, obviously strikes a heavy blow at the agriculturists in an area, apart from the actual loss sustained to the co-operative society by the loss of buildings, equipment, and stock. The co-operative movement in Ireland has been built up in the face of enormous difficulties, and with great sacrifice and enthusiasm. It is in some ways one of the most remarkable developments of recent years in Ireland, and the destruction of co-operative creameries has inflicted a grievous blow on a movement full of promise.

The burning of factories, such as those at Balbriggan and Bandon, to which we have already referred, of printing works, as at Tralee, Athlone, and elsewhere, of other workshops, and of large distributive stores (such as has taken place on a large scale in Cork) has meant both the loss of a considerable amount of wealth and a growth of unemployment.

The suppression of markets in many places has increased Ireland's economic troubles and inflicted serious injury, particularly upon the peasant population. In Killarney, for example, fairs have been prohibited, and the poorer sections of the community who fattened pigs for sale have no means of transporting them to adjacent markets.

Moreover, the prevailing uncertainty has had an adverse effect upon trade everywhere. We have already pointed out, for example, that distributive stores in Cork have suffered very considerably in recent months.

One of the most distressing features of the economic situation in Ireland is the discouragement of enterprise. As an example we may quote an instance which was brought under the notice of the Commission. A scheme was inaugurated for the establishment of a business organisation under the title of Irish Co-operative Meat Limited. The organising committee consisted of representatives of the Farmers' Unions and Co-operative Societies in the counties of Cork, Waterford, Kilkenny, Carlow, Tipperary, and Limerick and Queen's Co. The project will require funds amounting to a quarter of a million sterling. So far, about 160,000 shares (out of a total of 250,000) have been taken up by 5,000 members. The purpose of the concern is to develop the export of meat to this country, and by providing cold storage for butter, cheese, poultry, and eggs, to ensure increased and regular supplies for export. The policy of terrorism in the area concerned in the enterprise, and the destruction of co-operative creameries in Ireland, have combined to render the immediate execution of the plans of Irish Co-operative Meat Limited impracticable. Farmers and Co-operative Societies are naturally disinclined to risk capital in the prevailing circumstances, and even if the total sum necessary for the scheme were forthcoming, the promoters would hardly feel justified in proceeding with the erection of buildings which might suffer destruction at the hands of the forces of the Crown. This important new development of Irish industry may, if existing conditions continue, be killed in the birth.

It is, in our opinion, disastrous that the British Government's policy in Ireland should be one calculated to destroy the economic life of the country, and more particularly to strangle the new developments of the co-operative movement.

(3) The Spirit of the People

The Government has stated that it is "breaking the terror" created by the "murder gang." The effect of their policy cannot be so simply described. There are signs here and there that the Government's policy, and the intimidation and cruelty for which the Crown forces are responsible, might force a section of the people into a sullen acquiescence in the political government imposed on Ireland by Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition, and that the spirit of these people might be broken. We shall not count it for righteousness in the British Government if it achieves this end. On the contrary, we should regard it as the worst of the crimes which could be charged against them.

We do not think, however, that the real danger lies in this direction. One of the most fundamental results of coercion and violence is the intensification of the spirit of revolt and the increased bitterness against British dominion. We ask what effect the harrying of Irishmen is likely to have upon their minds. It is more likely to engender deeper hostility than to encourage conciliatory feelings. Even if such men were to abjure their faith—which is not likely—it would not ensure their safety. Moreover, the murder or ill-treatment of husbands and sons and brothers, the indignities to which large numbers of people have been subjected, the threats which have been hurled at them, and the provocative behaviour of members of the armed forces in Ireland are creating a new bitterness of spirit which a stern and relentless policy of violence will only strengthen and can never allay.

Whatever the Government may assert to the contrary, their policy is a failure. It may yield an apparent and temporary success, but the rising generation is being nurtured in an atmosphere of hatred for all things British, and until reasonableness and generosity supersede repression and violence, the Irish problem will remain insoluble. The urgent question which lies before the British people is that of peace in Ireland.

Conclusion

We cannot close this section of the Report without an appeal to the British Labour Movement and to the British public. Things are being done in the name of Britain which must make her name stink in the nostrils of the whole world. The honour of our people has been gravely compromised. Not only is there a reign of terror in Ireland which should bring a blush of shame to the cheek of every British citizen, but a nation is being held in subjection by an empire which has proudly boasted that it is the friend of small nations. Let the people of Britain raise their voices in a united demand for the rescue of the Irish people from the rule of force and for the establishment of peace and freedom and a new brotherhood between the peoples of the British Isles. Only by repudiating the errors of the past and the infamies of the present can the democracy of Great Britain recover its honour. Only by granting to Ireland the freedom which is her due can we fulfil our great responsibilities towards our sister nation.

PART III

PEACE EFFORTS

British Labour's Policy

The National Executive of the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party have been concerning themselves for a considerable period with the possibilities of bringing about an honourable and durable settlement of the problem of Irish Government. The resolution adopted at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party held at Scarborough in June aimed at defining the general principles which British Labour regarded as the essential basis of any solution that the majority of the Irish people were likely to accept.

On the occasion of the third reading of the Government of Ireland Bill in the House of Commons on November 11, the Rt. Hon. William Adamson, M.P., Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, made an important new pronouncement on Labour's Irish policy which was in strict harmony with the Scarborough resolution, and removed any doubts that may have existed regarding the interpretation of that resolution. Briefly, the policy outlined by Mr. Adamson was as follows :—

- (a) That the British Army of Occupation be withdrawn.
- (b) That the question of Irish Government be relegated to an Irish Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of proportional representation by free, equal, and secret vote.
- (c) That the Constitution drawn up by the Assembly be accepted provided—
 - (1) it affords protection to minorities; and
 - (2) prevents Ireland becoming a military or naval menace to Britain.

The importance of this new declaration lay in the fact that it represented in clear and unequivocal terms the considered views of the political wing of British organised Labour, and carried with it the unanimous support of both the National Executive and the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Irish Labour's Policy and its Significance

The political effects of this official presentation of definite policy began to manifest themselves almost immediately. On November 16, the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress held a National Conference in Dublin, at which a thousand properly-accredited delegates were present. This conference, which spoke in the name of the combined political and industrial Labour Movement in Ireland, took cognisance of the British Labour Party's Irish policy, as it had been outlined by Mr. Adamson, and unanimously adopted the following resolution :—

This conference declares, on behalf of the Irish Labour Movement, its readiness to advocate the acceptance of this policy as being the fulfilment of Ireland's demand for the right to choose and decide its own form of Government, and assures the British workers that the realisation of the policy outlined will lead to goodwill and fraternity between the two peoples; and further we endorse the statement already made by our National Executive to the leaders of the British Trade Union Movement,

that the only obstacle to peace and good order is the presence of the British armed forces ; and we endorse with confidence the assurance they have given that the withdrawal of these forces from any district, leaving responsibility and power for the maintenance of order to the popularly elected representatives, will secure peace and good government in that district.

This resolution was remarkable in its significance. For the first time since 1914 the British and Irish Labour Movements were in true alignment on the great issue of Irish self-government. It is not without interest to remark that this rapprochement was the consequential result of British Labour's initiative. Irish Labour came into line with British Labour in support of a definite set of proposals emanating not from Ireland but from England, for the solution of what is primarily an Irish problem. Unity of purpose and (as will be seen) uniformity of method had been achieved between the workers of Great Britain and their comrades in Ireland.

British Labour was not alone in recognising the great political importance of this resolution. The Prime Minister, in reply to a question in the House of Commons on November 25, said :—

I have carefully considered the resolution in question and welcome it as expressing a desire on the part of Irish Labour organisations for a constitutional settlement. . . . Undoubtedly this body represents a very powerful section of Irish opinion, and to that extent it is a valuable contribution.

The Prime Minister added that he did not believe that Ireland would accept an expression of opinion from a Labour conference as an expression of opinion of the whole nation. Irish Labour was apparently not the body which the Prime Minister regarded as being able "to deliver the goods"; nevertheless he conceded that the conference declaration was "a valuable contribution."

Labour and Violence

It had been intended that the Labour Commission of Inquiry into Reprisals, and their moral and economic effects, should leave London for Dublin on November 23. On November 22 a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party was held at the House of Commons to discuss the question of the departure of the Commission in the light of the unhappy events which occurred in Dublin during the previous week-end. At this meeting it was decided that the Commission's departure should be postponed until the following week. The prejudicial effects of all acts of violence to the restoration of peace in Ireland and to the opening up of negotiations for a settlement by agreement of the political problem were discussed and the following resolution was passed :—

This meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party expresses its deep horror of the brutal assassination of British subjects, civilian and military, in Dublin during the past week-end. The Labour Party has already emphatically denounced the British Government's inhuman policy of reprisals, but the Parliamentary Party, whilst associating itself fully with such denunciation, also condemns acts of violence committed against agents of the British Government and others, under whatever provocation. It holds that, from the political point of view, such acts embitter public opinion, provide the Government with apparent justification for their policy of reprisals, and jeopardise the efforts that are being made by the Labour Party under grave difficulties to bring about an early and honourable settlement of the Irish question.

The Parliamentary Labour Party appeals to both sides for an immediate truce. It calls upon the leaders of the Sinn Féin Movement to repudiate the outrages committed in the name of Irish Nationalism, and to take every possible step to bring them to an end, and upon the British

Government to discontinue its policy of physical repression. Outrages and reprisals, by whomsoever committed, have thrust into the background the real problem, and until they are terminated there can be no progress made towards the inauguration of an era of peace and freedom in Ireland.

In this resolution the Parliamentary Labour Party indicated what it regarded as the chief obstacle in the path to peace, and it gave utterance to the above two-fold appeal in the hope that it would afford both sides an opportunity to make a frank and dignified response which would lead to a cessation of acts of violence and other provocative acts and so pave the way for the opening up of negotiations.

Truce Conversations

On November 23 Mr. Henderson, who had been appointed chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, and Mr. Adamson took part in a private discussion with Mr. George Russell ("A. E.") and Mr. James MacNeill, brother of Professor John MacNeill, one of the most influential and responsible of the Sinn Fein leaders. On the following day Mr. Henderson and Mr. George Russell breakfasted with the Prime Minister when an extended conversation took place regarding the situation in Ireland.

Following upon these informal discussions Mr. Henderson suggested that it was desirable the Commission should extend the scope of its activities in Ireland to include conversations with representative leaders regarding the possibilities of a truce being arranged as a preliminary step toward official negotiations. Mr. Adamson, who had been associated with Mr. Henderson in some of the private discussions in London and who was not one of the original members, became an additional member of the Commission, it being understood that Mr. Henderson and Mr. Adamson should devote their time and attention to the peace issue, leaving the other members of the Commission to carry on the inquiries concerning reprisals.

No definite plans had been arranged, prior to the Commission leaving London, regarding the steps to be taken with a view to exploring the possibilities of a cessation of acts of violence being brought about. An informal consultation with members of the Executive Committee of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress had, however, been arranged with a view to discussing the general work of the Commission. It was hoped that this meeting would afford an opportunity to touch upon the wider issue of a truce. The reason for this limited move was that the Commission were strongly averse from taking any step that might not meet with the approval of the Irish Labour representatives, and considered that it would be quite useless to attempt any act of mediation unless they were able to count upon the benevolent support of Irish Labour. The newly established unity between the two national movements was not to be endangered by any precipitate action, however well-intentioned, on the part of the British Labour Commission.

During the train journey from London to Holyhead the Commission noticed in the press the remarkable letter issued by Mr. Roger Sweetman, Sinn Fein M.P. for North Wexford. In this letter Mr. Sweetman suggested an immediate conference between the British Labour Commission, the Irish Labour Party, the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, and the Irish Peace Conference, with the object of considering steps to put a stop to bloodshed in Ireland. He stated, "I am absolutely convinced that the methods of warfare now being employed are deplorable in their results to our country, both from a material as well as a moral standpoint. I therefore take it upon myself in this great crisis to make this suggestion solely on my own responsibility."

This letter, it will be observed, contained a direct reference to the Labour Commission, and it was regarded as affording a valuable opportunity for the issue of a statement dealing with the greater issue with which a portion of the Commission proposed to concern themselves. Accordingly, Mr. Henderson made the following communication to the press, as a tentative response to Mr. Sweetman's suggestion :—

We have seen the proposal made by Mr. R. M. Sweetman, Sinn Féin M.P. for North Wexford, suggesting an immediate conference between the Irish Labour Party, the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, the Irish Peace Conference, and ourselves, with the object of bringing to an end acts of violence in Ireland. The suggestion is both courageous and timely, and will certainly be most carefully considered at our first meeting as a Commission.

Whilst the specific purpose of our visit is to inquire into allegations which have been made with regard to outrages and reprisals, we desire to say to the Irish people that we are less concerned with apportioning responsibility for violence in Ireland than with proposals for terminating violence and disorder; and they may rely upon us to give all the assistance in our power to any suggestion for re-establishing peace in Ireland. We should, indeed, be only too happy if in any way our Commission could become an instrument towards this end.

If the bodies mentioned by Mr. Sweetman express any desire to secure our co-operation they will find us ready to meet them. We do not wish to prejudice any chances there may be of terminating the reign of violence in Ireland, and we must, therefore, wait until our good offices are invited. Moreover, before committing ourselves to any particular method of helping forward the cause of peace, we should wish to confer with our Irish Labour colleagues, whose policy for the settlement of the Irish question is in complete accord with that formulated by the British Labour Party.

We are convinced that once a halt is called to the murderous strife which is now rending the living body of Ireland in twain, it will be possible to attain a permanent settlement on the lines of conciliation and consent.

The reception of this statement by the press, and especially the Irish press, was on the whole both sympathetic and encouraging.

On Wednesday, December 1, the Commission held its first meeting in Dublin, which was attended by Messrs. McPartlin (chairman), William O'Brien, Farren, O'Farrell, and T. Johnson (secretary), representing the Executive of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress. Mr. Henderson explained that the primary purpose of the Commission was to inquire into the whole question of reprisals. But they were of the opinion that it was especially desirable to secure a cessation of all acts of violence, so as to create a suitable atmosphere in which official negotiations for an official truce and subsequently for a political settlement might be conducted between the representatives of the British Government and accredited delegates from the elected representatives of the Irish people. He further declared that the Commission were only concerned to use their good offices in the capacity of mediators desirous of helping towards this end provided they were acceptable to both sides. Care would be taken to make it perfectly clear that the initiative in the matter had been taken by the British Labour Commission, who were anxious to avoid the impression being created that Ireland alone was desirous of a truce being established, or that any steps which might be taken by the Commission were inspired by any supposed "weakening" on the part of the Irish people.

As the Irish Labour representatives had not been informed that it was

the intention of the Commission to broach the question of a truce and consequently had not come prepared to express any official view in the matter, the Commission retired in order that their Irish colleagues should have an opportunity fully and freely to discuss the proposals in private. On re-assembling the Commission were acquainted with the official views of the Executive Committee of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress.

The next step taken by Messrs. Henderson and Adamson was to seek a personal interview with Dr. Walsh, Archbishop of Dublin. The meeting took place on the morning of Thursday, December 2.

In the afternoon of the same day they paid a visit to Mountjoy Prison where, by the courtesy of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, they had a long private consultation with Mr. Arthur Griffith, the acting President of the Irish Republic.

On Sunday, December 5, Mr. Henderson, who motored from Dublin to Armagh, was received by Cardinal Logue, the Irish Primate.

The proposals discussed at each of these several interviews were in strict accord with those outlined by the Commission to the representatives of the Irish Labour movement.

In addition to seeing the foregoing, Messrs. Henderson and Adamson met a number of representative persons connected with Irish trade and industry, the higher professions, or political parties other than Sinn Fein, and individual citizens who took a deep personal interest in the national problem of Ireland but who were not associated with any political organisation.

The general conclusions formed by the Commission as the result of these inquiries may be summarised as follows :—

(a) There was undoubtedly a general desire among the Irish people for an immediate and complete cessation of all acts of violence and all provocative acts.

(b) There did not appear to be any grounds to justify the belief held in certain quarters that Sinn Fein was almost ready to surrender unconditionally or was becoming anxious for peace at any price.

(c) The attitude of responsible leaders of different branches of organised thought and opinion was one of conditional approval of the suggestion of a truce. As regards official negotiations, they were convinced that the leaders of Sinn Fein would only enter a conference provided they were recognised as being on terms of equality—as the elected representatives of one nation negotiating with the elected representatives of another nation.

(d) That, provided there was a real disposition on the part of the British Government to respond to the general call for a truce, there would be an equally ready disposition on the part of those in Ireland who wield enormous power to exert their influence with the extremists in the direction of bringing a period of calm and tranquillity in their country.

(e) That, in the event of both sides earnestly endeavouring to give effect, in the first instance, to an informal policy on these lines, there were reasonable grounds for believing that a cessation of strife could be effected, provided it was understood that negotiations for an official truce, to be followed by negotiations for a political settlement, would be inaugurated within a reasonable period.

(f) The bulk of the Irish population regard the British Labour Party as the final hope of rendering possible a settlement by agreement.

Fortified by the views which had been expressed to them in Ireland, Messrs. Henderson and Adamson returned to London, in the belief that if the Government were sincere in their expressed desire for peace in Ireland and were not irrevocably fixed to their policy of ruthless repression as the only means whereby they believed peace would be realised, they were in a position to make suggestions which would materially help towards an expeditious settlement.

On Tuesday, December 7, they were received by the Prime Minister who listened to their proposals and their views on the Irish situation, in the light of the information they had gained and the impression they had formed during their visit to Ireland. The Prime Minister at this interview was non-committal. He gave his reply on Friday, December 10, in the House of Commons, when he outlined the Government's new policy of proclaiming martial law in certain districts, while encouraging every effort towards peace. The two principal features of his statement were :—

(a) A promise of safe conduct to all Sinn Fein M.P.s not accused of serious crime to meet to discuss peace; and

(b) Martial law and intensified war against the militant members of the I.R.A. in the south-west of Ireland.

This official statement appeared to indicate that Labour's efforts for peace in Ireland had been rendered at least temporarily abortive. Notwithstanding this, however, the Commission made yet another effort to influence the mind of the Prime Minister. On Thursday, December 16, at a joint meeting of the National Executive of the Labour Party, the Parliamentary Labour Party, and the full Commission, which had returned from Ireland, it was decided to request the Prime Minister to receive the members of the Commission as a deputation. The interview took place at the House of Commons at 5.30 p.m., the Prime Minister being accompanied by Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Hamar Greenwood. Mr. Henderson and Mr. Adamson represented to the Prime Minister the situation in Ireland as it had been appraised by the Commission, and reiterated their appeal to the Government to declare their willingness to participate in an all-round cessation of acts of violence as an essential stepping stone to official negotiations. The Prime Minister's reply, however, made no appreciable advance from the position which he had taken up in his statement in Parliament on the previous Friday, though he did encourage the Commission to proceed with its peace endeavours.

The Commission's Proposals

While, in view of the latest Ministerial declarations, the Commission were not very sanguine of immediate success, they decided to persist in their mediatory efforts which had proceeded so satisfactorily in the early stages. The proposal which the Commission had submitted to the Irish Labour representatives and to Cardinal Logue and the Archbishop of Dublin was that the Commission should prepare an appeal to be issued over the signatures of its members, and to be countersigned by representatives of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, and by the Irish Catholic Hierarchy or responsible representatives thereof.

It was proposed that the appeal should be directed to the British Government and the recognised leaders of Sinn Fein, urging the cessation of all acts of violence and all other provocative acts committed by responsible or irresponsible members of either the Crown forces or the Sinn Fein movement, in order to produce a period of quiet in Ireland; that when this unofficial truce had operated for an agreed period, official negotiations should be commenced for (a) a regular truce, and (2) a peaceful settlement of the political question by agreement.

While it was suggested that the preliminary truce should be unofficial and in the nature of an earnest of good intention, it was intended that it should be the first of three related steps to which tentative agreement should be secured in advance from the responsible parties on both sides.

The reception of this threefold plan by the heads of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in Ireland and by the Irish Labour representatives was so favourable as to encourage Mr. Henderson and Mr. Adamson in the view that if, on their return to London, they could obtain a satisfactory response from the Government, it would be possible to make a beginning in the direction of peace by the issue of the Labour Commission's proposed appeal, countersigned by the responsible leaders of the two national bodies referred to above. The Government, however, neither definitely rejected nor actually accepted the proposals.

The effect of this non-committal attitude, and of the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons, was prejudicial to British Labour's endeavours at conciliation, as will be gathered from the following text of a communication addressed to the Prime Minister on Thursday, December 23 :—

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

When you received the Labour Commission on Ireland, you suggested that we might continue our efforts in the direction of peace and the cessation of the policy of violence. As the result of your statement to the House of Commons on Friday, December 10, the Commission were in considerable doubt as to whether the representatives of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress would join in the appeal which, in the more promising circumstances existing when the Commission was in Dublin, they and the heads of the Catholic Hierarchy had promised to do, provided that there were reasonable assurances that such an appeal would meet with a response on both sides.

Notwithstanding our doubts, the Commission, after our interview with you, Mr. Bonar Law, and Sir Hamar Greenwood, felt that they must act in harmony with your suggestion to go forward with our peace effort. Accordingly, we communicated with the Executive of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, who have replied to the effect that, judging by your speech of Friday, December 10, there seems to be no prospect of the Government making an immediate response to the suggested appeal, and that in existing circumstances for them to associate with the Labour Commission in any such appeal would be calculated to do more harm than good.

We are not surprised at the reply to our letter, and feel bound, most regretfully, to say that as the matter stands now there is a deadlock which can only be removed by the Government. We beg you most earnestly to consider whether it would not be possible for you, for a limited period from a given date after the issue of an appeal for a cessation of all acts of violence endorsed by the heads of the Catholic Hierarchy and the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, to undertake that so far as the Crown forces are concerned there should be no acts of provocation or violence. On our side, we would endeavour to obtain a similar undertaking from Sinn Fein, it being understood that you would call off "reprisals" only if Sinn Fein called off all acts of violence.

We suggest also that you should undertake during this "unofficial truce" to meet those who can speak for the elected representatives of the Irish people for the purpose of agreeing upon the terms of an open truce to continue, say, four months, and that during this period the seventy-one elected representatives should be allowed to meet to elect

their delegates and formulate proposals for discussion with representatives of the British Government of the general question of a permanent settlement, each side being free to state its demands.

We feel sure that on these lines the present unhappy condition of Ireland could be terminated, and if you will, on behalf of the British Government, accept the proposals we have outlined, you may rely upon the Labour Party and ourselves to give every assistance in our power.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ARTHUR HENDERSON,
WILLIAM ADAMSON.

Conclusion

The Commission deeply regret that their efforts have not met with that measure of immediate success for which they had hoped, and which they were entitled to expect. It has to be borne in mind, however, that the Commission occupied the difficult position of unofficial mediators engaged in the voluntary task of attempting to create a set of circumstances that would render probable a conference between the representatives of the British Government and those of Sinn Fein. It is true that for the time being they have not achieved their object, but they believe their endeavours have not been entirely fruitless. Labour can render valuable service not only by helping to create the right atmosphere but also by pursuing its purpose of endeavouring to establish direct contact and official relations between the British Government and the Sinn Fein movement. The final solution of the Irish problem will not be found through a policy of violence or of vengeance. Ultimately it will have to be found along the lines of conciliation and consent by the more enlightened method of negotiation. The Irish people have faith in British Labour alone among the political parties in this country, and we believe that if the Labour Movement will persist in its efforts for peace it will be able to make an effective contribution towards the settlement of the most difficult problem now confronting the British people.

(Signed)

ARTHUR HENDERSON (Chairman).

WILLIAM ADAMSON.

J. BROMLEY.

A. G. CAMERON.

F. W. JOWETT.

J. LAWSON.

W. LUNN.

C. W. KENDALL.

C. B. THOMSON.

W. W. HENDERSON.

ARTHUR GREENWOOD,

Secretary.

December 28, 1920.

APPENDICES

A
~~SECRET.~~
C1

S.
ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY OFFICE, DUBLIN CASTLE.

Crime Department—Special Branch.

(The Officer to whom this File is addressed is responsible for its safe custody.)

SUBJECT Information

Date... The 20th ... 19.. 20..

Cp' Kenagh

A man named Baker who is employed in the Dublin Tramways, has just returned from Thurles, and has furnished Griffiths with sworn statements of outrages committed by "Black & Tans" in Tipperary. He has relations in Thurles and it is suggested that they should be looked up. This should be done as discreetly as possible. Perhaps the police know something of these people, and should act according to the best of their judgment, and report result of search if such be made.

L. Chessman
C1 100 219

PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SECRET POLICE DOCUMENT REFERRED TO ON PAGE 67

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

POLICE DOCUMENTS

(1) Police Complicity in "Reprisals"

The original of the following document is no longer in possession of the authorities. The Commission saw the actual document and a photograph was taken of it. The term "look up" is apparently an accepted phrase which may cover a multitude of sins. The instructions in the document are couched in vague language, but the Commission is of opinion that the recipient of the instructions would read between the lines.

SECRET

117S

34142

ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY OFFICE, DUBLIN CASTLE

CRIME DEPARTMENT—SPECIAL BRANCH

(The officer to whom this file is addressed is responsible for its safe custody.)

Subject.....Information.....

Date : November 16, 1920.

C.I., NENAGH

A man named Baker, who is employed in the Dublin Tramways, has just returned from Thurles, and has furnished Griffith with sworn statements of outrages committed by "Black and Tans" in Tipperary.

He has relations in Thurles, and it is suggested that they should be "looked up." This should be done as discreetly as possible. Perhaps the police know something of these people, and should act according to the best of their judgment, and report result of search if such be made.

L. CHEESMAN,

C.I. for D.I.G.

The above document may be compared with the telegram (a photograph of the original of which is reproduced in this Report) sent by the District Inspector of Police in Sligo to the Head Constable of Ballaghadreen, instructing him to "inform all available Auxiliary Force to proceed at once to Ballymote, where a sergeant has been shot." The head constable and the Auxiliaries would doubtless read between the lines of the instructions. The only apparent purpose for which the Auxiliaries should be asked to go to a place where a sergeant has been shot is for revenge (*see* page 14).

(2) Theft of Motor-cars by "Black and Tans"

The following is an abridged POLICE report (from which only formal matter and names are omitted) relating to the theft of motor-cars by men who, in the opinion of the local police, were "Black and Tans."

ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY

County of _____

District of _____

Subdistrict of _____

REPORT OF OUTRAGE

Nature of outrage : Larceny or malicious injury.

Date and hour of occurrence : 2/11/20, between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m.

Name, &c., and condition in life of injured person : I.—A— B—

II.—C— D—

STATEMENT

Station : _____

Dated this 10th day of November, 1920.

I.—I have to report that on the night of the 2nd inst., between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m., the garage of A— B—, _____, was forced open and an Overland car taken out and thrown into a stream 200 yards from the garage. B— also alleges that twelve motor tubes and a rug were taken. He also states that the tap of a barrel of lubricating oil was turned on and allowed to flow all over the garage.

He has lodged a claim for £300. Very little damage, if any, was done the car.

II.—On same night a new Overland car [registration number given] was taken out of the garage of C— D—, _____ Street, _____, and taken away, and has not since been traced or returned.

It is suspected that a party of "Black and Tans" first entered B—'s garage and endeavoured to start his Overland, but failed. They then, it is thought, took it out and threw it in a stream close by. B— is a Sinn Feiner, and it is suspected his cars are for a long time past being engaged in doing Sinn Fein work.

The party then went to C—'s and took away his new Overland car, valued for £490, and it has not since been returned or traced.

On morning of occurrence the police wired to all adjoining towns the description of the Overland car taken, but there is no clue. Both C— and the police suspect some party of "Black and Tans," who wanted a car to go on a journey, of taking away this Overland, and were expecting daily that it would be returned. C—, the injured man, is loyal, and through all the trouble in _____ repaired the police cars. He has three or four cars for hiring purposes ; this, with a little repairing shop, are his sole means of living.

The local "Black and Tans" deny any knowledge of the taking of C—'s car.

I have still hopes that the car will be returned.

(Signed)

(3) The Provision of Masks by the Government

The following is a copy of a packing note, showing that goggles for "night practice"—or masks, as we prefer to call them—are supplied by the authorities for the use of the forces of the Crown in Ireland. The Commission examined one of these masks, which are expensively produced.

Package	{	Description : 1 Case	Army Form G.1028
		PACKING NOTE	
		No. B.132	C.fergus Station.
Unit :	O.C. Depot Rl. Irish Fus.		12/10/20. Date.
Indent No. and date			

DESCRIPTION OF STORES.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF STORES	QUANTITY
------------------------	----------	-----------------------	----------

Section 15

Goggles Night practice	
Sets	16
Case W.P.	1

Packer : WM. SEMPLE

Witness :
WM. MULLAN, SR.

(4) Drink demanded at Points of Revolvers and Indiscriminate Firing by Military

The following police statements (which were not supplied to the Commission by the authorities and which may be incomplete) indicate that military have not been altogether free from indefensible acts.

32003

84069 C

66189

ROYAL IRISH CASTABULARY OFFICE,
DUBLIN CASTLE,

October 26, 1920

Kilfenora visited by a party of men on 27/9/20. Drink demanded at the points of revolvers; indiscriminate firing; two cows shot.

C.I. ENNIS

What is the result of the further inquiries made by the D.I.?

The men are said to have arrived in a lorry. Perhaps the D.I. can ascertain the class of lorry, to see whether it resembled a police or military lorry.

The residents who saw the men should be able to closely describe their uniform.

We want to get at the following:—

(1) Whether the men were dressed as police or military or neither—a description of the uniform would decide.

(2) Were they Irish or English?

(3) Was the lorry a Crossley tender, or what?

This case should be fully inquired into, and the D.I. should state whether he is satisfied that the cows were shot dead, and express his opinion from his inquiries as to who the uniformed persons were.

If there is any likelihood that the men were police the D.I.'s of the surrounding districts, who have lorries in their district, should state whether any of their men were in the district in question at the time.

(Signed) C. A. WALSH,

D.I.G.

County Inspector's Office,
ENNIS. 28/10/1920.

Transmitted for report, please.

(Signed) R. D. HARRISON,
T.C.I.

D.I. ENNISTYMON

ENNISTYMON, 30/10/20

Report herewith.

(Signed) J. J. BERREEN.
3 D.I.

C.I.

COUNTY OF CLARE,
ENNISTYMON,

30/10/20

Kilfenora visited by a party of men on 27/9/20. Drink demanded at the points of revolvers; indiscriminate firing; two cows and a horse shot.

With reference to my report, Form 38, on 28/9/20, and 38/Fr. on 7/10/20, I beg to report that the men arrived in a lorry, which resembled a military one, from direction of Lisdoonvarna. The residents who saw them say they were soldiers. They were dressed in military uniform. They spoke with an English accent, and were not Irish. The lorry was described as the ordinary military one, but the persons who saw it cannot say whether it was a Crossley tender, or not.

I have inquired fully into the case, and am satisfied that the cows and the horse were shot dead, and am of opinion that the uniformed persons were soldiers.

There is no likelihood that the men were police. The residents who saw them have no doubt whatever that they were soldiers.

(Signed) J. J. BERREEN,
3 D.I.

C.L.

B

ENNIS, 1/11/20

Please report as to A.

R. D. HARRISON,
T.C.I.

D.I. S'BARNE.

Complied with.

C. J. DIGNA,
3 D.I.

LISDOONVARNA,
Co. CLARE.
4/11/20.

Kilfarna visited by a party of men on 27/9/20 ; drink demanded at points of revolvers ; indiscriminate firing ; two cows shot.

I beg to (report) that there were no police from this district in or near Kilfernora on the date of this occurrence. I had no motor-lorry of any kind in this district at the time.

C. J. DIGNA,
3 D.I.

County Inspector's Office,

ENNIS, 5/11/20.

Submitted.

H. J. MUNRO,
T.C.I.

I.G.

(5) Police Reports of an Attack upon Women

The two following police documents, which came into the hands of the Commission from unofficial sources, relate to a case into which we inquired. Evidence obtained by the Commission may conveniently preface the police reports.

The case is that of Miss A—— B—— and her sister, Mrs. C—— D——, who live at —— Road.

On the front of the house is its name very prominently in Gaelic. About 2 a.m. on October 26 they were alarmed by the crashing of their front room windows, which they afterwards found had been done with bullets which they picked up in the room. Nothing more took place.

On November 1 they went to bed about 11 p.m. At about 12.30 they heard a noise in the yard and a knocking at the door. They rushed downstairs and saw three men at the door. Two of them, armed with revolvers, rushed in saying they were officers, but they were in civilian clothes. When in the house the men, who were hopelessly drunk, said they were "Black and Tans." Miss A—— B—— says she was afraid of the second man, and watched him carefully. She then tried to knock the revolver out of his hand, but he became violent. Miss A—— B—— and the man struggled, and ultimately he fell on his back in the front room, the woman still holding the hand in which was the weapon. It was fired, and the shots entered the wall. The man who was down called to the other, whose hand was held by Mrs. C—— D——, to "Shoot, Bobby." A third man did shoot, and the bullet passed over the heads of "Bobby" and Mrs. C—— D——. At this moment, Miss A—— B—— ran out of the front door and Mrs. C—— D—— out of the back. Shots were fired at them, but they were not hit. Miss A—— B—— went along the street and saw two policemen. She asked them to come to —— Road as there was murder going on, but just previously she had screamed and shouted "murder" and no one came. The policemen said they would come in a minute or so, but they did not come, and when she got back her sister was absent, Mrs. C—— D—— having gone to ask another policeman to come, who refused. She called at Mrs. ——'s. Miss A—— B——

then went to the barracks and brought some police back with her. On the way they passed one and then another man crawling alongside the barrack wall, one of them having nothing on his head.

At the house the police picked up a cap and bullets and took them away, and since then the women have been to the barracks and identified "Bobby."

Two weeks ago an officer called and said the men were belonging to the ———, and would be court-martialled. He said that the women would be informed, but they have not heard anything since.

POLICE REPORT (No. 1)

D DIVISION,

BRIDEWELL STATION,

November 1, 1920

THREE MEN ENTER ——— ROAD AND FIRE SHOTS

I beg to report that at 1.40 a.m., 1st inst., Constable ——— telephoned to Bridewell Station from ——— Street Barracks, stating that a short time previously a woman, who declined to give her name, called at the barracks and told the constable that there was some trouble in ——— Road.

On receipt of the message, Constables ——— and ——— were sent at once to the place, and soon afterwards Sergeant ——— and I went there, and after patrolling the road saw light in the house ——— Road.

On making inquiries there we were informed by Miss A—— B—— that, at about 12.30 a.m., while in bed, she heard a knock at the back door, and on coming downstairs asked who was there. "We are Black and Tans." She opened the door, and three men in civilian garb entered, each holding a revolver in his hand. On asking what they wanted, one replied, "We came for arms," and on being told that there were none in the house one of them entered the drawing room and got into handgrips with Miss A—— B——; in the struggle both fell. He asked her to surrender and he would give her the revolver. At the same time a shot went off, she believed accidentally, the bullet penetrating the wall separating room from hall. She then ran out by front door for the police; when leaving, a shot was fired after her.

C—— D——, sister, who was in the house at the time, stated that, after the three men were admitted, she left by back door and went to ——— Street Barracks for assistance. A shot was also fired after her. E—— F——, housekeeper, corroborated above statements.

Both Mrs. C—— D—— and her sister describe the men as being like military officers, and heavily under the influence of drink. They would know them again.

Constables ——— and ———, who were on duty at Sergeant ———'s, about 500 yards away, state that at about 12.30 a.m. they heard shots being fired in the direction of ——— Lane, some of the bullets whizzing past them. Believing that they were being fired by the military at ——— Barracks, they went towards the barracks and on their way they heard a woman shouting and screaming "murder."

Outside ——— they met a party of military with Lieut. G—— (name of regiment given). He inquired about the shots. The constables then told him about the woman screaming at ——— Road, and asked them to accompany them there. In starting from ———, a man dressed in civilian garb was seen approaching; he was halted by the sentry and searched, and in his possession was found a Webley service revolver and twenty-one rounds of ammunition. In the revolver were five spent and one live cartridge. He was brought into the guardroom. On coming along ——— Lane another man was halted by military and searched; he had a service revolver with four spent cartridges in it. He was also placed in the guardroom.

The constables, who were still accompanied by the party of military, soon afterwards met Miss A—— B——, who made a similar statement to the one made to me, and they accompanied her back to the house.

On the footway outside the house, Constable ——— picked up two spent revolver cartridges. They then returned to the ——— Barracks, and asked Lieut. G—— the names of the men detained in the guardroom. He said that they were officers belonging to the ———, ——— Barracks, but would not disclose their names. In the meantime he interviewed the adjutant, who requested that the matter would be kept confidential, and would make further inquiries and report to the police in the morning.

Privates _____ and _____, who were sentry duty at _____ Barracks gate, stated that at about twelve midnight they saw four men in civilian clothes leaving the barracks, and soon afterwards heard reports of shots being fired. A party of military, under Lieut. G_____, turned out, and this was the party who, with the constables, stopped and searched the two men mentioned and accompanied them to _____ Road.

On examination of the premises I found a bullet mark in the wall of the drawing room, about two feet from the floor, and on the footway outside the gate I found three empty revolver cartridge cases.

The three ladies already mentioned appeared to be much agitated and excited by their experience, especially as the house had been fired into on the morning of the 26th ult., as already reported.

I, with the sergeant and a number of police, searched the locality, but found no trace of any other person about, as the military were reticent about the persons they had in custody in the guardroom. I was unable to interview them or to get any information as to who they were.

(Signed) _____ (Station Sergeant)
_____ (Superintendent)

November 1, 1920

POLICE REPORT (No. 2)

I beg to report with reference to the entry _____ Road, and specially reported on the 1st inst., that, on making inquiry, I was shown by Mrs. C_____ D_____ and Miss A_____ B_____ the mark of a bullet in the woodwork beside the door of the dining room, and the mark of another bullet which passed from the inside to the outside of the woodwork under the fanlight in the hall door. These ladies stated that the men could easily have shot them had they wished, and that the shots fired on their leaving the house were fired when they had gone a considerable distance, and it was owing to the state of intoxication that they, the ladies, were able to attack them as they did. They believe they would be able to identify two of them. They can assign no reason for the attack. The _____'s, their nephews, have not been in the place for several months; that they themselves, while sympathising with Sinn Fein, are not officially connected with it, but that the name of the house in Irish on the fanlight may have attracted attention.

Major _____, X Company, _____ Barracks, informed me that he had four officers in custody over the affair—Lieuts. J_____, K_____, L_____, M_____, same company, and that he was investigating the case with a view of having them dealt with from a disciplinary point of view, and would look up the constables and ladies as witnesses.

He said that their account was that they had left the barracks to go to see the crowds at _____, and that they were fired on when passing this house, and entered it. One had a slight wound on the knee and the wrist, his wristlet watch being damaged.

(Signed) _____
Superintendent.

APPENDIX II

Some Cases Examined by the Commission

(1) Summary of Evidence taken by the Commission in the Case of the Croke Park Shootings at Dublin on the Afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920

First witness stated : " On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, I was acting as a ticket-seller at Croke Park football ground, Dublin. I was on the bridge outside the ground when at about 3.45 p.m. I saw lorries filled with ' Black and Tans ' approaching. I rushed down from the bridge into the football ground. As I was entering the field I heard shots behind me outside the ground, and a few seconds later I saw the ' Black and Tans ' enter the field."

Second witness stated : " On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, at about 3.45 p.m., I saw several lorries filled with ' Black and Tans ' arrive on the bridge outside Croke Park football field and pull up. The men in the lorries jumped out and immediately began firing down Russell Street and in the direction of the football field. I saw a man hand something to another man by the railings in Russell Street."

Third witness stated : " On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, I had been out and was returning home when I saw lorries of police pass up Russell Street in the direction of Croke Park. This would be about twenty minutes to four o'clock. I then heard a noise and went to see what it was, and saw a man crouching in a bent position by the railings in Russell Street. He was holding on to the railings with his left hand.

" An army officer went up to him and then called to me and asked for water, which I procured for him in a jug. I saw the officer was trying to dress a wound which the man had received in the lower part of the abdomen, but the man was too far gone, and shortly died."

Fourth witness stated : " On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, I was present at the football match at Croke Park, Dublin. I was taking tickets at the turnstile entrance when I saw a boy fall from a tree close by (*see plan*). I then saw ' Black and Tans ' coming from the direction of the bridge. They were firing. One of them ordered me to open the gate, and threatened to shoot me if I did not. I opened the gate, and as soon as the ' Black and Tans ' got in they began to fire towards the hill the other side of the ground.

" I went to the boy, who was still on the ground, and saw that his jersey was blood-stained near the right shoulder. He said to me, ' Take me to mother.' I picked him up and carried him to the corner of the North Circular Road, where I handed him over to a man I knew, who put him on an outside car and took him away."

Fifth witness stated : " On Sunday, November 21, 1920, I was present at the football match, Croke Park, Dublin. I was accompanied by my fiancée. We were standing near the centre line of the ground opposite the grand stand. The match had been in progress about a quarter of an hour when I saw an aeroplane approach, hover over the ground, and then go away. Almost immediately afterwards I heard the sound of shots coming from the direction of the bridge outside the ground, and my fiancée, who had hold of my arm, was shot dead. A few seconds after this ' Black and Tans ' rushed into the field through the gate near the bridge, and the people became panic-stricken. I saw the ' Black and Tans ' ordering people to put up their hands. I saw no shots fired from the crowd."

Sixth witness stated : " On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, I was acting as an official of the Gaelic Athletic Association at the football match at Croke Park, Dublin. I was on duty at the 2s. entrance gate when I saw an aeroplane fly over the ground and then go away. I immediately after this saw an armoured car arriving at the 2s. gate. I informed the secretary of this and walked over to the division between

the 1s. and 2s. enclosures (see plan). I next heard a volley at the far end of the ground and saw people rushing away from the firing. People were sitting on the wall opposite the grand stand, and when the firing began they dropped off into the Belvedere football ground. I saw no individual policeman firing, but I saw some with their rifles pointed up and I saw smoke overhead. After the volley I heard rapid independent firing. I saw no firing from the crowd. Becoming alarmed, I ran for cover a distance of about eighty yards, and whilst doing so saw the dust and gravel near me fly up from bullets."

Seventh witness stated: "On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, there was a match between Dublin and Tipperary at Croke Park football ground, Dublin. I was in the kitchen of the secretary's house, which is partly inside and partly outside the ground, when, somewhere between 3.30 and 4 p.m., I saw 'Black and Tans' rush past the window. I went out into the back yard and heard shooting as I got through the door. I then saw a man just outside the yard door, which was open. He was in a crouching position, and I saw a man in the R.I.C. uniform go up to him and deliberately shoot him. The man staggered through the yard door and then crawled to a tank the other side of the yard. I informed the police of what had happened, and some came in and saw the man lying in the yard. I tried to give the dying man a glass of water, but was prevented from doing so by a 'Black and Tan,' who threatened me with a rifle. The man was searched whilst he lay in the yard; his dead body was taken away in an ambulance. I saw one of the Association's employees, who had a child in his arms, being pushed against the wall inside the house by a policeman, who threatened him with a revolver. During the whole of the operations I only saw 'Black and Tans' and Auxiliaries—no soldiers."

Eighth witness stated: "On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, there was a match between Dublin and Tipperary at the Croke Park football ground, Dublin. I was on duty at one of the turnstiles, when at about 3.45 p.m. I went into the ground to watch the match. Almost immediately afterwards I saw 'Black and Tans' come into the ground and begin firing at the crowd. I next saw a 'Black and Tan' shoot at a man just outside the house in which the secretary of the Association lives. The man staggered through a door into the yard. I then went into the house and took one of the children up into my arms, when a 'Black and Tan' came and, putting a revolver to my throat, threatened me."

Ninth witness stated: "On the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, I was acting as a ticket-seller at the match between Dublin and Tipperary at the Croke Park football ground, Dublin. I was on duty outside the 2s. gate when, on information received, I went inside the ground, and had scarcely done so when I heard shooting. I helped to open the 2s. gate to let in an armoured car, after which I got mixed up in the crowd, and was ordered to put my hands up. Whilst in this position an R.I.C. man and an Auxiliary searched me. The Auxiliary took some notes I had amounting to about £8. This sum was part of the ticket-money, and I have not seen it since."

Tenth witness stated: "I was present at the match at Croke Park football ground, Dublin, on the afternoon of Sunday, November 21, 1920, between Dublin and Tipperary. I saw the police on the ground, but I did not see them or anybody else give a megaphone message to the spectators. The only megaphone on the ground belonged to the Association."

Eleventh witness stated: "The match between Dublin and Tipperary, which was stopped by the attack of the authorities at Croke Park football ground, Dublin, at about 3.50 p.m. on Sunday, November 21, 1920, had been arranged some three weeks previously and had been well advertised. I was present at this match, but I saw no megaphone used by the authorities, either before or during the attack. There was a megaphone on the ground, but it was the property of the Association."

(2) Summary of Evidence taken by the Commission in regard to Fires in Cork

The evidence given below was taken by the Commission in its investigations in Cork. The cases relate to the cutting of hose and to the obstruction offered to members of the fire brigade in the discharge of their duties.

Statement by a Member of the Cork City Fire Brigade in the Case of the Fire at Messrs. Forrest's, Patrick Street, Cork, on November 27, 1920.

(See extract Fire Brigade Report Book. Fire No. 8.)¹

At about 4.15 a.m., on November 27, 1920, I was called to a fire at Messrs. Forrest's, Patrick Street. I thereupon proceeded with two men from McGurk's fire to the scene of the new fire. On arriving there I saw that I could easily put it out with a chemical engine. On approaching within about ten yards of the fire, a man dressed in mufti stepped from a doorway across the pavement to the curbstone and, after firing at me, shouted to me to get back. I did so and returned to the fire-station. About thirty minutes later I was again called to the fire at Messrs. Forrest's, which by this time was so serious that a large portion of the premises was destroyed.

Messrs. Forrest's premises are in Patrick Street, and just round the corner in Academy Street I noticed men in uniform, but they made no attempt to assist or protect me.

Statement by a Member of the Cork City Fire Brigade in the Case of the Grand Parade Fire on November 25, 1920.

(See extract Fire Brigade Report Book. Fire No. 6.)

At 8 a.m., on November 25, 1920, the brigade was turned out from the central and sub-stations to go to a fire in the Grand Parade. I arrived before the men and got the hydrant ready for them. As soon as the men arrived we ran a line of hose up the staircase of the premises held by the Artane Clothing Company, and others. We then brought another line of hose across the Grand Parade and up a ladder, playing in the upper portion of the building. In a few moments the water stopped running through this hose, and I saw that the hose had been cut about the centre of the Grand Parade. I got another line of hose to work and taken up the ladder. Having done this, I saw that the hose which was running up the staircase had also been cut. We put this hose right, and then I saw that the other hose up the ladder had again been cut. The only people in the street beside the fire brigade were men in the uniform of the R.I.C., others with black cloth overcoats together, with Mr. ——— and his wife, who lived near to the burning building, and some people who lived at the top of the burning premises. I saw no military at this fire. I produce those portions of the hose which were cut, also a petrol can which I found on the stairs of the burning building.

Statement by Members of the Cork City Fire Brigade in the Case of Hose-cutting and Intimidation at the Hardwicke Street Fire.

(See extract Fire Brigade Report Book. Fire No. 5.)

First witness stated : " At about 11.45 p.m., November 24, 1920, I was on duty at the Hardwicke Street fire. On arrival at the fire the hose was laid on by the men from Sullivan's Quay. It was working when I arrived. After about twenty minutes the water stopped. I went to turn the water on and found the hose uncoupled. I coupled it again and turned on the water. Some time after this the water was again stopped, and again I went to turn it on, and, having done so, I noticed that the hose was leaking badly through what appeared to be a hole in it made by some sharp instrument. When I returned to the fire the water was turned off again. I called to Fireman ———, and he went with me back to the hydrant ; we had gone about a hundred yards towards the hydrant when somebody called out, ' Get back out of that,' so, fearing we would be shot at, we turned back.

" The only people who could possibly reach the hose and the hydrant stand-pipe, apart from the men of the fire brigade, were ' Black and Tans ' and military."

Second witness : " At about 11.45 p.m. on November 24, 1920, I was on duty at the Hardwicke Street fire. I was in charge of the Hardwicke Street side of the fire, when the supply of water stopped, ——— went to see what was wrong. This happened

¹ See Appendix III, page 89.

a second time, and ——— went again to turn on the water, after which I noticed that water was spurting out of the hose-pipe about fifty yards from the hydrant ; water, however, came through the hose. For the third time the water stopped ; ——— called to me to go with him to the hydrant ; I did so. The distance from the fire to the hydrant was 100 yards, and we had proceeded about fifty yards when someone shouted, 'Get back out of that,' or words to that effect. Fearing to be shot, we went back, and I gave orders to uncouple the hose and unship the stand-pipe."

(3) Summary of Evidence taken by the Commission in the Case of the Murder of ——— and the Attempted Murder of ———

First witness : " At about midnight on Thursday, November 18, 1920, my husband and myself were awakened by a noise of the front door being broken open. My husband went out on the landing. I heard a shot, and my husband staggered back into our bedroom and crouched against the wall near the wardrobe. A man followed him in and emptied further shots from his revolver into him.

" The murderer then held a flash-lamp to my face as I lay in bed. He was dressed in policeman's clothes and wore goggles. I screamed, 'Don't shoot myself and my child, you are after murdering my husband already.' He then left and ran upstairs. Soon afterwards I heard a further shot upstairs, and the man ran down and left the house. My brother had been shot through the mouth. A little time afterwards the Corporation ambulance came, and took my husband's body and my wounded brother to the ——— Hospital.

" Except to shout 'All right' to somebody below the murderer never spoke a word. When I awoke the street outside was lit up by a powerful searchlight.

" My husband was not in the Republican movement. He was an ex-soldier and fought in the war. My brother is sixteen and a-half years old."

Second witness stated : " I was awakened about midnight in my home by a noise downstairs, and I got up. Hearing the sound of shots downstairs I came out of my room. I was met half-way down the first flight of stairs by a big man dressed in policeman's clothes, holding a revolver in one hand and a flash-lamp in the other. I screamed to him that there was nobody above but two children, and endeavoured to prevent him going up. He brushed me on one side and went up. I then heard a shot above, and half fainted. The man then hurried down past me.

" When I got up to my son's room I found him stretched on the floor near the bed, bleeding from the mouth. There were teeth on the landing and there was a trail of blood into the bedroom. Downstairs I later saw the dead body of my son-in-law. My son is sixteen and a-half years old and in the Boy Scouts."

Third witness stated : " At ten minutes past twelve on the night of November 18 and 19, 1920, I heard banging in the street and voices shouting. I looked out and saw four men kicking the door of ———'s (the first witness's) house outside. I saw them trying to take out the lock. Finally the door was opened and two went inside and two others remained outside, one on the left hand and the other on the right hand of the house. They all had policemen's caps and revolvers. One of the men who went inside had a torch-lamp. After the man had gone in I heard a shot fired, and then followed by two more shots. Shortly afterwards the four men went away ; they were laughing. I saw an armoured car at the corner of the street about ten yards down. A searchlight was playing before the shooting."

(4) Summary of Evidence taken by the Commission in a Case of Brutal Treatment and Theft

The statement given below is a sworn deposition which agrees in all points with the evidence given before the Commission.

Copy of sworn deposition of Mr. ———, of ———, Cork, concerning a raid by police and military on his residence on ———, 1920.

I was awakened at 2 a.m. on ———, 1920, at my residence, ———, Cork. My wife and myself got up, but before I was able to get downstairs I was accosted by a number of military officers on the lobby outside the bedroom door. Those of them who hadn't moustaches had the upper lip painted black as a disguise. They asked me my name, and kept my wife and myself about ten minutes standing in the cold, practically naked, answering questions as to why I had left my last house and come to live here, &c., &c.

They then allowed me to get my trousers on, and ordered me down to the kitchen. My wife, in her nightdress still, and myself went down to the kitchen where we found soldiers under the direction of an officer tearing up the flooring boards. They emptied the contents of various cupboards on to the floor. They then ordered my wife upstairs. She refused to go as military were upstairs in the bedrooms. She was eventually compelled to go.

An officer picked up a photograph, and, in reply to his questioning, I told him it was a photograph of my little son, nine years old, taken in kilts. He thereupon tore it up in bits and hit me across the face with them, saying, "This is another murder."

He asked was I the man who was employed at the City Hall. I replied, "Yes." He said, "You are the fellow who said we stole your money." I said, "Yes." He kept cross-examining on this point, giving me the impression that he was a man of law. He admitted having raided the City Hall on the occasion under discussion. He asked me, was I a loyalist? I said, "If it's to your Crown, I am not." He said, "You are a Republican." I said, "Yes." He took a revolver out of his pocket and placed it to my right temple, and asked me to tell him where Donal O'Callaghan, the deputy, sleeps at night. I said I did not know. He called me a liar, and stated I did know, and that I knew everything going on at the City Hall. He then opened the button of my shirt and placed the muzzle of the revolver against my heart, telling me he was giving me five minutes to divulge the information.

While the revolver was at my heart an officer standing at the corner discharged a shot from a revolver. (It may or may not have been a blank cartridge, as we cannot yet find the bullet.) There was a hearty laugh from the officers and soldiers around at this. It was done presumably to frighten me.

He pressed me hard for some time longer, still keeping the revolver to my heart. It being of no avail, he caught me by the ears and by the hair of my head and shook me. He then kicked me, and told me to get upstairs.

He followed, and asked where my uniform and pipes were. As it was of no use, for I refused to give him the information he desired, he ordered me to dress and to come away with him. They were then about an hour in the house. When dressed and outside the house, I noticed a group of officers some ten yards away, apparently holding a consultation. A young soldier, about seventeen or eighteen years old, took charge of me at this juncture. He placed a rifle to my chest and said, "You b——, if I had my way you would not go in the lorry, I'd finish you now."

On being marched off, this same soldier kept prodding me in the spine from behind (as a result of which I am still sore). This he did all the way to ———, about 150 yards from my house. The party halted there, and the officer who had previously threatened and assaulted me proceeded to start the same all over again. His brother officers tapped him on the shoulders several times and apparently asked him to come away. He eventually called me on one side from them, again giving me a further caution respecting the Republican Army and the pipers' band, stating that all the people of this country will be mown down inside of another twelve months, as they (the Crown forces) intended to finish the business. He then ordered me to get away home.

On arriving home, I first found that they had entered by breaking open the door. They must have done this with some strong instrument, as there was a double lock and two bolts on it. They had taken away the key. I met my wife in the kitchen still undressed. It was then 4 a.m. She appeared quite dazed and could not speak when I addressed her. The kitchen and one back bedroom appeared like refuse heaps. The back garden was also dug up, and articles were missing, which the subjoined list details :—

Ten knives; one silver and pearl bread-knife; one butter-knife; three plated spoons; one framed photograph of the murdered Republican Lord Mayor of Cork, Alderman Thomas MacCurtain; a two-shilling piece; three ordinary life insurance books; one pound of butter; two bars of soap; six boxes of matches; one large tin

of boot polish ; two ivory-covered prayer-books ; one pound of sugar ; a shilling toy pistol belonging to my young son ; and two pairs of gloves.

The party numbered about sixteen, of whom six were dressed in officers' clothes, one wearing a Glengarry cap.

(Signed) _____

(5) Arrest of a Man who Desired the Commission to Visit his House, Property in which had been Destroyed

The events related below occurred on Tuesday morning, December 7, 1920. Two members of the Commission make statements concerning the incident. The story is completed by an eye-witness. The man arrested was released during the afternoon. His house was visited by members of the Commission, who saw the wanton destruction of furniture and other effects which had taken place the previous evening.

I was seated in the car at the Imperial Hotel with Mr. Johnson, Mr. Jowett, Mr. A. Cameron, and Mr. Lunn, M.P. Messrs. Lunn and Cameron were seated in the front of the car. I was about to close the door when a man came up and said : "Are you the Labour Commission ?" I replied : "We are part of it." He then said : "Well, I want you to come and see what these ruffians have done to my house last night." I told him we were going to Bandon and that the rest of the Commission was sitting in the City Hall taking evidence. "We are already late," I said, "so you had better go up and give your evidence to them, as they are dealing with the Cork incidents." He said : "Why shouldn't you come and investigate it and see what your people have done ?" I then noticed a man in officer's uniform behind. He was listening to what was said. I asked the man not to speak so loud. He said : 'I don't care ; what I say is true.' I told him again he had better see the remainder of the party at the City Hall. The taxi-driver then drove off."

(Signed) JOHN LAWSON.

On entering the car a young man, apparently a workman, approached the door of the car and engaged in conversation with the occupants. He was informed that we had not time to take any evidence as we were already late ; and instructed the car driver to proceed, which the latter did.

(Signed) A. G. CAMERON.

An eye-witness made the following statement, supplementing the above :—

Immediately thereafter, an officer in khaki approached this young man, loosening his revolver and presenting it at the man's head. The officer said : "You should not call an officer of police a ruffian." The man ran out into the street, the officer following him and again holding the revolver close to his head. The officer then took the man by the collar, dragged him into the hotel, put him down on a sofa, and walked up and down the hall. He called for an assistant, and they stood there with the man sitting down. The man kept on saying : "Listen to me." But the officer refused to listen. The officer sent for a car, and the car came up half an hour later—at five minutes to ten. I spoke to the officer and said that I believed that the man did not call him a ruffian, but had only said : "Some ruffians have done this." The officer said in reply : "The man turned round and said, 'Ruffians like us,' " and said that the man signified himself (the officer) particularly. The officer proceeded to say that the man was a brave man because he resisted being pulled into the hotel though he (the officer) had a revolver at his head ; and he added : "He apologised, and I think it will be all right." The man, hearing me speak for him, said once more : "And listen to me," but the officer drove off with his assistant, who was in mufti, taking the man with them.

(6) Intimidation of the Press

The events related in the following statement occurred during the Commission's visit to Tralee, and the journalists referred to were examined by the Commission.

I am the special correspondent in Ireland of _____. In company with three other Press representatives, Mr. A_____, Mr. B_____, and Mr. C_____, I arrived in

Tralee on Thursday, 9th inst., the day of the Labour Commission's visit. About nine o'clock that night Mr. D——, a local journalist, came with his wife to the Grand Hotel where we were staying and reported to us that, during his absence from home that afternoon, an R.I.C. man and a member of the "Black and Tans" had called on his wife and threatened to shoot him.

Mrs. D—— made a detailed statement of the incident. A member of the Commission was present when she did so and took notes of her evidence. After hearing Mrs. D——'s account, and believing Mr. D——'s danger to be real, we decided that it would be unsafe for them to go home alone along the dark streets. We therefore accompanied them to their house while two members of the Commission called on the District Inspector in order to draw his attention to the threats. We left Mr. and Mrs. D—— at their door about 11 p.m. and returned towards our hotel. While walking along the main street we were held up by a picket composed of R.I.C. and "Black and Tans." We were ordered to put up our hands. Mr. C—— and I were together at the time, and Mr. A—— and Mr. B—— were some paces ahead. Mr. C—— and I were asked who we were. We replied: "Journalists." One of the "Black and Tans" asked me if I had anything to prove it. I produced my military and police permits, representing that I was a journalist on the staff of ——-. While they were being examined another "Black and Tan" asked Mr. C—— if he was Hugh Martin. He replied that he was not. He was then questioned if he knew Hugh Martin. "I know of him," he said, "but I have never met him." The "Black and Tan" then remarked: "Hugh Martin! There's a journalist for you. He's the brute we're after. I wish we had him here—we would do for him."

Mr. A—— and Mr. B—— were also questioned if either of them was Hugh Martin, and whether Hugh Martin was one of our party. When they said "No," they were told: "It's as well for him not to come here." An R.I.C. sergeant then approached them, and after putting the same questions, said: "We heard he was here under an assumed name. I believe he has been writing something about us in Tralee, and we would like to see him again." The members of the picket were perfectly civil towards us and allowed us to proceed home. I may add that it was in Tralee Mr. Hugh Martin of *The Daily News* was threatened by "Black and Tans" some six weeks previously because of his dispatches on reprisals in Ireland.

(Signed) ——

Mr. A—— and Mr. B—— accept as a true statement the section above which refers to them.

APPENDIX III

Material supplied to or obtained by the Commission

(1) Victimisation of Policemen's Wives and Barrack Servants

The following statements are a selection from a number of police reports supplied to the Commission by the police authorities. Only the names of persons and places have been deleted. None of the cases referred to has been investigated by the Commission :—

December 27, 1919

Thirty masked and armed men came to the evacuated huts at ——— and burned them. The sergeant's wife and her sister resided in one section of the hut. The raiders gave them five minutes to clear out, and they were not allowed to take anything away, and prevented the two women leaving either for ——— or ———. The neighbours refused them admittance, thus compelling them to remain in the little wash-house all night and until 11 a.m. the following day, where they were found by the District Inspector and party who investigated the outrage.

April 16, 1920

An armed party visited the house of the Misses ——— and took the two girls out in their night attire. They were marched some distance and a court-martial held on them "for walking with the Peelers." They were sentenced to be shot, but it was mitigated and their hair cut off instead.

The motive for this outrage was that these two girls were on friendly terms with the younger members of the R.I.C. at ———.

April 16, 1920

Mrs. ———, who is a policeman's widow, received a threatening letter stating if she took Mrs. ——— (a sergeant's wife) in as a lodger her house would be burned and she would get the death of Mrs. ———. (This is the woman who was shot through the heart by Sinn Feiners in a raid for arms in Co. ———.)

May 12, 1920

Sergeant ———, who occupied ——— vacated police barrack, heard knocking at the door and refused admission on demand of raiders, who then started breaking the windows and were admitted. Fourteen raiders entered and marched the sergeant out of the building and made him face a wall while the raiders proceeded to remove his four children to a neighbouring house. One of the children was ill with influenza, but the raiders said she must be removed as these were times when many were suffering. They then set the barracks on fire.

May 22, 1920

Mrs. ———, who was barrack servant at the R.I.C. barracks, ———, had to leave her employment through being terrorised by receiving a threatening letter to leave her employment at once.

May 24, 1920

Mrs. ———, who is employed as barrack servant, was warned by two masked and armed men who entered her house that it was against the rules of the I.R.A. to work for the R.I.C., and that if she continued her hair would be cut off.

June 13, 1920

A party of twenty armed and disguised men forced open the door of Miss ———'s house, seized her, knocked her down, and cut off her hair with a tailor's scissors.

The raiders then visited the house of Miss ———, and cut off her hair and warned her not to have any more to do with the police.

The motive for this outrage is that these girls are friendly disposed towards police.

June 15, 1920

Fifty armed men—some with rifles, others with shot guns, and others with faces blackened and disguised—called at Mrs. _____'s (wife of Constable _____) house and ordered her and six children out of their house. They were marched to the house of _____, who was warned by the raiders to keep her for the night. They then returned to the house, set fire to it, and with furniture and bedding was completely destroyed.

June 25, 1920

A party of about twenty armed and disguised men entered the house of Mrs. _____ (a policeman's wife), seized herself and four children who were under six years of age, and put them out on the road. The furniture was then put out. Being raining at the time, Mrs. _____ sought refuge at the local post office, but the raiders informed her she would not be allowed to remain in the parish another night. She had then to cycle to _____ wet through, in a deplorable condition, where her husband was stationed.

July 21, 1920

Injured person received a letter stating that if she continued in the employment of the police the I.R.A. would take steps to have her removed from the locality.

August 7, 1920

Four men entered the house of an injured person. Two of them seized her by the hands and feet while another put his hands over her mouth. They then put three pig rings into her buttocks with pincers. She had been supplying the police with milk.

August 10, 1920

Injured person's hair was cut off because she was keeping company with a policeman.

August 10, 1920

Injured person was made swear on oath that she would cease working for police.

September 5, 1920

Seven or eight masked men entered the house of injured person, forcibly removed her outside, and cut her hair off. She was a barrack servant, and had been previously warned to leave police employment.

September 11, 1920—10.30 p.m.

_____ was taken from her lodgings by armed and masked men, gagged, and taken to a field where her hair was cut off, and she was kicked in the body. She was employed as a barrack servant, where her predecessor had left owing to the boycott of the police.

(2) Shooting in Cold Blood

The following statement, sworn before a solicitor, was made by an educated man who was seriously wounded and has since died.

[This case was not investigated by the Commission.]

I, A _____ B _____, of _____, _____, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows :—

I.—During the early hours of Tuesday, October 12, I heard violent knocking at my hall door. I got out of bed and went downstairs without waiting to dress. I opened the door and was immediately confronted by a number of military officers in uniform. They inquired who was in the house. One of them asked where was a certain man whom he named, and I said he was not living for some time past. They then made inquiries about two other men, after which they rushed upstairs, leaving me downstairs in the hall in charge of an armed guard.

II.—The moment they went upstairs firing started, which lasted for some time. Immediately the firing ceased I was marched upstairs by an officer, who kept a revolver pressed against my back. I was brought into the front room, where I saw a man in uniform lying on the floor, apparently dead. I was then brought out on the landing to the door of the back room, which was open, and I was able to see that there was no person in the room.

III.—One of the officers who was with me then went into the back room, and I was told to turn my back towards him, which I did. I immediately heard the report of a shot, and was shot through the back of the neck. I fell on my face on top of a man who was lying apparently dead on the landing. I was unable to move but quite conscious.

IV.—I tried to call my wife, and heard one of the officers say to the other: "I thought he was dead."

V.—While I was in the hall downstairs, as stated in Paragraph I., I heard the men who had been staying at the back-bedroom jumping through the glass roof of the conservatory.

VI.—I positively state that at the time I was shot there was no person other than the military officers either on the landing or in the back bedroom.

VII.—The officers had been threatening to shoot me, both in the hall downstairs and while I was being brought upstairs.

(3) Robbery by Armed Masked Men

The sworn testimony which is appended refers to a case which was not investigated by the Commission. If the latter portion of the statement be true, then it would appear that the "Black and Tans" intentionally led the deponent to believe that the robbery was the work of Sinn Feiners:—

SWORN TESTIMONY OF ———, ———, CO. ———, IN THE MATTER OF
A ROBBERY OF £480 APPROXIMATELY BY ARMED MASKED MEN, AT
MIDNIGHT, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER ———, 1920

On Wednesday, September ———, I was awakened at 11.45 p.m. and found three men, each holding a flashlight and a revolver up to my face. They were dressed in grey, and wore handkerchiefs as masks on their faces. I was ordered out of bed. The raiders spoke with an English accent.

When I got up I saw two more men with revolvers standing at the door of my room, one of whom was dressed in R.I.C. uniform. I could not well see how the other man was dressed. They blindfolded me, and I heard them tell my wife to put a blanket about her and get out of bed. After a short time they informed my wife that she could get back to bed again, but to keep her head covered.

The leader said to me: "Where is your safe, and where do you keep your private correspondence?" I replied: "I have not got a safe, and all my correspondence is business correspondence." I offered to show him the exact spot in my office where the letters were if he unbandaged my eyes. He replied: "That's all right."

I heard them go into the next room, where my five year old son was sleeping. I heard him crying, and he ran into me, still crying, and said that they struck him in the face. We then heard them go upstairs, where two maidservants and my three little girls, aged three to seven years, were sleeping. After about fifteen minutes they came down, and one fellow said to me, "Show me your hand." He put a paper into it and said: "Take warning by this. Don't remove the bandage from your eyes for half an hour after you hear a motor car leave your door." They then left. When the motor car had gone half an hour I removed the cloth from my eyes, and with the aid of a candle read the paper the raider had placed in my hand. It ran thus:—

ALL MONEY BELONGS TO THE IRISH REPUBLIC. IF YOU DO NOT STOP SUPPLYING MEAT TO BARRACKS YOU WILL BE SHOT DEAD ON YOUR NEXT VISIT UP SINN FEIN.

By Orders,
I.R.A.

On examination we found everything turned upside down, locks broken, &c. The cash box was found broken open and about £70 (seventy pounds) in silver and notes missing; nothing was left in it but two cheques and two sixpenny pieces. In a spare room upstairs I saw that a pair of gold earrings and three pounds ten shillings in gold were missing from a box. In my own back trousers pocket, which was in my own room during the time the raiders were there, was £400 (four hundred pounds) in ten-pound and five-pound notes, which I had since ——— fair on the previous day. All was taken. I interviewed Colonel ———, of the ——— Regiment, and gave him a full account of the raid, also the paper which one of the raiders had placed in my hand.

He said : " Mr. ———, I am very sorry to hear this. I do not know whether it was the Sinn Feiners or the military who did it ; of course there are orders to raid certain houses, but if the military did it they should not have treated the maids as they did nor have taken the money. You could avoid all this by giving information. You know where to send it to in London, as the papers informing you of such were put under your door. Personally, I don't want any information, and if any man like you with an interest in the country won't give it they have only to put up with the consequences."

The following week I had a conversation with Captain ———, I.D., ———. He told me that a military inquiry had been held in the barracks on Monday over the raid on my house. The guard at the barrack gate deposed that three " Black and Tan " police came out of the barracks at 11.40 p.m. He did not want to let them out, but they said they were police on special duty. They knocked at the door of my house, and receiving no reply they entered through a window. They came out at 12.45 p.m. and re-entered the barracks. They wore masks on their faces all the time.

He further told me that the guard had been placed under arrest for letting them out of the barracks, that the " Black and Tans " who broke into my house were arrested at ——— and had been sent to ——— Barracks, ———; they were afterwards transferred to England.

(4) The Shooting of Prisoners alleged to have Attempted to Escape

The following sworn testimony relates to the shooting of two prisoners, who were alleged by the military to have attempted to escape.

On ——— morning, ———, 1920, at the hour of 1 a.m., I was awakened by very loud knocking at the door. My brother ——— and myself were sleeping in the one room ; we got up and dressed, then came downstairs ; my father came down before us and had the door opened. Two policemen, one of whom was Constable ———, of ——— police barracks, and an officer entered. About twenty-five soldiers who accompanied them surrounded the house outside.

A thorough search of the house was proceeded with for about an hour and ten minutes by the officer and a sergeant. The officer then placed my brother and myself under arrest, without charging us with any offence.

We were taken on foot by the entire party to the military headquarters at ———. We were handcuffed there and left in the guardroom until evening, when we were removed about 6 p.m. During the interval we were in the military barracks the handcuffs were kept on us for ten hours, but our treatment otherwise while in the barracks was quite normal.

At 6 p.m. we were placed in a military motor lorry in charge of an officer and about ten soldiers, and the lorry proceeded along the main road leading to ———. We were both handcuffed separately and were sitting on the floor of the lorry. I was at the rear of the lorry, and my brother was at the front, both of us facing in the direction from which we had come. About half a mile outside the town I heard my brother cry out, and immediately a revolver shot rang out. The shout from my brother was in all probability occasioned by his seeing his assailant levelling the revolver at him. A second shot followed immediately, and I fell in the lorry shot through the right shoulder. I gave no provocation whatsoever for this shot, and my brother gave none either. We were both sitting quite still, and were making no effort to escape, as is alleged by the military.

An hour and a-half later we were both admitted to the military hospital at ———. During our journey to ——— the military left us lying in the lorry and never approached us to ascertain the extent of our injuries or to succour us in any way, neither did they speak—even amongst themselves—after firing the shots, until we reached the hospital. As my brother uttered no sound during the journey to ———, I believe he was unconscious all the time. I suffered great agony from the wound in the shoulder but did not speak.

When we reached the hospital we were placed in a ward and our wounds attended to. My brother died almost immediately on being admitted.

On November —, 1920, I was released from hospital without any charge being preferred against me or without being tried in any way. My right arm from the elbow down is still lifeless, and I am unable to move my fingers. I have to use a crutch also, as my right leg is exceedingly weak, owing to what the military doctor terms " shock." The British authorities never inquired of me as to how the tragic occurrence took place.

(Signed) ———

(5) Cases of Assault and Brutality

The following affidavits refer to cases not investigated by the Commission:—

I

I, _____ of _____, in the county of _____, _____, aged twenty-one years and upwards, make oath and say as follows:—

On Monday, October 4, 1920, I was walking along the public road at _____. A lorry passed me out on the road, which was full of policemen. As the lorry was passing me, one of the policemen on the lorry hit me a blow on the left jaw and tumbled me on the road. I had done nothing then, or at any other time, to this policeman or to any other policeman to in any way justify or give any provocation for this attack.

(Signed) _____

II

I was arrested on October 21 by military under the command of an officer. On being searched a despatch was found in my possession, and on refusing to give any particulars about it, I was struck in the face and knocked down by two soldiers while their officer looked on. Blood flowed freely from my mouth, and I was hurried away to town of _____ to the military quarters. On my way there I was kicked twice by the officer. On arriving at _____ I was stripped naked, being told that my body was to be examined for bullet marks. They found none, and I dressed as best I could. The officer then offered me rum, but I refused, telling him I did not drink. At this refusal the most vile language was used, and they told me I would drink in spite of myself. Two knives were then produced and the handles placed at each side of my mouth, which was still bleeding. The rum was then thrown into my mouth. I threw it out again as much as possible, my shirt getting soaked with blood and rum. At times the officer, who was master of ceremonies, gave permission to one of the soldiers to give me what he termed "the kidney punch." I was again questioned as to particulars of the despatch, but refused to give any information. The officer then ordered that I be taken out into the yard to be finished off. I asked him to give me my beads, but this request was the cause of great laughter on his part. He remarked that there were two priests up the village who were under the influence of drink, and that perhaps they would drop in. When I heard this I asked him for pity's sake to have done and shoot me. He said he had another treatment besides shooting, remarking that shooting was too easy a death. I told him he had not pluck enough to shoot. He then ordered two soldiers to bind my hands and feet. When this was done he poured petrol on my bare head and chest. Between my feet a bundle of hay was placed, and, having been sprinkled with petrol, was set alight. The flames caught my face and chest and I suffered terrible agony. I was again questioned, and again refused. I was then relieved of my bonds, and, after being struck several times on the head and face, I was thrown into an old cell and left there. During the night I had a narrow escape. A soldier, the worse for drink and using terrible language, came in my direction. He had a revolver. He was arrested in time and forcibly removed by his companions. In the morning, with a face badly swollen, I was removed to _____ Police Station, _____. At _____, on the way, a "Black and Tan" swung a heavy coat and struck me in the face. I was left in a cell in the barracks for twenty-four hours, in unsanitary conditions, and was allowed but one meal. Here I was told I was a fool to be led astray by others, and the most vile language was used against De Valera and his followers. I was then removed to the county gaol. I am prepared to swear before any tribunal that this statement is the truth, and I can also identify the officer and two soldiers who maltreated me at _____ military quarters.

(Signed) _____

III

On the evening of September 20, 1920, at about 10.30, I arrived at my home and, after ten minutes' conversation with my people, I retired to my bedroom; it was then about 10.45 p.m. When I had been asleep for some time I was awakened by my father and sister and was told to dress. While dressing, my three sisters and my mother came into the room; the room was also occupied by my two brothers. I heard three rifle

volleys discharged somewhere on the street outside the house ; I understood that it was about 11.30 at the time. When I was almost dressed, being only without my boots, I heard the crashing of the glass in the front shop windows, the shutters having been removed. About two or three minutes afterwards the door of the room was opened and about eight men, dressed in the uniform of the R.I.C. and carrying rifles without bayonets, stood at the door and shouted, "Come out." My mother, who was agitated at the time, cried out to them, "Spare the children," being answered with the cry, "You did not spare the D.I.," presumably referring to the R.I.C. officer who was shot that night in _____. One of the men, advancing, caught my father by the arm, but my mother clung to him, being almost hysterical at the time. I told her to let him go as I thought nothing would happen to him. She released him, and he was pulled away by the uniformed men and I did not see him again that night. Three or four more men who had remained behind came forward into the room, and catching my younger brother John, who is aged about fifteen years, by the arm said, "This is the boy we want." I immediately stepped forward and said : "If you are looking for anyone it is I, not the child." Thereupon, one of the men seized me by the arm, and my mother, brothers, and sisters left the room. One of the uniformed men then flashed what appeared to be an oil lamp in my eyes, with the apparent object of temporarily blinding me. Another then struck me on the face with his fist, and releasing the other man's grip I ran to the bed and lay face downwards, with the object of saving my face. The men followed me across the room and, raising the butts of their rifles, struck me several times on the back of the head. Then one of them caught me by the arm and turned me over and struck me several times on the top of my head and once on the upper lip also with the butt of his rifle. I implored them to shoot me, and one man answered, "Shooting is too good for a . . . like you," using a terrible oath, and accompanying his remark with a blow over the left eye with the butt of his rifle. I then became unconscious and remembered no more until I found myself in the yard adjoining the house, having, I believe, stumbled in a semi-conscious state out of the room and down the stairs. When I had regained consciousness I called out for my mother three times, but received no answer. I ran across the yard—the house was in flames at this time—and saw that the gate was open, but on going over to it I was immediately halted by two uniformed men, who held their rifles to my chest. Beating down the rifles with my hands, I ran back to the yard and into the garden adjoining. All this time I was without my boots. . . . I crossed the wall of our yard and made my way out into the fields, and succeeded in gaining shelter in Mr. _____'s cottage at _____. Here I remained until the following morning. . . .

(Signed) _____

(6) Letters from Irish Trade Unionists

The following letters will be of interest to British trade unionists. They were all addressed to the headquarters of various unions and supplied by the latter to the Commission.

Copy of letter from the local secretary of the _____ Union at _____ to head office.

November, 1920.

During last week military and police in _____ set fire to and wrecked several houses in _____. They smashed the windows and doors of the Trade Union Hall, then entered the hall and destroyed tables, chairs, and presses. They smashed the press, wherein all books, letters, and receipts of the _____ Branch were held. They scattered them about the hall and destroyed some of the books, and they took the Labour flag from the hall and threw it into one of the burning buildings.

As up to the present time things are not quiet I cannot know what books I may require, as some of the books have been saved. People have left the town and are only now returning, all work was suspended for three or four days.

I have not collected any contributions since Sunday week, and we are deprived of our hall, and the members cannot assemble anywhere to pay their contributions. However, things may be quiet here before Sunday.

Yours fraternally,
(Signed) _____

Letter from the secretary of the ——— Union Branch at ——— to head office.

November 8, 1920.

While a meeting of the central committee of the above branch was taking place at ——— on Sunday, ———, a party of police and military raided the room where the delegates were assembled. They searched each delegate and carefully examined all the ——— Union papers and books. Unfortunately I was carrying the local fund of the branch with me, which amounted to £33 10s., and this was examined also. I explained the money was belonging to the ——— Union, and they put it down on the table.

They rushed us all out of the room to be lined up on the road for arrest. This I think was only a pretext, because they drove off without arresting anyone, and when they were gone and the confusion over it was discovered that the money was also gone. The explanation that our meeting was purely in connection with trade union business only seemed to heighten their suspicions that we were a collection of seditious individuals, and some of us were handled roughly by the police.

Fraternally yours,

(Signed) ———

Secretary.

Letter from Mr. ———, president of ——— Union Branch, ———, to the general secretary.

I got your letter this morning and, needless to say, I am glad you took such satisfactory steps in connection with my arrest. As regards my torture after arrest, I give the following details, and gave the same statement to the authorities in ——— during my imprisonment:—

I was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning and walked about one and a-quarter miles to the barracks. During the journey shots were fired at every side trying to terrorise me, but I kept firm. After arriving, I was put in under a stairway and the soldiers were like thunder up and down over my head. After some time I was taken to the kitchen and ordered to cut onions for their dinner, which I refused. The sergeant in charge ordered one of the men to get his rifle; still I refused, and asked for the officer. One of the men went to the officer and came back with a bayonet. Still I refused, and after four or five stabs had to comply with their request, as I got one bad stab. I am sure I would have got more, but I told them I would report to Colonel ——— in ———, which I did, and he sent the doctor to me on that night. The soldiers in ——— were nice to me, and also in ———, where I was detained for a night on my way to ———. The officer here has been changed since, and the present officer is a good man. Two soldiers were here on Friday evening and were late going back. They informed their officer that I waylaid them on the way with some others, which is not true. They wanted to re-arrest me, but the officer would not heed them. If the other officer was there I expect I would be down in ———. Again, one of these soldiers admitted he was in the driving of ———'s sheep to ———, also the officer at the time, a Mr. ———. I have not gone by the barrack since, as, if the officer was not there, I am sure I would get another hand.

It would be well if you could find out if ——— was responsible for my arrest, also if he could be made to pay compensation. There was about £30 of goods taken from my house by the soldiers; some of the articles I saw with them when arrested. Give me any instructions you can about the recovery of same.

Yours fraternally,

(Signed) ———

Letter from the secretary of the ——— Branch of the ——— Union to the head office.

November 8, 1920.

The military have made a raid on my house and smashed it up and broke it to atoms, and also took away with them all books, stationery, and letters belonging to the ——— Union. As we had no hall or place for them I kept them in the house. Please let me know by return what I will do for them. It is five or six weeks since any money was collected, as the military hunted our members from the hall every time they went into it. We had made arrangements to have it collected next week.

Yours fraternally,

(Signed) ———

Secretary.

October 6, 1920.

Just a line to let you know we are still alive, but don't know the minute. I would have written before, only we are expecting a raid every night, and you cannot settle yourself to do anything. The other night a crowd of the "Black and Tans" came in and posted bills on all the doors. They got on terrible, shouting and knocking the people up, and I needn't tell you their language was lovely. The poor people are all terrified out of their lives. Last night they came along shouting. One of their men was shot. They turned all the people out of their houses in ———, and they had to stay in the fields all night, and you know the night it was. They arrested one boy about fourteen, and said they saw him standing by when their chum was fired at. They kept the kid all night, and this morning when the fellow got sober enough he told them the revolver went off in his pocket. So you see, if one of them happens to meet with an accident we have to suffer. They are even shooting the dogs in the street. I wonder how it will all end. There comes quite a crowd from all parts to see the ruins. You ought to come this week-end if it is anyway fine, but this is a miserable place when it is raining, and now it is even worse, for people are afraid to go out. I wish the weather would take up, things are bad enough without bad weather. If you think you will come, drop
a p.c.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ———

(7) A Threat by "Black and Tans" to Punish a Shopkeeper for alleged Refusal to Deliver Goods to the R.I.C.

The following copy of a letter is an example of the threats made to shopkeepers who refuse, or are alleged to have refused, to supply goods to members of the Crown forces.

REFUSAL TO DELIVER GOODS TO R.I.C.

Sir,—It has come to our notice that your men have refused to deliver goods to the R.I.C. This conduct cannot be allowed, and will have to cease. You are now warned that from and after this date you will be held responsible that any orders received from R.I.C. will be at once attended to. Failing this, you will incur a serious responsibility. YOU UNDERSTAND. Send along the names of your men who refuse to the undersigned and they will also be dealt with.

"BLACK AND TANS."

Mr. ———

(8) Public Notices of Threats by the Crown Forces

We append examples of notices which have appeared in the Press in Ireland, or which have been circulated in certain localities. In some cases the newspaper notices have been inserted as a result of compulsion exercised at the revolver point. The first three notices were issued in Cork; the sixth and seventh were posted up at different places in Tipperary. The last two documents were signed, "Anti-Sinn Fein League."

I

NOTICE

Constable Ryan kidnapped and his comrade robbed while attending divine service at St. Patrick's Church, Cork, on Sunday, November 21, 1920.

If Constable Ryan is not returned within twenty-four hours, citizens of Cork beware of the consequences.

(Signed) COMRADES.

II

NOTICE

We have been requested to publish the following :—

ANTI-SINN FEIN SOCIETY

CORK AND DISTRICT CIRCLE

(Membership, 2,000, and still growing)

TO ALL CORK CITIZENS

TAKE NOTICE that any householder known to shelter any rebel, or who is known to subscribe to any rebel funds, or to assist in any way the murderous gang of assassins known as Sinn Fein, had better increase his or her Fire and Life Insurance, as it will be needed. It will be wiser than buying spurious Dail Eireann Bonds.

Remember 1641

Remember 1798

By order of the Committee,

J. P. H. D., Secretary.

III

KIDNAPPING IN CORK

NOTICE

If Mr. Downey is not returned to his home within fifty-six hours, Cork citizens prepare, especially Sinn Feiners.

“BLACK AND TANS.”

IV

NOTICE

If G. Horgan is not returned by four o'clock on to-day (Friday), December 10, Rebels of Cork Beware, as one man and one shop shall disappear for each hour after the given time.

(Signed) “B.’S AND T.’S.”

V

IMPORTANT NOTICE

8/12/20

We, the undersigned, do now give the male sex of Cork City notice, “which must be adhered to forthwith,” that any person of the said sex who is seen or found loitering at street corners or on the pathways without reasonable excuse why he should be there, or any man or boy found to be standing or walking with one or both hands in his pockets will, if he does not adhere to this Order, suffer the consequences which will no doubt ensue.

(Signed) SECRETARY OF DEATH OR VICTORY LEAGUE.

God save the King and Frustrate his Enemies

VI

Male persons with their hands in their pockets have been known to pass R.I.C. men in the streets, and on the country roads, and on passing have produced revolvers, and in doing so have endangered the gallant men's lives. Any male person in town will make himself liable to be shot at sight if he walks about with his hand or hands in his pockets.

Furthermore, the ambush in the Glen has not and will not be forgotten.

Any person or persons refraining from giving information with regard to bad characters, or the knowledge of ambushes in the neighbouring country, will be severely dealt with, and will be liable to be shot without hesitation.

It occurred some time ago that some of our gallant R.I.C. officers of Tipperary were cowardly murdered behind the hedges, not far from Tipperary, by Tipperary murderers. If the ambushes do not cease forthwith, Tipperary and district will be an ocean of blood, and you may take this as final warning.

If those cowardly murderers want a good fight they can come out from behind those hedges where they wait day and night to shoot down those innocent men.

It was in **Tipperary town** the murder started in 1919, when two innocent men were shot dead like dogs, and they did not even give them time to say a prayer or prepare to meet their God above. But remember that is not forgotten.

Any person pulling this notice down does so under a **penalty of death** and destruction, and fire will follow.

Any person with his hands in his pockets will be shot at first sight.

[At the bottom of this notice was a rough sketch indicating a skull and cross bones. The words in heavy type above were underlined in the notices.]

(9) Fires in Cork

The Commission was supplied with the following particulars showing the number of fires attended by the City of Cork Fire Brigade from October 9 to December 7 :—

1.—October 9, 1920

Called at 4.5 a.m., and returned at 5.50 a.m., from City Hall fire ; there was rifle firing across river when proceeding to same.

2.—November 21, 1920

Called at 1.25 a.m., and returned at 2.25 a.m. from Messrs. Dwyer's fire, Washington Street.

3.—November 23, 1920

Called at 1.55 a.m., and returned at 3.20 a.m. from Club House fire at Watercourse Road.

4.—November 24, 1920

Called at 3 a.m., and returned at 12 mid-day from private house fire, Shandon Street.

5.—November 24, 1920

Called at 11.50 p.m., and returned at 1.45 p.m., November 25, 1920, from Hardwick Street fire. Hose cut and threats to shoot Firemen D. Sullivan, T. O'Leary, M. Higgins, and J. Barry when ordered to turn on water.

6.—November 25, 1920

Called at 3 a.m., and returned at 6.30 a.m. from Grand Parade fire. Three lengths of hose cut. Upper portion of building alight.

7.—November 27, 1920

Called at 2 a.m., and returned at 9 a.m. from McGurk's fire, North Main Street ; building well alight.

8.—November 27, 1920

Called at 4 a.m. to fire at Messrs. Forrest's, Patrick Street ; sent on men, who were fired on and told to go back. At 5 a.m. sent again ; also men and reels from North Main Street.

9.—November 28, 1920

Called at 1.15 a.m. to fire at Blackthorn House and adjoining property ; well alight and spreading. Returned at 6 p.m.

10.—November 29, 1920

Called at 11.45 p.m. to fire at Camden Quay, and extinguished it. Received a call at 4.15 a.m. for same place ; the men were fired at on Patrick's Bridge and told to go back. Called again at 7 a.m. ; building well alight.

11.—November 30, 1920

Called at 1.15 a.m. to fire at Thomas Ashe Club, Charlotte Quay ; building well alight.

12.—November 30, 1920

Called at 3.40 a.m. to fire at City Hall (Public Health Offices). Received second call at 4.50 a.m., and extinguished same.

13.—November 30, 1920

Called at 5.5. a.m. to fire at Messrs. Egan's, Patrick Street, and extinguished same.

14.—December 1, 1920

Called at 4 a.m. to fire at Messrs. O'Gorman's, King Street ; building well alight ; extinguished same.

15.—December 1, 1920

Called at 7.10 p.m. to American Boot Stores, Patrick Street ; debris alight and gas escaping from main.

16.—December 3, 1920

Called at 12.30 p.m. to McGurk's, North Main Street ; coals alight.

December 7, 1920.

**(10) Report to November, 1920, of Co-operative Creameries
and other Societies stated to have been Destroyed or
Damaged by Armed Forces of the Crown**

[The cases investigated by the Commission are marked with an asterisk (*)]

(1)

April 9, 1920

REARCROSS CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. TIPPERARY

REARCROSS C.C.—a central creamery. Stated to have been burned by police and soldiers ; machinery broken by police previous day ; property completely destroyed.

Direct personal evidence given.

Claim for £5,000 lodged in county court ; damages amounting to £1,100 (buildings, £800 ; loss in trade, £300) awarded. Compensation for machinery was refused, as it was not a separate claim of which notice was given within three days, in accordance with Malicious Injuries Act.

Creamery appealed against decision, and were awarded a further sum of £1,200 for machinery destroyed, with costs.

This was the first co-operative creamery attacked in Ireland.

Trade turnover, 1918, £7,858.

(2)

April 10, 1920

REISKA, CO. TIPPERARY

REISKA—an auxiliary creamery or separating station, property of Upperchurch Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society, Co. Tipperary.

Stated to have been damaged by police and soldiers ; machinery smashed and premises injured.

Direct personal evidence given at county court.

An award of £800, including consequential damage, was given against the county.

County Court Judge Moore expressed the view that Crown ought to pay the amount.

This creamery was later entirely destroyed (*see* Reiska, August 10).

See also Upperchurch, July 31.

(3)

April 10, 1920

**KNOCKFUNE CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. TIPPERARY**

KNOCKFUNE C.A. & D.S.—an independent auxiliary creamery society supplying cream to Newport C.A. & D.S. for churning.

Stated to have been damaged by military and police; machinery smashed and premises injured.

Direct personal evidence available.

This creamery was later entirely destroyed (*see* Knockfune, July 29).

See also Newport C.A. & D.S., July 23.

Trade turnover, 1918, £6,581.

(4)

April 10, 1920

KILCOMMON CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. TIPPERARY

KILCOMMON C.C.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been damaged by military and police; machinery smashed, premises injured, and goods destroyed and stolen.

Direct personal evidence given.

Damages amounting to £493, with costs and expenses, awarded at county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £15,496.

(5)

April 14, 1920

KILLONAN, CO. LIMERICK

KILLONAN—an auxiliary creamery or separating station, property of Drombanna Co-operative Creamery, Co. Limerick.

Stated to have been fired by military and police.

Damage estimated at £1,032.

Direct personal evidence available.

(6)

July 23, 1920

NEWPORT CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. TIPPERARY

NEWPORT C.C.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been burned by military; buildings, machinery, and stocks destroyed.

Direct personal evidence given.

Claim for £20,000 lodged in county court. Creamery awarded £12,339, including interest at six per cent. for one and a half years on value of stock, buildings, and machinery. Also fifteen per cent. was allowed for increase in price of machinery. (*See* Knockfune, April 10 and July 29.)

Trade turnover, 1918, £34,765.

(7)

July 25, 1920

GARRYSPELLANE CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. LIMERICK

GARRYSPELLANE C.C.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been burned by police and military.

Evidence mainly circumstantial.

Claim for £10,000 lodged in county court. Award given for £5,420.

Trade turnover, 1918, £20,966.

(8)

July 29, 1920

**KNOCKFUNE CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY.
CO. TIPPERARY**

KNOCKFUNE C.A. & D.S.—an independent auxiliary creamery society supplying cream to Newport C.A. & D.S. for churning.

Stated to have been destroyed by fire by Crown forces.

Direct personal evidence given.

Damages awarded by county court judge amounting to £3,965.

This was the second attack upon this creamery. The central creamery at Newport, to which it sent its cream for churning, was destroyed on July 23. (*See Knockfune, April 10. See Newport, July 23.*)

(9)

July 31, 1920

UPPERCHURCH CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. TIPPERARY

UPPERCHURCH C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been burned by Crown forces.

Evidence partly personal, but mainly circumstantial.

Claim for £20,000 lodged in county court. Award made for £8,749 at Nenagh, October quarter sessions.

This society owned Reiska auxiliary, which was attacked on April 10, and in a subsequent attack on August 10 was entirely destroyed.

Trade turnover, 1918, £20,884.

(10)

August 6, 1920

LOUGHMORE, CO. TIPPERARY

LOUGHMORE—an auxiliary creamery or separating station, property of Centenary C.D.S., Co. Tipperary.

Stated to have been totally destroyed by fire supposed to have been started by military and police.

Evidence circumstantial.

County court judge awarded damages, £3,581.

Littleton, another auxiliary belonging to Centenary C.D.S., was burned on October 31.

(11)

August 6, 1920

FOYNES CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, CO. LIMERICK

*FOYNES C.A.S.—a co-operative society doing a general store business.

Premises burned; stock and books destroyed.

Presumptive evidence against police, who did not assist villagers to put out fire.

County court judge awarded compensation, £5,100.

The village hall was burned down a few nights previously.

(12)

August 10, 1920

REISKA, CO. TIPPERARY

REISKA—an auxiliary creamery or separating station, property of Upperchurch Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society, Co. Tipperary.

Completely destroyed by fire. Stated to have been attacked by police and military. County court judge awarded £720.

Evidence given partly personal, but mainly circumstantial.

This was the second attack upon this creamery. The society had repaired the damage done in first attack. On July 31 the central creamery, to which Reiska belonged, was totally destroyed by fire. (*See Reiska, April 10. See Upperchurch, July 31.*)

(13)

August 16, 1920

TEMPLEREE AND CASTLEINEY CO-OPERATIVE DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. TIPPERARY

TEMPLEREE AND CASTLEINEY C.A. & D.S.—an independent auxiliary creamery society supplying cream to Ballyduag Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society for churning

Creamery bombed and machinery and books ruined. Later the premises were fired, petrol being used.

Personal evidence given to show that the damage was done by Crown forces. County court judge awarded £1,578 in this case.

Trade turnover, 1918, £10,759.

(14)

August 17, 1920

KILLEA CO-OPERATIVE DAIRY SOCIETY, CO. TIPPERARY

KILLEA C.D.S.—an independent auxiliary creamery supplying cream to Ballyduag Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy Society for churning.

Burned down. Presumptive evidence against Crown forces.

Compensation, £3,182, awarded by county court judge.

Trade turnover, 1918, £6,588.

(15)

August 27, 1920

SHANAGOLDEN CO-OPERATIVE DAIRY SOCIETY, CO. LIMERICK

*SHANAGOLDEN C.D.S.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been burned by police.

Direct personal evidence.

Claim for £12,000 lodged with county court, and award for that amount given.

Trade turnover, 1918, £30,908.

(16)

September 8, 1920

**NEWCASTLE WEST CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY
CO. LIMERICK**

NEWCASTLE WEST C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Damaged by fire, stated to have been started by Crown forces.

Direct personal evidence.

Claim for £1,900 lodged with county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £35,569.

(17)

September 15, 1920

**SILVERMINES CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. TIPPERARY**

SILVERMINES C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Supposed to have been burned by military.

Evidence presumptive.

Claim lodged for £3,000.

Trade turnover, 1918, £8,452.

(18)

September 19, 1920

DEVON ROAD CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. LIMERICK

DEVON ROAD C.C.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been burned by police and military, who commandeered petrol from creamery manager's premises adjacent.

Direct personal evidence.

Claim for £2,000 lodged, and compensation for that amount awarded.

Trade turnover, 1918, £42,504.

(19)

October 1, 1920

**TUBBERCURRY CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. SLIGO**

*TUBBERCURRY C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been attacked by police; machinery smashed, then premises set on fire and completely destroyed. Manager's house (occupied by his wife and three children) fired into repeatedly. Manager shot at.

Direct personal evidence.

Claim for £16,900 lodged with county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £15,656.

(20)

October 1, 1920

**ACHONRY CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. SLIGO**

*ACHONRY C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery with general store and small bacon factory.

This society is stated to have been attacked on the same night as was Tubbercurry C.A. & D.S., by police. The general store and creamery were burned, but most of the machinery of the latter was saved by neighbours. The bacon factory was not injured.

The evidence in this case is direct.

Damages first estimated at £3,500, but as debris is being removed further damage is coming to light.

Trade turnover, 1918, £45,070.

(21)

October 7, 1920

NEW ROSS CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, CO. WEXFORD

NEW ROSS C.A.S.—a general co-operative society. Cushinstown Hall is one of a number of halls erected throughout the country out of a bequest left by Gertrude, Countess of Pembroke, and which have been vested in co-operative societies for administrative ends. These halls are used for educational and social purposes of all sorts, and have been found valuable accessories to the co-operative movement.

Soldiers are stated to have held up about fifteen men present at 9 p.m., smashed scenery and stage fittings, burst open presses, and smashed boards out of stage fronts and out of wall and floor with a pickaxe, and then fired shots over the hall when leaving.

An estimate has been obtained for the repairs, and a bill for same has been sent to Sir Nevil Macready.

(22)

October 8, 1920

BANTEER CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. CORK

BANTEER C.C.—a central creamery.

Creamery fired into, windows broken, walls perforated, eave chutes broken, &c. Damage supposed to have been done by military. Cause unknown.

Evidence purely presumptive.

Claim for £50 lodged with military authorities.

Trade turnover, 1918, £10,098.

(23)

October 9, 1920

KILDIMO CO-OPERATIVE DAIRY SOCIETY, CO. LIMERICK

KILDIMO C.D.S.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been set on fire by Crown forces. Separators and milk tester destroyed; other machinery severely injured; roof completely burned, also some interior woodwork.

Damages estimated at £2,000, and a claim for that amount has been lodged.

Evidence is direct and personal, but witnesses profess themselves afraid to go into court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £13,274.

(24)

October 9, 1920

GRANGE CO-OPERATIVE DAIRY SOCIETY, CO. LIMERICK

GRANGE C.D.S.—a central creamery.

Creamery twice attacked, presumably by Government forces. Damage (estimated at £80) was slight. A bicycle, a clock, fifty-six pounds of lard and one hundred pounds of butter were taken away.

Trade turnover, 1918, £35,234.

(25)

October 11, 1920

HOSPITAL CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. LIMERICK

HOSPITAL C.C.—a central creamery.

Creamery premises set on fire; coal store and galvanised iron store burned down. Stated to have been done by Crown forces. Cause unknown.

Evidence, so far, indefinite.

Claim for £720 lodged with county court. Compensation, £641 3s. 10d., and costs allowed.

Trade turnover, 1918, £26,466.

(26)

October 18, 1920

ABBEYDORNEY CO-OPERATIVE DAIRY SOCIETY, CO. KERRY

*ABBEYDORNEY C.D.S.—a central creamery.

Premises stated to have been burned by police. Store burned beyond recovery. Main creamery saved by exertions of staff and neighbours. No motive can be assigned for this attack. Manager struck on the head with clubbed rifle. Assistant manager also assaulted. Five 56-lb. boxes of butter, fifty-six 1-lb. rolls of butter, and two 80-lb. cheeses were taken by the police.

Damage estimated at £2,000.

On November 11 the residence of the manager (the property of the society) was burned to the ground by armed, disguised men. (See Abbeydorney, November 11.)

Trade turnover, 1918, £31,806.

(27)

October 18, 1920

MOYCULLEN CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, CO. GALWAY

MOYCULLEN C.A.S.—a general store society.

Soldiers and police visited this society, stripped and flogged two assistants, and shot the manager in the neck.

Police broke into this society on September 30 and stole some goods. Three soldiers burgled the place later and took about £30 worth of goods.

No claims have been made in these cases, as it is feared worse might happen if they were lodged.

Trade turnover, 1918, £16,859.

(28)

October 25, 1920

LIXNAW CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. KERRY

LIXNAW C.C.—a central creamery.

Set on fire after drenching with petrol, it is believed, by police. Office and cheese room destroyed; also main roof of building. Stocks of cheese lost, and also some butter.

Evidence presumptive and circumstantial, but strong.

Damage to machinery estimated at £965 ; buildings, £1,521 12s. 4d. Comprehensive claim for £10,000 lodged with county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £40,971.

(29)

October 27, 1920

**BALLINTRILICK CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. SLIGO**

BALLINTRILICK C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been burned by Crown forces. Threat made to shoot manager. Store and office completely destroyed, with all stocks. Roof burned, also churn. Pasteuriser thrown into river ; safe destroyed. Bulk of machinery escaped marvellously, but all pipes, rubber connections, and beltings severely damaged.

The windows of the manager's house (the property of the society) were broken, front and rear.

Direct personal evidence of manager and others.

A claim for £18,500 has been lodged with county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £31,219.

(30)

October 31, 1920

LITTLETON AUXILIARY CREAMERY, CO. TIPPERARY

LITTLETON—an auxiliary creamery or separating station, property of Centenary Co-operative Creamery, Co. Tipperary.

Creamery burned and totally destroyed by military and police.

Direct personal evidence available.

Claim for £5,000 lodged with county court.

(31)

November 3, 1920

**BALLYMOTE CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. SLIGO**

BALLYMOTE C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery doing a butter business of over £30,000 per annum.

Creamery, offices, and stores burned, with all stocks of butter.

According to Press reports completely destroyed by Crown forces.

Claim for £25,000 lodged with county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £32,206.

(32)

November 4, 1920

NENAGH CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. TIPPERARY

NENAGH C.C.—a central creamery.

Creamery burned to ashes. Amount of damage as yet unascertained.

No statement as to perpetrators yet beyond Press reports that fire was caused by Crown forces.

Comprehensive claim for £20,000 lodged with county courts.

Trade turnover, 1918, £39,587.

(33)

November 5, 1920

ARDFERT CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. KERRY

ARDFERT C.C.—a central creamery.

Creamery searched by police and military. Horse belonging to creamery, which was in its stable with door locked, was wounded by shots fired through lock. Horse afterwards shot.

Claim for £70 lodged with county court.

Trade turnover, 1918, £37,812.

(34)

November 8, 1920

MILFORD CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. CORK

MILFORD C.C.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been attacked by Crown forces. Creamery entered forcibly, fire set to barrels of separator and machinery oils. Cast-iron bars of boiler wrecked by bomb; a live bomb with wire attached to pin of same was placed across a walking passage used by staff. This was later discovered and removed, and given up to District Inspector, R.I.C. In the general stores oil was run off from barrels over cheese crates, egg crates, and straw packing for eggs, and all set on fire. The egg store was similarly treated. Cheese to the value of £1,000 was damaged by smoke and heat, and later from water used to quench and confine conflagration.

There is direct personal evidence.

A claim for £4,000 has been lodged with the local authority.

Trade turnover, 1918, £74,060.

(35)

November 9, 1920

MARYBORO' CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, QUEEN'S CO.

MARYBORO' C.A.S.—a general store society.

Bomb, believed to be a Mills', exploded in window. A live bomb was found on pavement outside the shop window.

The local R.I.C. have done their best to discover perpetrators.

No witnesses; motive and perpetrators unknown.

No motive suggested. Excellent relations between police, military, and people.

Claim for £30 compensation has been lodged with county court.

(36)

November 11, 1920

ABBEYDORNEY CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. KERRY

*ABBEYDORNEY C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Manager wired I.A.O.S. on November 12—"Abbeydorney manager's residence burned to ground yesterday evening, 5.30, by armed, disguised men."

Damages estimated at £800.

This creamery is stated to have been attacked on October 18 by police, the creamery and other buildings fired, the manager assaulted, and considerable property stolen. (See Abbeydorney, October 18.)

(37)

November 13, 1920

BALLYMACELLIGOTT CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND DAIRY SOCIETY,
CO. KERRY

*BALLYMACELLIGOTT C.A. & D.S.—a central creamery.

Stated to have been attacked by military and police. Creamery burned.

Trade turnover, 1918, £38,160.

(38)

November 18, 1920

CLOUGHANEELY CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY, CO. DONEGAL,

CLOUGHANEELY C.A.S.—a general store society.

No details.

Press report says stores destroyed by fire caused by men stated to have been wearing uniform.

(39)

November 21, 1920

DUHARRA CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. TIPPERARY

DUHARRA C.C.—an independent auxiliary creamery supplying cream to Nenagh C.C. for churning.

Manager wired to I.A.O.S. on November 22—"Creamery burned to ashes last night." Press report of November 23 damage is alleged to have been done by uniformed men.

Estimated damage, £12,000.

(See Nenagh Creamery, November 4.)

Trade turnover, 1918, £14,852.

(40)

November 26, 1920

RAHEEN WORKERS' SOCIETY, CO. CLARE

RAHEEN WORKERS' SOCIETY—a general store society.

Store looted. Manager shot in Exchange Police Station, Dublin.

(41)

November 27, 1920

MILFORD CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. CORK

MILFORD C.C.—a central creamery.

Manager wired—"Flour mill, engine room, office, and butter burned on Saturday morning." Later report says mill and office completely burned out. Machines a heap of debris. Large quantities of grain destroyed. Fifty boxes of butter burned.

Personal evidence to prove fire was started by Crown forces.

This is the second attack (see November 8).

Claim for £12,000 compensation lodged.

(42)

November 27, 1920

CARNADOE CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERY, CO. ROSCOMMON

CARNADOE C.C.—a central creamery.

Manager wired on November 28—"Creamery burned down on Friday night."

Supposed to be reprisal for kidnapping a constable at Rooskey, four miles away.

Damage estimated at £10,000. Claim for compensation lodged.

Trade turnover, 1918, £9,011.

APPENDIX IV

The Labour Party and Ireland

The Executive Committee calls the attention of every constituent society of the Labour Party and of every local labour party to the very grave situation that has arisen in Ireland, menacing to life and property, destructive of order, and discrediting the British Government throughout the civilised world. The Parliamentary Labour Party, whilst losing no opportunity of exposing the scandalous breakdown of the British administration in Ireland, and of protesting against the iniquities involved in the unregulated military tyranny to which that country is now being subjected, finds itself powerless, in face of a mechanical Government majority, to effect any improvement. It is now for the organised Labour Party throughout Great Britain, whilst unequivocally condemning acts of brutality and violence, and murders by whomsoever committed, publicly to dissociate itself from responsibility for the deplorable maladministration exercised in the name, but, as it is confidently believed, against the wishes of the British people.

It will be unnecessary to do more than refer to repeated declarations of the Labour Party in favour of self-determination for Ireland—a policy in which the Party has never wavered. The British Cabinet by its present climax of failure has now plainly forfeited whatever rights it may have possessed to govern Ireland. The whole course of events of the past two years has demonstrated the futility of seeking to set limits to the Irish in their framing, for themselves, the constitution to which they aspire.

There is nothing for it now but—

- (1) To withdraw all the armed forces ;
- (2) To place the responsibility for maintaining order in each locality in Ireland (as in Great Britain outside the metropolitan area) on the local authorities themselves ; and
- (3) To provide for the immediate election, by proportional representation, of an entirely open constituent assembly, charged to work out, at the earliest possible moment, without limitations or fetters, whatever constitution for Ireland the Irish people desire.

The time has passed when any difficulty can be made about names and titles and forms and ceremonies, insistence on which only creates suspicion and results in misunderstanding. So far as Ireland itself and Irish affairs are concerned, the Labour Party is unequivocally prepared to allow Ireland to assume whatever form of self-determination the great mass of the Irish people desire, with whatever constitution, under whatever designation, and with whatever arrangements for local autonomy, and thereby allow Ireland to face its own difficulties in its own way—subject only to two conditions (which were accepted by the Irish Trade Union Congress at its meeting on November 16) that it afforded protection to minorities, and that the constitution should prevent Ireland from becoming a military or naval menace to Great Britain.

But self-determination for Ireland involves also self-determination for Great Britain. Whatever may be the form or the substance of the future relations between Great Britain and Ireland, there are, and must necessarily be, many matters (whether postal, fiscal, commercial, judicial, or what not) which on any revision of relations must be arranged by agreement. Moreover, Great Britain has its own obligations, not only to maintain the interests of its own people, but also to secure a proper protection both for Britons in Ireland and for any minority, whether religious, political, or geographical. There are, further, matters which are common to both the British and the Irish peoples, and must necessarily be dealt with in common, such as the policing and lighting of the narrow seas, and the protection of both islands against foreign aggression.

In respect of all these matters, the importance of which will be as apparent to the Irish as to the British, the Labour Party holds that it is a profound mistake to seek in any way to limit or fetter the Irish constituent assembly in its framing for Ireland of whatever constitution it desires. The appropriate method of defining and regulating the future relations of Ireland and Great Britain, of securing justice for minorities, and for providing for common interests and common services, is not by the constitution to

be framed for Ireland by its own constituent assembly, any more than by that which has grown up for Great Britain, but by an agreement (coming into force simultaneously with the new Irish constitution, and made binding by immediate ratification in statutory form by the respective legislatures), in which every necessary detail could be specified, and every desirable safeguard for either party effectively provided.

The Labour Party recognises that, in the negotiation of such an agreement, the potential bargaining power of Great Britain would be overwhelmingly superior to that of Ireland. This cannot, in the nature of things, be avoided. But the Labour Party believes that the Irish may now confidently rely on the British people not making any use of that inevitable superiority in bargaining power to exact, in the terms of the agreement, anything derogatory of the effective autonomy of Ireland. What the Labour Party appeals for is the most trustful and most generous settlement, confident that only in this way can the necessary appeal be made to the imagination of both peoples.

It is the intention of the Labour Party to use every endeavour to bring home to the British public the facts regarding the present administration of Ireland. The Parliamentary Labour Party suggested the appointment of an independent Commission to inquire into the allegations regarding reprisals. This suggestion was contemptuously refused by the Government. Organised labour has, therefore, decided to appoint a Commission representative of the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party to visit Ireland in order to ascertain the truth regarding the policy and methods of the British Government.

The Labour Party has also decided to conduct a great national campaign to enlighten the public on the facts of the Irish situation, and to present the labour policy outlined above. The Labour Party confidently calls upon its affiliated organisations, and upon all local labour parties, to bend their energies to the task of bringing peace and freedom to the Irish people.

An earnest appeal is made to all people of goodwill who realise the need for a campaign of public enlightenment on the Irish problem, and who desire the fulfilment of a democratic policy for the solution of Irish ills, to give financial support to this work. Contributions should be sent to the Secretary of the Labour Party, 33 Eccleston Square, S.W. 1.

A. G. CAMERON, *Chairman of the Executive Committee.*

F. W. JOWETT, *Vice-Chairman.*

ARTHUR HENDERSON, *Secretary.*

WILLIAM ADAMSON, *Chairman of the Parliamentary Party.*

J. R. CLYNES, *Vice-Chairman.*

H. SCOTT LINDSAY, *Secretary.*

APPENDIX V

Report of the Special Labour Party Conference on December 29

The special Labour Party Conference, called to discuss the Irish situation and to receive the Report of the Labour Commission of Inquiry sent to Ireland by the Parliamentary Labour Party and the National Executive of the Labour Party, was held at the Central Hall, Westminster, on Wednesday, December 29, 1920, Mr. Alex. G. CAMERON (chairman of the National Executive) presiding. There were nearly 800 delegates present.

CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

The Chairman, who was received with cheers, said that, on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, he had to apologise for calling the delegates together during what was termed the holiday season. He was sure that everyone present would recognise that, in view of the serious situation in Ireland, the Executive was justified in calling the meeting as early as it was possible and practicable after the return of the Commission which had been investigating there on the delegates' behalf.

The Irish Question was not a new question ; it was about the oldest political question that the Government of this country had been dealing with. The way the Government was dealing with it was the cause of the trouble, to a very great extent. But when one remembered that we had in the Government to-day men like Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. F. E. Smith (Lord Birkenhead), supported by Sir E. Carson, and the attitude they adopted only a few years ago towards Ireland, opposing what was then considered to be the sentiment of the Irish people, it was perhaps not surprising. Mr. Bonar Law, Sir E. Carson, and Mr. F. E. Smith were behind the Prime Minister and those who were trying to coerce Ireland, but could not coerce Ireland, and they had no excuse whatever—indeed they ought to be ashamed of it—for trying to throw any blame on the representatives of democracy in that country.

The manner in which the Irish Secretary (Sir Hamar Greenwood) had answered questions on Irish affairs which were put to him from all parts of the House, not only discredited the Government, but reflected discredit on the House of Commons. Sir Hamar Greenwood had always evaded the truth ; he had, as a matter of fact, discredited every statement put forward by the representatives of Labour. The representatives of Labour in the House of Commons appeared to be powerless in the face of the mechanical majority which supported the Government ; consequently they decided, owing to information which they were getting from quite independent sources, that they would send to Ireland a commission of their own, who would make inquiries on the spot with regard to outrages and reprisals.

These outrages and reprisals, it should be remembered, were not of yesterday's doing ; the outrages had been going on for a period of three or four years. It was not only the destruction of life that one had to deplore at the moment ; it was the wanton destruction of economic Ireland. It appeared as if the Government were trying to perpetrate on Ireland what the Government did eighty or ninety years ago. Then it was thought by the leading politicians of this country that a famished Ireland would be a peaceful Ireland, and that in a state of starvation Ireland would never be inclined to revolt. All our history was full of selfishness as far as the Government of this country in Ireland was concerned.

And to-day what did we find ? We found them endeavouring to destroy the economic resources of Ireland, the co-operative movement having been specially singled out. Over forty creameries, which had been run by the co-operative movement, had been attacked ; many of them had been burnt down, and the lives of civilians had been lost. Shops and factories had also been destroyed ; indeed, they did not stop at destroying property of all descriptions, and looting the contents of factories and workshops. They had even held up persons in the streets in the broad daylight and robbed them of whatever money they possessed. That was a known fact. The members of the Commission had themselves seen men held up in the streets of Cork and Dublin. He would ask them to go with him in their mind's eye just for a moment to a little village by

the sea, a village where Sinn Fein did not predominate as far as the mass of the people were concerned, but where labour predominated. Imagine a labour member of the council, who was sympathetic with Sinn Fein, but not actively engaged with it, being roused at two or two-thirty o'clock in the morning and asked the simple question whether he was a Sinn Feiner, or a leader of the Labour Party, and replying that he was a labour leader but sympathetic with Sinn Fein, and being shot on the spot, the perpetrators of this deed then driving away as if nothing had happened.

Or let them go into another small cottage on the hillside, where a father and mother lived with their young son and daughter. Imagine them being roused and dragged out of bed in the early morning, and the father being questioned by a person in uniform. On being asked where his son was, he replied, "In the British Army, at present in Mesopotamia." "But you have another son?" he was asked; the father replied in the affirmative, and immediately the lad shouted from the room upstairs, "Yes, dad, I am here." Thereupon they went up to the bedroom and instructed him to come out at once, as they had some questions to put to him. The mother implored them not to take away their lad, but the boy said, "It is all right, mother; I will be back in a few minutes." He did not, however, return, and after the lapse of two hours the father went out and found his son lying in a field after having been shot. (*Shame!*) Shame—it was more than shame!

Take another case, not in a rural district. Let them imagine a man living in a small cottage with his wife and two little babies, and the wife's mother and brother. They were roused out of their beds. The father inquired what was the trouble, but before they had time to collect their thoughts a brute in uniform rushed up the stairs and shot the husband dead. The mother was there with her two little babies, one of them seriously ill. She screamed and warned the others. Then the man who had shot the husband found the woman's brother, a boy, crouching in a corner of the little bedroom, and deliberately shot him in the mouth. There was a wife, with two little babies, left to mourn the loss of a father and husband, and the loss of a brother. And all because of the lack of discipline—the loss of control over what were called the Auxiliaries and the "Black and Tans"—the loss of all human feeling on the part of those men, and on the part of those who allowed them to act thus.

Now, it was not necessary to say that the British people, if they knew of those facts, would not tolerate them for five minutes; but the unfortunate thing was that it was very difficult to acquaint the British people with those facts. He held in his hand the Report of the Labour Commission to Ireland, and he made bold to say that it would be most difficult to get people to believe all there was in that Report, because it was the most serious indictment against the methods adopted by the British Government in trying to coerce Ireland that had ever been placed before the British public. It was because of that fact that those present would be asked to-day, in order to assist in spreading the facts with regard to Ireland as broadly as possible, to go back to their various districts and arouse British public sentiment against the present Government, in the direction of compelling them to desist from the inhuman outrages that were being perpetrated on the Irish people.

The Irish people had been struggling for freedom for 600 or 700 years. The Irish people had come to this position, that they wanted peace, but they did not want a peace that would mean Ireland in pieces. Those present must not run away with the idea that the men who were behind Sinn Fein were wild, excited, irresponsible individuals. They were nothing of the kind. The men and women behind Sinn Fein to-day were amongst the best women and the best men in Ireland, and they numbered easily eighty per cent. of the population. The Commission were told, when across there, that the people of Ireland, whatever their political opinions might have been in the past, had now come to this conclusion—that they could not rely on a word that this Government said. Hence they said there was only one thing for the Irish people to do, and that was to have faith in themselves, and through Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein movement had taken a good many to itself. It was not a war growth; it was a growth of the last fifteen or twenty years. It had arrived where it was to-day because of the failure of politicians to settle Irish questions on the floor of the House of Commons. They lost faith in the representatives that they were sending across here, because they knew quite well that the promises made to them from time to time were promises that were

always being broken. They were sick and tired of the make-believe that had been going on on this side of the Channel. They told the Commission that they were sick of the investigators and the committees that went to inquire into their affairs. The people of this country ought to know by this time what Ireland wanted, and all that Ireland wanted was to be left alone to look after herself. That was proved by the fact that under Sinn Fein the courts that were in operation there—the courts of justice—received greater recognition and did more good than the courts that were in operation under our Government. The people had absolute faith in themselves. They had absolute faith in the representatives they had chosen—call them Sinn Feiners or anything else. He had heard the Prime Minister once say that a country that could place seven million men in the field, that could sustain a war for over four years, and that could successfully emerge from the greatest war ever known, must eventually beat down the opposition that was in Ireland. The Prime Minister meant beat it down by physical force. Those were not the words of a great statesman; those were the words of a bully, backed up by other bullies. The Irish people knew quite well that, as far as physical and material forces were concerned, if such forces were used against them, they would have little chance physically. They might be conquered physically for the time being, but spiritually they would never be conquered.

The freedom of Ireland, as understood by the Irish people, must come sooner or later, and the sooner it came the better it would be for the people on this side of the water, as well as for the people of Ireland. As a result of the treatment that had been meted out to Ireland, Great Britain's reputation was suffering. Other countries knew all that was going on. The Government might try and censor the Press as much as they liked on this side of the water, but they could not do it in America or in Europe. Everybody was getting to know what was going on in Ireland; all the principal newspapers had representatives there and full reports were being sent. The result was that, not only the Government, but the people also were discredited. It would be their fault if they allowed this to go on. He said to-day, on behalf of the Executive Committee and on behalf of the Commission that went to Ireland, that Ireland should be allowed to get on with her own affairs, and she would prove that she could do it better than any section outside Ireland. We must not try to coerce, and we must not bully her people. If the methods adopted there by the "Black and Tans" were not ended, the day would come when those methods would operate in this country also. He therefore asked those present to do all they could to rouse the freedom-loving spirit of this country against the Government in their outrageous methods towards Ireland.

A DELEGATE asked why a general conference of the trades union delegates had not been called, so that they could have sent representatives with the Commission to Ireland.

THE CHAIRMAN said that they had not time, as they wished to get the matter through as quickly as possible; besides, there were many delegates present who attended the trades union conferences.

THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

Mr. Arthur Greenwood (Secretary of the Labour Commission) said, in formally presenting the Report to the Conference, that the text in the hands of delegates would be revised, certain omissions would be repaired, and further photographs would be included. The Commission trusted that the Conference would, through the affiliated organisations, do all that they could to put copies of the Report into the hands of the workers of this country. The Report was a moderate and balanced statement. It was an under-statement of the condition of affairs existing in Ireland to-day. But they believed the truth to be so terrible and so convincing that they felt that moderation in the form in which they prepared the Report would carry more weight than if they had issued an hysterical document. The Report was a Report of people who had tried to set down honestly and in moderate language the results of their inquiries.

He had to deal now more particularly with what were called "reprisals." Mr. Henderson would deal with the activities of the Commission in another field of work—the possibility of bringing about peace negotiations. "Reprisals" was a bad term. It was a term which covered almost any kind of crime or violence that might be perpetrated by the forces of the Crown in Ireland.

It was part of a vicious circle. It would be remembered that, on the outbreak of war, the hopes of the Irish people were disappointed by the Government, and that the resulting bitterness provided a new stimulus to the Sinn Féin movement. The development culminated in the rebellion of 1916, and the unfortunate treatment of that incident by the British Government. The rebellion was followed by the imprisonment of hundreds of Irishmen, who were kept in prison without any charge being laid against them. That, again, was followed by the suppression of meetings, by the suppression of newspapers, and by a thorough policy of coercion and repression. The Irish people smarted under that treatment for two years before being driven in desperation to a policy of retaliation. Their action might be interpreted as "reprisals" upon the "outrages" of the British Government. Some people in Ireland made attacks upon the police. The police, losing their courage, resigned in large numbers, at the rate of 300 or 400 per month, and in their extremity the British Government, seeing itself without a police force, immediately diluted the Royal Irish Constabulary with men from Great Britain.

These men were known by the title of "Black and Tans," and some of them gloried in it. They were men accustomed to violence, for most of them were ex-soldiers, but they had not the sense of discipline which they gained in the army during the war. Worse than that, however, the Government got together something approaching a White Guard—he meant by that the Auxiliary Division of the R.I.C.—men who were ex-officers, perhaps ex-gentlemen; men whose sympathies were not with the workers in Ireland, men who were military adventurers prepared to gain their living by any kind of wild venture. Those men were let loose in Ireland. They began the horrible era of reprisals on a large scale. The Government did two things—it always blustered, and then, when driven to say something, it not merely defended those reprisals, but justified them as being necessary; or alternatively, it denied that the incidents had ever occurred.

The Labour Party in the House of Commons asked for an inquiry, and that inquiry was refused. They decided, however, to have their own inquiry, and they had had it. The Government had not a leg to stand on. The Government was either responsible for reprisals, or it was not responsible for them. If it were responsible for reprisals deliberately and directly, then it was guilty of frightfulness and inhumanity without parallel in the history of this country. If, on the other hand, it was not responsible for reprisals, it was guilty of the crime of letting loose on Ireland people who were beyond control. It let loose those men over whom it had no real control whatever, who went roving about the country and doing much what they liked, and their acts were being defended and justified by the Chief Secretary for Ireland in the House of Commons. He, the speaker, did not blame the individual "Black and Tan," or the individual Auxiliary cadet; he blamed the British Government as being primarily responsible.

They were responsible for a whole series of crimes, for "reprisals" covered a multitude of sins. There was first what he thought was a most inhuman form of reprisal—compelling the whole Irish people—men, women, and children—to live in an atmosphere of sheer terrorism. That terrorism had been created by the display of military force, of policemen and cadets, armed with rifles and revolvers and all the paraphernalia of war, such as wire-entanglements, sand-bags, tin hats, &c. Everything had been done to reduce the people to a state of utter terror. The Commission had had brought to their notice cases of deliberate burning, where men had gone out in lorries supplied with petrol with which to make their work more effective.

They had had cases of looting on a large scale, and of theft, as Mr. Cameron had said, from people in the streets. They had had cases of deliberate and wanton destruction of the homes of the people. Mr. Denis Henry, in the House of Commons, at the very time the Commission was in Ireland, denied the charge made with regard to the wanton destruction of property. He said that such statements were entirely untrue. That, however, was a lie. The members of the Commission themselves saw scenes of wanton destruction of houses and shops which made them feel ashamed of the name of Englishmen. They had irrefutable evidence in Cork itself of men who had been robbed in the street. They made a close examination of one case, of a commercial traveller, who was robbed of his month's salary and other money amounting in all to nearly £100. That was a case of loot beyond doubt. They had heard of a man who was actually robbed of the only two coppers he had in his pocket.

Then they had deliberate cases of cruelty perpetrated on men, women, and children. They had seen men who had been beaten literally black and blue by forces of the Crown. They had examined in detail an ex-sergeant-major, with fourteen years' service, who, two nights previous to their visit to the town, was set upon by five policemen and bruised and beaten over the whole of his body from head to foot. That was not an isolated case : that went on day by day.

And worse even than that was the shooting which was taking place in Ireland. They had heard with horror the story of the murder in Dublin of a number of British officers and civilians. It was a horrible thing, but it was no more horrible than the shooting of men in their beds night after night. Trade union officials, for no crime that anybody knew of, save perhaps their trade unionism, had been shot at the doors of their cottages. Men had been shot in the sight of their families with no cause shown. Cases had come to their knowledge of men shot in mistake for other men. The police did not ask many questions. They simply asked your name. If you were unfortunate enough to possess an Irish name like Murphy, you might get shot out of hand in mistake for another Murphy.

But there were even more brutal things than that. There was the case of a man whom they saw, and who, in the presence of responsible citizens of his town—the mayor and members of the Corporation—declared how he was called from his bed one night and taken out and, when crossing the bridge over the river, was asked whether he would be shot or drowned. He said, "For the love of God, shoot me, because I cannot swim." They said, "Then we will throw you into the river." They threw him into the river, but fortunately the tide was low. When he fell into the river they fired two shots at him. Then one of the "Black and Tans" said to the others, "He has gone where MacSwiney has gone," and they left him, as they thought, drowned and shot. He (Mr. Greenwood) would not tell them who that man was, because the man would be shot if he did so. These things were, naturally, things which it was difficult for them to believe. They were put in the Report, and they challenged the British Government to deny them. He was willing to say that the Commission would be prepared to make a public apology if it had made any untrue statements in that Report, but they had a right to ask that the Government should prove to the hilt that what they had said was untrue, or alternatively make way for better and cleaner men.

Let them consider for a moment the effect of these reprisals. Not only were we bringing discredit upon ourselves before other nations, but we were, through the British Government, forging a weapon in the Auxiliary police that might be used against the workers of this country. The health of the Irish people was being seriously affected. Think of the effect upon men, women, and children in Ireland of the atmosphere of tension which pervades the country. Think, again, of the effect of the events in Ireland upon its economic life. The events which have taken and were still taking place were slowly starving the Irish people. Then think of the effect of these reprisals upon the spirit of the people. Mr. Lloyd George told them that he "had got the murder gang by the throat." It was not true that he had got anybody by the throat in Ireland. If he succeeded in breaking the spirit of a section of the Irish people, he would have done nothing to be proud of. He would have committed a gross crime against humanity. But the effect of this policy was to harden the fibre and strengthen the spirits of the men who were now at the head of public affairs in Ireland, and to make impossible the success of any policy of force.

The Commission had put forward this Report to initiate the campaign which would become general throughout the length and breadth of the country. They asked for the assistance of those present. They asked them to remember the Irish trade union officials, and the rank-and-file members, who were smarting under injustice and bitterness to-day, whose homes had been violated and whose families were reduced to a state of terror, and to remember that many trade unionists had been shot in cold blood. They asked those present to remember the women and children of Ireland living under the black cloud of terror day by day. The question was urgent. Every day brought information of new horrors in Ireland ; almost every hour some new thing was perpetrated against the Irish people. Something must be done, and done quickly, and the Commission asked that Conference to assist them to bring the truth home to the people of this country. Mr. Cameron had said that the people did not know the truth, and that was a fact. He (Mr. Greenwood) believed that once the people of this country knew the truth, they would destroy the horrible monster of violence and murder which stood now over the bleeding body of the Irish nation.

MILITARY POSITION

Brigadier-General C. B. Thomson (Military Adviser to the Labour Commission) said that on the principle that a cobbler should stick to his last he proposed to confine his remarks to the military situation in Ireland. In point of fact there was no military situation in that country, for, although it was perfectly true there were a large number of men wandering about with lethal weapons in their hands, that life and liberty were in danger, and that two armies were engaged, there were no war-like operations in the strict sense of the term. But there was something far more deadly than any pitched battle could be to the life and health of the country.

He proposed to deal first with what were called the forces of the Crown, or, fallaciously, "the forces of law and order," in Ireland, and he would begin with that portion of the British army which had the misfortune to be quartered in Ireland in these troublous times. He thought he was expressing the views of the Commission when he said that the first thing that struck them in regard to these forces was the extreme youth of the soldiers—some of them mere children. They were not at all like those hard-bitten, beer-drinking soldiers that constituted the British army in his early days. On the contrary, they looked as if their favourite diet was cake or chocolate. The reason why he laid stress upon that was that, in spite of their inexperience and innocence, and in spite of the fact that they were only half grown, these boys were asked to perform the duties of veterans—duties which should only be confided to highly disciplined troops. Their duties consisted of supporting the Auxiliary forces—the police—when called upon and defending themselves when attacked, and in consequence they were frequently in conflict with the population. They assisted at scenes of arson, pillage, and murder, the effects of which on fully grown men would be bad enough, but which were peculiarly pernicious in the case of growing lads. He was far from attempting to justify the presence of the army of occupation in Ireland; he thought it was criminal, but what he said was: "Don't blame these boys, don't blame their officers, but put the blame where it is due—put it upon the policy which has turned Ireland into a place where violence reigns supreme; where a man's house or his church are not secure from violence; where 50,000 growing lads are being demoralised and spoilt." That was the story of the British army in Ireland.

Turning next to the R.I.C., with which were associated the so-called "Black and Tans," he did not suppose that anybody who was acquainted with the record of the R.I.C. in the past would care to denounce, in general terms, that body. They might have had many defects, but at least they were men of Irish birth. Unfortunately a new element had been added, and it consisted of Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Welshmen. They were ex-soldiers. They were men who were habituated to violence in thought and in deed, and he did not think he was exaggerating when he said that at least one per cent. of them were men of very evil character. Unfortunately that small fraction had changed the whole body of the R.I.C. The "Black and Tans" were men who would always have the most disagreeable, the most sinister, associations in the minds of the Irish people. They were the most provocative element in that unhappy country. He did not suppose any member of the Commission who was present at Limerick Junction, after they had left Cork, would forget the scene at that station. There were some fourteen members of the R.I.C. on the platform, and at least two of them were under the influence of drink. It was one of the most revolting spectacles he had ever seen. These men, clothed in a uniform which should be the symbol of law and order, were behaving like swaggering bullies. They had the platform at their mercy because they were armed. He did not suppose that there was anything which brought home to them, whether Englishmen or Scotchmen, the realities of the Irish situation more clearly than that did, and they (the members of the Commission) felt ashamed of their country. And they were not the only cause of provocation.

Day and night lorries full of men were careering up and down the main streets of the cities and the country roads, their occupants singing, or rather shouting—

"We are as happy as happy can be;
We are the boys of the R.I.C."

What would the members present think if our constables, the men to whom we applied for help and information, behaved like drunken rowdies returning from a revel? Was that the majesty of law? (Cries of "No.") That was the state

of things in Ireland to-day. A famous lawyer in the reign of James I said of Ireland : " There is no nation under the sun that doth love equal and indifferent justice more than Ireland." We were not giving them equal and indifferent justice. We were subjecting them to the most unlimited provocation, we were implanting in their hearts feelings of hatred and revenge, and a burning sense of injustice and wrong.

Referring to a much more recent growth—the Auxiliary Division—he said that Sir Hamar Greenwood, when he saw the Commission in Dublin, proudly reminded them that this division was recruited from ex-officers. He (the speaker) happened to be an ex-officer himself and knew their failings, but these complimentary remarks about officers were one of the legacies of the great war. They had all seen some very disagreeable stories in the newspapers about individual cadets, and they themselves, or certain of them, did see a drunken cadet lurching down the main street of Cork, who would have been an object of disgust and pity—if he had not had a revolver in his hand. There were undoubtedly in the Auxiliary Division a small number of degenerates, and there was no blinking the fact that some of these unfortunate men were the victims of the war and were suffering from nerve strain, but they were not an appreciable proportion of the Auxiliary Division. They had been foisted on to Ireland by a Government that was trying expedients. He was expressing his own personal opinion, but he believed it was shared by a good many of his comrades, when he said that the vast majority of the cadets in the Auxiliary Division were educated and intelligent men, but they were inflamed by political passion and they had a strong anti-Catholic bias. They were the authors of those reprisals which revealed the existence of a well-thought-out plan. They never got an impartial investigation into the activities of this division as a whole.

He had no special love for the Government, but he did not believe the Government were really behind these reprisals. (Cries of dissent.) He should say that Lloyd George knew nothing about it ; he knew no more about the real state of affairs in Ireland than he did about conditions in Central Europe ; and he allowed these things to go on because he was the tool of a powerful clique who were directing our Irish policy. His suspicions might be wrong, and he sincerely hoped they were, but all he could say was : Why did the Government, under these conditions, refuse an impartial and public investigation into reprisals ? At any rate this Auxiliary force was an utterly undemocratic body. It was a class weapon forged in Ireland which could be used in England also. He asked the delegates present, as believers in democracy, to ponder over this.

Lastly, he wanted to refer to the Irish Republican Army. It was not really an army. It was an organisation. It was not an army which could concentrate, and if it did concentrate it could be defeated without difficulty. It contained men of very varied degrees of education, and even varying degrees of conviction. It contained men of all faiths. They were formidable because they were intangible. They were everywhere all the time and nowhere at any given moment. It was a very formidable force for that reason. There was no doubt that if the Government cared to use 200,000 troops it could drive this movement underground, disperse the majority of the volunteers, and capture the leaders, but he wanted to tell them that these leaders were standard bearers, and if they fell others would take their place. They might be members of a " murder gang," and they certainly were dangerous. All intellectual people who resorted to force were dangerous. If Mr. Bernard Shaw were not a pacifist he would be dangerous. When a Government tried to rule a clever people it had to be honest, but unfortunately our Government had been decidedly dishonest in regard to Ireland, and, it might be, extremely stupid. Its cause was one of the greatest and most splendid in the world. What was going on in Ireland now was a fight for freedom. It seemed unthinkable that the British people should allow their Government to perpetuate this dreadful strife. They could still avert its terrible consequences—it was not yet too late.

In conclusion, he said they would find ample evidence in this Report that, so far from " having murder by the throat " in Ireland, Mr. Lloyd George had got it by the hand. It was a question of cause and effect. Reprisals succeeded outrages and outrages succeeded reprisals in a vicious circle. Both reprisals and outrages were the effect of causes of seven centuries of misgovernment, culminating in our own days in most terrible provocation and repression on a gigantic scale. These things had been committed

with our money and in our name, and a civilised world was looking on aghast. People might say they had never been told the truth, but this Report did tell the truth and it was most unpleasant reading. It was always hateful to speak evil of one's country, but sometimes it was a sacred duty. There were quite a lot of people in this country who did not believe anything was evil which did not happen to themselves. He trusted that was not their idea. His call was for them to carry the fiery cross of truth throughout the land. There was a cancer in the body politic to-day, and if they loved their country and were jealous for its honour they would probe deep to root it out. Then, and then only, would they be able once again to use great words like "liberty" and "justice," and get rid of the apathy and indifference to moral issues which had recently been so prevalent.

IRISH FRATERNAL DELEGATES

Mr. Seamus McPartlan (Vice-Chairman of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress) said that the Report before them was a record of the work done by their delegates in Ireland, but it did not give them as full an idea of what was taking place as he could give. The war policy of the British Government included the shooting of women in a state of pregnancy and almost on the point of childbirth, the shooting of old parish priests, and many other incidents of that sort. While the people here in England might not be prepared to accept that as their war policy in Ireland, they (the Irish people) did accept it as the war policy of the British Government.

With regard to reprisals, they in Ireland did not look upon them so much as reprisals as of the general war policy of the British Government. While they carefully drew the distinction between the Government of this country and the people of this country, he wanted to say that the workers in Ireland, anyhow, did not believe that that was the policy of this country. They knew very well that the general body of the people of this country was not in favour of a policy of that kind. Of course they recognised at the same time that there was an amount of apathy amongst the workers here, and it was necessary to have vigorous propaganda in order to stir the workers up. They had to try to educate the great mass of the people in this country, and it ought to be their policy to force the people to take action. They were either too ignorant or too damned dense. They would not mind him talking straight; he recognised that it took a pretty heavy hammer to drive anything in. They, on their part, were prepared to give all the help possible in order to educate the people here on the true condition of affairs in Ireland.

He thought that, in justice to themselves, as well as in justice to the Irish people, they should try to force this Report home, because they recognised that the "Black and Tans" and all the other forces—because they must recollect there had been no "police" in Ireland since 1914; they were all military practically—were intended to shoot down, not only the Sinn Feiners, but also the Irish trade unionists. They would shoot down anyone, because a man who was paid to shoot would shoot anything he was told to shoot. And it was not a new thing, because they had been shot down before. He remembered that a couple of years or so ago they in England had all been afraid to leave their jobs for a better one, but in Ireland they had a little more spirit and, he was going to say, a little more intelligence. They knew in the early stages what these things would result in.

As an Irish trade unionist he wanted them to accept the Report and go up and down the country and rub it home. There was only one party in England that the Irish people placed any trust in—and he was not saying that the Irish people placed much trust in them—and that was the British Labour Party. But they of the Labour Party in Ireland, in spite of any differences they might have, were still prepared to join with their countrymen in this country, in whatever way they thought best, in bringing about an honourable settlement. They in Ireland were with their British comrades in this matter, but if that could not be achieved, they were prepared still to go on.

Mr. Thomas Johnson (Secretary of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress) said that Mr. Arthur Greenwood, in presenting the Report, had drawn attention to the fact that it was both restrained and moderate. He could endorse that thoroughly, and he was at a loss to understand how men like Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Henderson were able to indite so restrained and moderate a statement. He was satisfied, however, that it was wise for them not to allow their pens to run away with them. It was wise because it would be impossible

to carry conviction if they said anything like one-tenth of the truth. In regard to this matter of reprisals, they in Ireland were not inclined to lay very much stress upon it. In this country they were now beginning to understand, what it seemed impossible hitherto to make them understand, that British power in Ireland was entirely the power of armed force. When they came to understand that, they had then to answer the question whether the British Labour Party, which had the prospect some day of entering into power in this country, were prepared to hold any nation merely by force of arms. (Cries of "No.")

General Thomson, in his reference to the responsibilities of the Government, seemed somewhat to cloak their responsibility for reprisals. It might be he was right. It might be that Mr. Lloyd George, or Sir Hamar Greenwood, or Mr. Winston Churchill had no responsibility for reprisals in Ireland. But when they came to look through this Report they would see certain references with regard to entry into houses by armed men, and in the Appendix there was a copy of an official packing note which referred to certain masks used for night attacks and sent by the military authorities—by Mr. Winston Churchill—from some part of England to some part of Ireland. Let them imagine themselves sleeping quietly in their homes with wife and children and hearing a loud knocking at the door, and then a number of armed men with masks rushing in. (The speaker here exhibited one of the masks.) That was a mask supplied by Mr. Winston Churchill to frighten men and women into terror, and manufactured in some part of England. It was very carefully prepared and bore the broad arrow, showing that it was official. That was just one little thing which showed the complicity of the British Government with what was called crime.

There had been previous examples in history, he had no doubt, of this kind of repression. He understood there was something like it going on in Hungary at the present time, and they had heard of the Cossacks in the days gone by. But there was nothing worse in any part of the world than the calculated terrorism that was obtaining in Ireland to-day. There was only one alternative to this undisciplined terrorism if they wanted to keep Ireland in fear to-day, and that was disciplined terrorism, or as Lord Hugh Cecil had said, "a progressive, calculated policy of terrorism, a steadily increasing policy of economic repression" to bring the Irish people to a certain state of mind. The three alternatives before them were liberty for the Irish people, the present state of undisciplined terrorism, or disciplined terrorism, and it was the duty of those present, as the responsible spokesmen for British labour, to take these three alternatives into consideration and to decide that they were going for liberty, and when they had decided on that, to take their courage in both hands and go for it. This was not the time for calculated policies if they were going to do anything to protect themselves, and incidentally to give Ireland freedom. They had got to enter into this campaign with the fiery cross, because right was right and they must follow the right despite the risk.

No one had described here to-day the very frequent cases that had been reported in the House of Commons of men attempting to escape and being shot. There had been at least twenty such cases reported during the last few months—men arrested, surrounded by the military with arms, and shot by the military or police, and the excuse was given that they were attempting to escape. Whatever might be said of the Irish people, they were not such fools as to try to jump out of a lorry when surrounded by twenty armed men. There was the case which had been reported of two men who were handcuffed with both hands behind them, back to back, and shot in the lorry for attempting to escape. (Cries of "Shame.")

In Ireland they accepted this state of things as the final throw of the Government. They could not do much worse and retain any semblance of respect, and when they had done this freedom must come. MacSwiney had taught them how to die, and many of his colleagues had taught them how to suffer. Ireland had learned the lesson which had been taught her, and which she had learned before, that victory would come, not to those who inflicted the most pain, but to those who were able to suffer most. Whatever men might think of the "mere Irish," there was one thing which sustained them and would continue to sustain them, and that was that they had perfect confidence in the triumph of right—not a mere theoretical confidence, but an actual living faith in God—and that was going to sustain them right through to the end. The

Government might do in the next fifty years what they had done in the last fifty years—reduce the population by one half; but the remaining half would still demand liberty, and not only in Ireland but in the lands beyond the seas. That was a factor they had to take into account.

He had been reading during the last two or three days a book he had picked up in London a few years ago, and it was very interesting and could teach them a lesson. It was a volume of Bohemian propaganda for England, the agitation for an independent Bohemia, and practically every word of their demands could be applied to Ireland to-day, and every appeal they made could be re-echoed in Ireland. The independence of Bohemia was recognised by the British Government, the French Government, the Italian Government, and the American Government, and the independence of Ireland would eventually be recognised by all these peoples.

In closing, he said that they did not want there to be any misunderstanding in respect of Irish Labour's attitude. It was British Labour's attitude, and they were willing now, as they always had been, to shake hands with British labour, and he hoped they would assist one another in the international fight. Here they were fighting against the powers of imperialism and capitalism at home, and they in Ireland were prepared to go with them, but they hoped British labour would be prepared also to work with them in their fight for freedom. They stood, as they had stood from the beginning of the war, for the self-determination of all nations. That was their demand in Ireland—for the right to self-determination without limitation—and they were not going to have any self-deception or any deception with each other. If the right to self-determination were given to Irish labour to-morrow, they would determine for a Workers' Republic in Ireland. They stood for a Workers' Republic, and if they could achieve the right to self-determination fully eighty per cent. of the workers would demand a republic. It might be that the majority of the people would hold a different opinion, but they would abide by the majority, whatever it was. But they were not hauling down their flag when they said that they would accept the Labour programme, for Labour in this country also stood for the right of self-determination. They intended to assist in every way possible to propagate that political right, and they believed that betterment would come when Ireland was granted that liberty.

RESOLUTION ON REPRISALS

Mr. J. Bromley (Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen) then moved the following resolution:—

That this Conference approves the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry by the National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Labour Party, and deplores the lamentable condition of affairs in Ireland as revealed in the Report of the Commission and in many organs of the Press; it approves the demand by the Parliamentary Labour Party for an immediate judicial inquiry into the question of reprisals; and the Conference now challenges the Government to disprove the statements of the Labour Commission by such a judicial inquiry, and to deal with those proved guilty of such serious charges as their offences deserve.

In doing so he said they were asking this Conference to challenge the Government to take this Report which they had issued and to make it, if they wished, the subject of a judicial inquiry, but always with a guarantee for the safety of the lives of those who would come forward to give evidence. He did not want this Conference to throw out the challenge in a mere flaunting or truculent manner, but as people in this great movement who felt from the bottom of their hearts that this was disgrace and dishonour to England. They wanted the challenge to be in that spirit, because denials had been made in the House of Commons, denials had been made in the Press, and even in part of the Irish Press, that certain things which had appeared in the papers had occurred. It was in view of these denials that they had gone out and sought the proof for themselves, and he told them that much of this evidence was sworn evidence—and after all, whether they be Catholics or Protestants, the oath was regarded seriously—and the evidence they gave was such that he never expected to find such things being perpetrated even in Ireland. He was well aware that the difficulty would be to get the ordinary, kind-hearted English man or woman to believe what was set out in this Report. He therefore appealed to every one of them to go carefully through the Report, to take it back to those they represented, and in guarded language to

tell what they had read. It was difficult, he knew, to be guarded. It was difficult for himself, having heard and seen what he did in Ireland, to speak in a guarded manner, but he would ask them to go back and put it in this way: That this document was issued by the British Labour Party, and every one of them was jealous for the honour of the Party, and they were not putting forward anything which could be controverted by a Government inquiry. They challenged the Government with a desire to prove that every word in this Report was correct.

This Report would be the property of the world, but what could be said of a nation which fought for the rights of small nations, which assisted in freeing Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and other nations, and yet in a small part of the British empire declined to grant the rights of small nations. He had seen in Ireland things which would be unbelievable if he had not actually witnessed them himself. He had seen a man in British uniform in the streets of Cork after dark, amongst men, women, and children, with loaded firearms, and drunk. This man was going down the street staggering, with a loaded revolver. He (the speaker) accosted him, and the man told him he had just stampeded a crowd. No doubt this would convey to their minds that where that was possible anything and everything was possible.

Take the Croke Park affair, where the military authorities had decided on what was called "a military operation." That was to surround the football ground with a cordon of military, then to inform the whole of the people present that they must pass quietly out through the turnstile and be individually searched. How they were going to search all those people he did not know, and what good it would do was not apparent, as it would be the easiest thing in the world for anyone to drop anything he wished to get rid of before getting to the turnstile. But the operation itself was legitimate. Now what happened? Before the military had time to surround the whole ground, before the officers in command of the troops had had sufficient time to carry out their instructions, lorries of "Black and Tans" arrived on the ground and began to fire indiscriminately into the crowd. (Cries of "*Shame!*")

These things should make them take some action. It was Britain's honour that was at stake—*our* honour. In the sight of humanity the British people were responsible for allowing these things to be done in their name. He recited one or two cases which went to prove, to him at least, that their visit—although they were treated courteously and assisted by the Crown forces—was not by any means appreciated by the people whose conduct they were going to inquire into. There were men who did not dare to give evidence, although they could have done so. They went to a priest in one town, a man of high standing and an educated man, and he said: "When Great Britain went to war in 1914 I joined up. I served with the army because I believed, bad as the British Government was, the German Government was worse. I also believed it was a war to end war. Now," he said, "I am disillusioned." He further said: "I could tell you the whole of the occurrence you ask about. I was there first and saw it all, but I shall not tell you a word about it, for do you realise that, for less information than that, we are liable to have our houses burned over our heads, or to be shot in our beds at night?"

He knew that reprisals had been visited upon those who had attempted to assist them, and he could recount something which gave him reason to believe it. Mr. Lysaght came and gave them evidence and a day or two afterwards he was arrested and thrown into prison. On one occasion officers searched Mr. Henderson's bedroom, and then went into the bedrooms of the rest of the party and did the same. They were looking for a man who had shortly before been giving information to members of the Commission. Then in Cork, a business man, not connected openly with politics, had his place ransacked. He came to the Commission to give evidence and was arrested at their hotel. They had a clerk of the Transport Union who acted as stenographer to the Commission. He was drawn up to a lorry in Cork to be searched, and he said: "You can search me if you like. I am here with the British Labour Commission." In reply to this the officer said that that was all the more reason why they should search him. Cork Town Hall was put at the disposal of the Commission, and it was burned down in the general conflagration, as it was said, but the Cork Town Hall was far from the burning area—nearly half a mile from the other burning and on the other side of the river. He was firmly of conviction that Cork Town Hall was burned down because it had been lent to the Commission. Their motor-

drivers, who had special military permits in their pockets to return, after dropping the party, were seized outside Cork by the military and were all thrown into prison at eight o'clock on Saturday night, and kept there until two o'clock on Sunday, when they were released. Spare tyres and other things were taken from their motors, and their clothes—even their night clothes—were taken, and these men only got away with the money the Commission had paid them because the man who had got it had put it into the sole of his stocking.

As to the White Guard, they were actuated by class hatred. He had got close to a lorry loaded with them, and to say the least of it they were not such a crowd as he would like to invite to a wedding party. They had to stamp this out for the honour of the British army and for the honour of British men and women, for the honour of the nation, for the honour of the great Labour Party, and for the honour and good of humanity. Let them think how they would appear in the eyes of the whole world when these things were known. They had either to stamp this out or go down to history as a most supine and dishonourable people.

Mr. W. Lunn, M.P., seconding the resolution, said that they had heard a good deal that morning about reprisals, but there was another resolution, and an important one on the Irish Question, and he believed there was a desire for discussion on the Unemployment Question before they left the Conference. But he wished to touch upon one side of the Commission's work. They felt it was their duty to visit the homes of the people in Ireland. He would like to say that he saw not a single instance in Ireland of a mother who was less affectionate than any mother he knew of in England. Did they blame these women for having that affection? Was it a crime for a mother to love her children and to protect her son? (Cries of "No.") They did not think so, but it was a crime in Ireland. He remembered one home where a mother had several sons. Her house was raided times without number in order to find these sons. They did not find the sons; but on one occasion the forces of the Crown appeared at the door, and the father would not let the mother get up on that occasion, although she begged him to do so, as he was a delicate man suffering from consumption. He would, however, go down stairs, and when he got to the door—the name of the street could be given—when he got to the door, without any question he was shot down, and the forces that night drove away. The Commission saw the mother two weeks afterwards, but she was not prepared to give her sons away—not for anything. She was still as devoted to those boys, even after the loss of her husband, as she was before. She asked the members of the Commission to remain in the house, and said that if they would she would guarantee a raid before twelve o'clock that night, if they kept the light burning. If a mother could not tell where her sons were she was subject to all kinds of indignities, and possibly her home might be burned down or the furniture destroyed. He knew that most labour men were family men, and he appealed to them, realising their love of their own children, that they should put a stop to the torture of mothers that was going on in Ireland to-day.

Mr. Lawson and himself were going to a particular office in Dublin the night before they left the city, and on the way they walked along the street and, not knowing where the office was, he got hold of a lad and asked him the way, and the boy jumped fully a yard. That was the condition of every boy in Ireland at this time. It was terrorism. The British Labour movement was a powerful movement, and if it chose it could put a stop to incidents like that. Mr. Lawson and he had been sent to Cork to see what had happened there, and an account of it was given in their Report. They had been the week before into some of the shops which had been destroyed.

They stood by that Report in every detail, and they had asked time and again, and they asked now, that a judicial inquiry should be made into these matters, so that the truth could be known.

But what was the position in the House of Commons? He would give them only one incident—the Balbriggan affair. A month ago, in the course of a speech which Mr. Asquith made, he referred to Balbriggan. He was followed by Sir Hamar Greenwood, who, in the early part of his speech, pointed across to Mr. Asquith and said: "Has the right honourable gentleman been to Balbriggan? No, he has not; but I have." He had no need to offer any further argument; his supporters in the House of Commons accepted

it; but he (the speaker) challenged Sir Hamar Greenwood to say that he had ever seen the victims. He never saw the cottages that were burned down at Balbriggan, except those on the main street, and he (the speaker) had it on the best authority that Sir Hamar Greenwood flew through Balbriggan at more than twenty miles an hour in a motor, in order to address recruits three miles away. It was up to them, as they went away from this Conference, and in the campaign that was to follow, to raise a storm of indignation in this country on the question of Ireland. He believed it was within the possibility of this movement to create a different feeling from that which was prevalent in the country to-day, and he hoped that this Conference might be the means, not only of showing the people what the reprisals really were, but also of laying the foundation for peace in Ireland in the future.

The resolution was then put to the meeting and carried unanimously.

The Conference thereupon adjourned for lunch.

PEACE WITH IRELAND

The Conference was resumed after the luncheon interval, when the Chairman called upon Mr. Arthur Henderson to move the second resolution,

That this Conference approves the declaration of the Parliamentary Labour Party with regard to outrages conducted in the name of Sinn Fein and reprisals by servants of the Crown; it expresses its satisfaction with the efforts of the Labour Commission of Inquiry to secure a cessation of all violent and provocative actions, with a view to the opening of peace negotiations between representatives of the Government and the elected representatives of the Irish people:

The Conference is further of opinion that a possible ground of negotiation and settlement is afforded by the following policy put forward by the British Labour Party in the House of Commons, and approved by a Special All-Ireland Trades Union and Labour Party Congress on November 16:—

- (1) *Withdraw all armed forces.*
- (2) *Place the responsibility for maintaining order in each locality in Ireland (as in Great Britain outside the Metropolitan area) on the Local Authorities themselves; and*
- (3) *Provide for an immediate election, by proportional representation, of an entirely open Constitutional Assembly, charged to work out, at the earliest possible moment, without limitations or fetters, whatever Constitution for Ireland the Irish people desire, subject only to two conditions, that it affords protection to minorities, and that the Constitution should prevent Ireland from becoming a military or naval menace to Great Britain.*

Mr. Arthur Henderson, M.P., said that the resolution dealt with the second part of the Report. In the first place, it dealt with the attitude of the Parliamentary Labour Party to outrages by whomsoever those outrages had been committed. The Commission felt, especially following the events that took place on that sad Sunday morning, that it was quite impossible for them as a Parliamentary party to remain silent, and the party unanimously passed a resolution expressing its condemnation and abhorrence of those outrages, whether committed in the name of Sinn Fein or by the forces of the Crown. The present Conference was invited—and he hoped it would have no hesitation in responding—to take up exactly the same position.

The resolution then went on to express its satisfaction with the efforts of the Labour Commission to secure a cessation of all violent and provocative acts. He wished the delegates to know that they did not take up the position of seeking the cessation of acts of violence in order that they might remain inactive, or that the position and policy of this country and its Government toward Ireland and the Irish people should remain as unsatisfactory in the future as it had been in the past. They took up that position in order that they might prepare the atmosphere in which negotiations might be entered upon as the result of a condition of truce, which negotiations, they ventured to hope, would lead to a settlement of the Irish problem consistent with the aspirations of the Irish people.

The Report gave details of negotiations, or at any rate of efforts to prepare the atmosphere for proper negotiations, for which the Labour Party had made itself responsible, and the first observation he had to make with regard to it was that they attempted to do everything consistent with the Scarborough resolution. Let there be no mistake about that. Those who were present at Scarborough would remember that there was a resolution and an amendment. The amendment dealt with the question of Home Rule, and by a small majority it was defeated. The resolution dealt with the question of finding a solution for Ireland by means of a Constituent Assembly, and it had to be on such lines as would satisfy the aspirations of the Irish people and not in any way wound their susceptibilities. When they came to the third reading of the Government of Ireland Bill in the House of Commons, the Parliamentary Party unanimously decided that any speech made had to be consistent with the Scarborough decision. The speech was made by the Chairman of the Parliamentary Party, who would follow him in seconding the resolution.

Within a very few days there was held in Dublin a large and representative conference of about 1,000 delegates, representing the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, and the conclusion which that very important and representative conference reached is set forth in the Report of the Commission. It adopted the policy declared by the Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party on behalf of the entire Party—and was it going too far to say that for the first time, for many years at any rate, the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress and the British Labour Party—the British Parliamentary Party—and, might he venture to hope, the Trades Union Congress?—were in actual line, going step by step for a settlement of this vast and long-standing question? At any rate they could say that, so far as the political side was concerned, the British and Irish Labour Parties were working in unison.

They were not satisfied, however, to leave matters at that point. As they were told a little earlier in the day, they endeavoured to get a satisfactory decision on the question of reprisals. He (Mr. Henderson) was requested by the Parliamentary Party to ask for an inquiry in the House of Commons. As usual, it was made a vote of censure, and the Prime Minister, elected to Parliament by the working-class vote of this country, brought in his followers to swamp everybody else, and they did not forget to do it.

Finally, the Labour Party determined to hold their own inquiry, and in preparation for that inquiry they took every step possible to obtain the fullest information. The steps they took were referred to in the body of the Report. He would not stay now to deal with them; suffice it to say that the Commission, whose Report was presented that morning, went to Ireland. On their way to Ireland they were presented with what they could see was a challenge, in the shape of a letter by Mr. R. N. Sweetman, Sinn Féin M.P. for North Wexford, that appeared in the public Press. He suggested an immediate conference between the Irish Labour Party, the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, the Irish Peace Conference, and their own Commission of Inquiry. The Commission felt that a public challenge like that could not be ignored, and they did not ignore it. If the delegates desired to find out the attitude they assumed towards that challenge, or invitation, they had it in the statement, by way of a reply to Mr. Sweetman, which he (Mr. Henderson) issued as Chairman of the Commission immediately they arrived in Ireland.

The following morning they got into conference with their friends of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, and he wished to make this point unmistakably clear—that the Commission was in no way influenced in drawing up its Report by Sinn Féin leaders. From the moment they entered Ireland to the time they left they were assisted by their friends who represented the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress. He did not know that he need trouble the meeting with all the details of the inquiry they made; the delegates would be able to read that for themselves when they returned home. Mr. Adamson and he had the pleasure, or the privilege, of going to Mountjoy. He did not know if they knew what Mountjoy was. They went to Mountjoy Prison and spent over an hour with Mr. Arthur Griffith. They also went to the palace of the Archbishop of Dublin, and he (Mr. Henderson) personally motored eighty-five miles for the purpose of discussing the situation with Cardinal Logue, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. They saw individually many business men and were in the closest possible touch with the most influential trade union leaders in

Ireland; and whatever section of the people they came in contact with they found one message upon their lips, and one message only, and it was this: "Tell the British people that we are tired of this strife, and want peace, provided that we can have peace with honour."

At the close of these inquiries it was agreed that Mr. Adamson and himself should at once return to London, leaving the remainder of the Commission to go on with the inquiry into reprisals. They returned to London and sought an early opportunity for bringing before the Prime Minister the peace side of the position as they had found it. They had a long talk with Mr. Lloyd George, and they expected that he might—in fact he told them that he might—again desire to see them the following night. When, however, they inquired for that appointment they were told that it was off. He (Mr. Henderson) then left for his constituency to keep long-standing engagements—the first since his illness. Subsequently Mr. Adamson, seeing the Prime Minister on other business, was told that Mr. Lloyd George would give his reply to them on the following day.

It was important that every delegate should remember this, for, in his opinion, that reply was the turning-point in the negotiations which the Commission had been conducting. That reply was to the effect that whilst the Government were prepared to agree to a peace policy, they were also prepared, and that with great determination, to pursue a policy of intensified repression and the imposition of martial law. What was to be expected by any man who knew anything of the present situation in Ireland, who had not forgotten the lessons that the past history of Ireland ought to convey to any intelligent being? It was that he should come to the conclusion that any peace effort must now cease under such a policy as Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, announced in the House of Commons on that day.

However, so anxious was the Commission to carry on its efforts towards peace, that they sought an interview with the Prime Minister. They met Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law, and the Commission had a full opportunity of stating its case. They told the Prime Minister that they (Mr. Henderson and Mr. Adamson) had not gone back to Ireland as they had intended to—and he could tell the delegates from experience that it was not an inviting place at this moment. They had intended to return to Ireland to join the remainder of the Commission and join their Labour friends in Ireland in putting through the scheme they had suggested as likely to lead to the official negotiations they wanted. They told the Prime Minister that they could not go, and that they had dropped their idea of issuing the proposed appeal.

He ought to mention that the scheme they had put up was a three-fold scheme—first, that the Commission, in the name of British labour, should issue an appeal to the Irish people and to the British people and to the British Government; that that appeal should be made as strong as possible, with a view to bringing about a cessation of acts of violence or other provocative acts, say, for two or three weeks. The intention was the creation of an atmosphere favourable to peace negotiations, and they had hoped there would have been such a response—and he believed that had the condition been forthcoming on this side and on the other side there would have been such a response—that before many days were over the second stage would have been reached.

The second stage was that three representatives of the British Government and three representatives appointed by the executive of the Sinn Fein movement should meet at "a wayside inn," as Lord Rosebery used to say many years ago—should meet at a half-way house and negotiate a truce to last for a period of several months.

Immediately that had been settled, a public meeting would be convened of the seventy-one representatives elected at the last General Election. Why he said seventy-one representatives was because of what the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons in answer to a supplementary question that he (Mr. Henderson) put to him after the Trade Union Congress held in Dublin. He asked the Prime Minister if their friends in that Congress did not adequately meet the condition he had always laid down, namely, that he wanted to meet somebody who could speak in the name of the Irish people, and Mr. Lloyd George said, "No, they were on the industrial side"; and he went on to suggest that the only people who could "deliver the goods" were the seventy-one Sinn Fein representatives. Therefore their proposal was that the

third stage should be six representatives of the British Government and six representatives elected by Sinn Fein, who were to have freedom of movement. The whole thing, of course, would break down unless they had it and those men, one of whom was hunted in the hotel where the Commission were staying and sought for even under his bed, were given liberty of action and freedom of movement.

They told the Prime Minister that they had discontinued their efforts, and in the Report the delegates would see the last letter, which was written only a week ago and sent in the name of Mr. Adamson and himself to the Prime Minister. He would read only one or two sentences—

When you received the Labour Commission on Ireland, you suggested that we might continue our efforts in the direction of peace and the cessation of the policy of violence. As the result of your statement to the House of Commons on Friday, December 10, the Commission were in considerable doubt as to whether the representatives of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress would join in the appeal which, in the more promising circumstances existing when the Commission was in Dublin, they and the heads of the Catholic Hierarchy had promised to do, provided that there were reasonable assurances that such an appeal would meet with a response on both sides.

Notwithstanding our doubts, the Commission, after our interview with you, Mr. Bonar Law, and Sir Hamar Greenwood, felt that they must act in harmony with your suggestion to go forward with our peace effort. Accordingly, we communicated with the Executive of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, who have replied to the effect that, judging by your speech of Friday, December 10, there seems to be no prospect of the Government making an immediate response to the suggested appeal, and that in existing circumstances for them to associate with the Labour Commission in any such appeal would be calculated to do more harm than good.

Continuing, Mr. Henderson said they could do no more, and, in their judgment, the responsibility for the fact that the negotiations had gone no further rested with His Majesty's Ministers. Their friends were willing to carry out their part of the bargain, but the Government, by its announcement of martial law and intensified repression, led them to believe that they were not willing to carry out their part of the bargain. For the time being—and might he venture to hope only for the time being?—their efforts to secure an atmosphere in which peace negotiations might be begun with promise were at a standstill.

He did not know that he need take up any more time in moving this resolution. The Parliamentary Labour Party had been fully justified, he thought, in the course it had adopted. It had brought the Labour Party into absolute harmony. Last night they had the first meeting of the first joint committee that had ever been set up between the Irish and British nations. That committee consisted of his friend on the right (Mr. Adamson), four representatives of the Parliamentary Labour Party, four representatives of the Parliamentary Committee of the Congress, four representatives of the National Executive, together with representatives of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress. They wanted to see that committee continued. They believed that the closer they came together the greater would be the promise of success for all their efforts.

As his final word in submitting this resolution, he wished to say that they had not abandoned their efforts to secure peace. They hoped that this resolution would be passed by such a large majority that they might resume those efforts. He was quite in agreement with what had been said that morning as to the disastrous effects that would follow reprisals, not only in the British Empire, but in all the civilised countries of the world. If they were to continue their efforts, do not let them make any mistake about this, that they could only hope for success by endorsing the policy which the Commission had set forth, a policy that would not wound the susceptibilities of the Irish, but would be consistent with the aspirations of the people of Ireland. Their policy must ever be based upon the will of the Irish people. That was the policy they had been struggling to carry through, and if the Conference carried this resolution it would be the policy by which united British labour would stand all over the world. They would go forward with their work in the hope that, through the joint committee, through the Commission, through the great national campaign that

they were going to launch at Manchester on the 17th of next month and close in the Albert Hall on February 15—the greatest campaign, he hoped it would be, that had ever been held in England—by playing with clean hands a spirited game, success would ultimately reward their efforts.

Mr. W. Adamson, M.P. (Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party), said he had very much pleasure indeed in saying a few words by way of seconding the resolution that had been moved in such admirable terms by Mr. Henderson. They had found that the great bulk of the Irish people were looking to the Labour Party as their final chance of finding an honourable and satisfactory settlement of their troubles. He thought that British labour and Irish labour would not disappoint the expectation of the Irish people, but their united efforts would be continued and used effectively on their behalf. During the brief time that they were in Ireland there was a real disposition on the part of a large section of the Irish people for a truce, which would give some weeks during which a great effort might be made to negotiate a more permanent settlement.

At the same time it was made perfectly clear to them, particularly by the responsible leaders in Ireland, that such negotiations must be carried on upon terms of equality—in other words, that the Irish representatives must be given the same standing in those negotiations as the British representatives would have. The Prime Minister had stated, not in private conference but across the floor of the House of Commons, that they were quite willing to have negotiations with a view to finding a basis for peace, but there were a number of persons to whom they could not give safe conducts in order to proceed with the negotiations.

In the second place, he stated that concurrently with the negotiations they were going to apply martial law over a part of Ireland. All he (Mr. Adamson) wished to say regarding the Prime Minister's reply to the efforts of Labour towards finding an honourable and satisfactory solution of the difficulty was this: He could have understood it if it had come from certain other members of His Majesty's Government, but he could not understand such a solution coming from the Prime Minister. (Cries of "*Oh*" and "*Why?*") He could not understand such a solution coming from the Prime Minister when he realised that the Prime Minister was himself a Celt. For those who knew the Celtic quality knew that there could only be one reply from a Celtic people to a statement of that kind. That reply had already been given, but he (Mr. Adamson) held in his hand the reply of the Irish women to the Prime Minister, in which they pointed out that the proclamation of martial law incited to crime. The women of Ireland, it said, considered it "a crime for any young Irishman of military age not to carry arms"; and the women of Ireland "consider it even a greater crime for any person of Irish blood to refuse to harbour and assist our brave soldiers. . . . They will prove no less true to their Irish soldiers than Nurse Cavell proved to English soldiers." That was the reply of a Celtic people to the proclamation of martial law—a reply that might have been expected by the Prime Minister, who himself was a Celt.

No, the soul of a nation could not be destroyed by repression. The Labour Party's policy for finding a settlement was the only feasible and sensible policy that could be carried out. He would like to point out further that our method of governing Ireland could not continue. Other nations were already beginning to ask, "What are you going to do with Ireland?" If we were not careful this matter would pass out of our hands. We could not be members of a League of Nations, and take a leading part in such a body, and expect that that body would apply its principles to all other nations but ourselves. The day would come when they would seek to apply the principles of that body to our treatment of the Irish people, and that day would come quicker than many people expected. So far as he personally was concerned, he would regard that as a discreditable thing to the British people. The British people ought to take time by the forelock and have this matter settled with the Irish people without outside interference.

The British people were a just people, and it was the duty of all present to take up a stand and let the British people know the exact position with regard to Ireland. He hoped they were going to take this matter up in a spirit of the greatest enthusiasm, and make the meetings they were arranging throughout the length and breadth of this country the medium through which our people would be brought into actual touch with the situation in Ireland. He was certain of this that, if they were able to

impart all the information that this Commission could make available for their speakers, they would change public opinion in this country. They would change public opinion to such an extent that the Labour Party would be able, much abler than they had been in the past, to influence the political situation, to bring sufficient pressure to bear, even upon this reactionary Government, to compel them to face their duty to the Irish people, and to come to an honourable and a satisfactory settlement. If we came to an honourable and satisfactory settlement, he had no hesitation in saying that the generous mind of the Irish race would quickly forget the horrors of the past and would join with us and live in peace and amity in the future, living as one section of the British people ought to live with another.

A DELEGATE, on a point of order, referred to the remark of the Chairman at the commencement of the Conference that no amendments would be allowed. He wished to know if this resolution was going to be allowed to be put with the knowledge that there was disagreement regarding it in the Conference.

THE CHAIRMAN said that the voting would decide the amount of disagreement amongst the delegates. But the Conference was not going to be rushed into taking a vote immediately, and if anyone present would like to say anything on the resolution, for or against it, this was their opportunity.

A DELEGATE asked why it was found necessary to preserve the third part of the resolution dealing with armed forces.

THE CHAIRMAN replied that, with reference to the condition laid down stipulating that Ireland must not become a military or naval menace to Great Britain, as a matter of fact not only was there agreement on this side of the water as far as Labour was concerned, but there was agreement on the other side of the water as far as Labour was concerned. There was no desire on their part that Ireland should become a menace.

A DELEGATE : Then why is it put here ?

THE CHAIRMAN : It is to meet public superstition and prejudice.

MRS. H. M. SWANWICK (Richmond Labour Party) said she had been speaking a great deal about the country since she came back from a tour in Ireland about two months ago, and belonging as she did to the Labour Party, she had found universally the question asked : "What does the Labour Party do in the House of Commons ?" She had replied : "If the country would send a larger party to the House of Commons it would be able to be more effective." At the same time she could not disguise from herself that the men who, in the House of Commons, had fought the battle for Ireland most effectively were not members of the Labour Party. It was such men as Commander Kenworthy, Mr. Devlin, and Mr. T. P. O'Connor who had done most. She wanted the country to realise that the Labour Party stood for justice to Ireland, but it was very difficult to get people to realise that when they had not got the banner of the Labour Party on the Irish question carried as high by their own representatives as it was by men of other parties.

A DELEGATE remarked that they had heard a good deal about the Celts. He also was a Celt, and he was rather anxious to know how Mr. Henderson proposed to carry on his propaganda through the country.

THE CHAIRMAN called the attention of the speaker to the fact that he was not speaking to the resolution.

THE DELEGATE said he only wanted to remark that, if they were to have a campaign throughout the country, he hoped that liberalism would be included.

MR. A. E. STONEHAM (Paddington Labour Party), alluding to what had been said with regard to a military or naval menace to Great Britain, said he would like to ask the proposer and seconder to eliminate both from the resolution. They were going to trust to a Government which they knew had not a word of truth ; no reliance at all could be placed on its word. Even supposing that this was agreed to by the Government, the Government would have the armed forces on its side, and that would be all the argument necessary for again repeating the horrors that were now going on in Ireland.

MR. HENDERSON expressed the hope that one tangible result coming from this Conference would be that the way would be paved for a settlement of the trouble. He would like to remind those who had put the question about a

military or naval menace that what had been accepted by a thousand delegates in Dublin ought to be accepted by delegates here. (A voice : "*Certainly not.*") Their friend said, "Certainly not." He had tried to point out in his speech that they were seeking to walk in line with the Irish Labour Party. What was good enough for them ought to be good enough for this Conference. He hoped they would show striking unanimity by accepting the resolution exactly as it stood, and he believed they would be doing a great day's work both for British labour and for Ireland.

The resolution was then put to the vote and carried by an overwhelming majority.

THE CHAIRMAN intimated that that completed the Conference as far as the Irish question was concerned. He hoped they would return to their districts and lend all the aid they could in conducting the campaign which was about to be initiated against the most vicious outrages that were ever perpetrated by one nation against another. He begged them not to go away without feeling a sense of their responsibility in this matter.

SEARCHLIGHT ON IRELAND

Labour Deputation Starts its Investigations

CHARGE IN DUBLIN

From Our Special Correspondent

DUBLIN, Tuesday.—The Labour delegation commenced its inquiry to-day into the Irish conditions by receiving representatives of teaching organisations covering 16,000 primary, secondary and technical teachers in Ireland. The discussion turned on Irish education and the Government Education Bill introduced into Parliament last session. The salaries of teachers were also discussed, and were shown to be very unfavourable by comparison with those paid in England and Scotland. The deputation promised that the suggested amendments of the teachers' organisation would be sympathetically considered by a special sub-committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party when the Bill was again before Parliament.

Forced Police Service

The deputation then met the Irish Civil Servants, whose grievances they considered, especially in view of the recent attempt to force them to enlist in special police. They then visited the Irish Unionist alliance.

To-morrow the deputation will go to Thurles to confer with the Archbishop of Cashel.

Arthur Henderson, interviewed on his arrival, said that the majority of the organised workers in Great Britain were anxious for the solution of the Irish problem. Even before the war they strongly favoured the granting of a measure of self-government in harmony with the wishes of Irish people.

Henderson's Views

The opinion has been fully expressed that the politicians in England at present are badly informed as to the real situation in Ireland. Whatever changes the war has produced, British Labour could not remain uninfluenced by the tremendous change in Irish representation in Parliament. Many workers in Ireland are members of trade unions affiliated to the British Labour Party and unions with headquarters in England or Scotland. For these and other reasons the Labour Party decided it was essential for some of its members to come into direct contact with those capable of expressing the popular opinion on the immediate situation.

LABOUR REPORT ON IRELAND.

"Britain's Honour Has Been
Gravely Compromised."

REBELS GIVE UP THEIR ARMS.

There has been a considerable surrender of arms in Ireland, according to official statements, in response to the Government proclamation demanding such surrender.

Yesterday was the last day allowed for the handing over of firearms, and unauthorised possession of them will bring the punishment of death.

A special meeting of the Labour Party is to be held at the Central Hall, Westminster, to-morrow, to consider the report of the deputation which visited Ireland to investigate conditions there.

The Labour Report.

The final report of the Labour Commission to Ireland was issued this afternoon. The Commission state:—

"Even if only a tithe of the fires which have admittedly occurred in many parts of Ireland during the past few months were caused by Government agents the case against the forces of the Crown and the Government would, in our judgment, be amply proved."

"There are so many undoubted cases of looting and theft that the Commission must add these crimes to those of burning and destruction."

"We were filled with shame that in the name of law and order servants of the British Crown should be guilty of besmirching in the eyes of Ireland the honesty of the British people."

"The final solution of the Irish problem will not be found in a policy of violence or of vengeance. It will have to be found along the lines of conciliation and consent by the more enlightened method of negotiations."

"Government to Blame."

"Things are being done in the name of Britain which must make her name stink in the nostrils of the whole world. The honour of our people has been gravely compromised."

With regard to the Government's responsibility for reprisals the Commission state:—"We do not believe that the Government directly and definitely inspired reprisals and violence."

"The blame for the present situation does not rest primarily with the members of the Crown Forces but with the Government."

The report also states that "The Chief Secretary (Sir Hamar Greenwood) has identified himself with a policy which is a disgrace to the British people, and which we believe to be unparalleled in this country."

LABOUR'S DEMANDS FOR IRELAND ^{30/12/20}

**"Our Policy is Based on the Will
of the Irish People"**

"WE WORK FOR A REPUBLIC"
—TOM JOHNSON

Over three and a half millions of politically organised workers were represented at the Labour Party Congress on Ireland yesterday.

Tom Johnson, secretary of the Irish Labour Party, declared that Ireland would accept the suggestions of the Labour Commission as England's "final throw."

Remarkable unanimity characterised the proceedings, and resolutions were adopted demanding an immediate judicial inquiry into the question of reprisals, challenging the Government to disprove the statements of the Labour Commission, and setting forth Labour's solution of the Irish problem.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Labour as a great political force demonstrated in a striking and unmistakable manner yesterday its indignation at the terrible state of affairs prevailing in Ireland.

The report of the Commission which recently visited that unhappy country aroused intense indignation amongst the delegates to the special Labour Party Congress, and with it a determination to see justice meted out.

A MEMORABLE CONGRESS

Labour has had many big issues with which to grapple, and many congresses have gathered to express opinion on vital questions. But yesterday's

that the Commission's Report was moderate but true.

A dramatic declaration was made by Johnson, following his statement that Ireland would accept the Commission's suggestions as England's final chance.

"We are not hauling down our flag," he declared. "We stand for a Workers' Republic."

Bromley moved the first resolution, and William Lunn, M.P., seconding, urged that the movement was powerful enough—if it would realise it—to put a stop to the terrorism.

As one man the gathering rose and carried the resolution demanding an immediate judicial inquiry into reprisals, and challenging the Government to disprove the statements of the Commission.

Arthur Henderson, M.P., added to the Commission's indictment, in moving the second resolution, setting forth Labour's solution, by a vigorous condemnation of the Government.

LABOUR'S POLICY

"We have not abandoned our efforts for peace," he declared. "Our

TELL-TALE BOOTS

of temporary insanity. turned a verdict of "Guilty" during a re- MY, after hearing other evidence, looking to be confined shortly, and the It transpired that Mrs. Hunt is ex- and himself afterwards. utter, and that he would "do me in" and me. He said he could not bear to see through the window. He has threatened his revolver. I rushed out and jumped followed me and hit me on the head with and he threw me down some steps. He my head down on my chest. I struggled. husband's knee upstairs. He tried to pull After they had gone I was sitting on my had several visitors on Sunday evening. years, and lived happily together. We we last been married three and a half

range. on of the German Empire.—Ex 8 the 50th anniversary of the founda government to celebrate on January government has requested all the State

IN THE EVENING the centre of the celebration will be the Albert Hall. Suggestions for the programme have already been submitted, and, together with the question of the charges for admission, they will be considered at the next committee meeting. Meanwhile the organisers of local contingents are requested to call conferences in their own areas and to make their own arrangements. They should engage their own bands and get their own printing carried out. Further information will be given in the DAILY HERALD as the plans for the celebration are perfected.

LONDON TIMBER FIRE

SEVEN BUILDINGS INVOLVED

A serious fire, involving seven buildings, occurred early yesterday morning at Mansford-street and Nelson-street, Hackney. The premises in Mansford-street, occupied by a firm of timber merchants, were gutted out and the roof collapsed. The other buildings involved were less severely damaged, but a great quantity of water and sand had to be used to keep the fire in check. A pile of loose timber was destroyed, and the damage amounts to some hundreds of pounds.

HIS LAST WALTZ

M.C. DIES AT A DANCE

Officiating as master of the ceremonies at a dance at the Bierrot's Hall, Addlestone, on Tuesday night, James Weatherburn dropped to the floor and died as the music ceased playing for a waltz. Weatherburn had taken part in the waltz and observed to a partner that he didn't feel well.

SHOT BY BROTHER


BOY ACCIDENTALLY KILLED

Emlyn Davies, aged 18, of Waterton Mills, Bridgend, has died in the local hospital as the result of being accidentally shot in the stomach by his brother, Thomas John Davies, aged 16, a collier's assistant. Emlyn was watching his brother shooting at birds when he was struck by the shot.

CANDLE OATH

Interpreting in a case at Thames Police-court yesterday, a Japanese took the oath by blowing out a lighted

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